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ABSTRACT 
 
Gerald Alva Miller 
“Variables of the Human: Theoretical Utopianisms and Heterotopian Science Fictions” 
(Under the direction of Gregory Flaxman) 
 
My dissertation examines a diverse array of contemporary science fiction texts to explore 
the genre’s immanent relation to critical theory and to stage science fiction as its own 
form of theoretical work. In general, critics have argued that science fiction functions as a 
privileged genre for critical theory because its estranging settings engage the reader in a 
dialectical thought process by encouraging comparisons between the real world and a 
textual one.  But, recently, science fiction novelists such as William Gibson have 
eschewed estranging settings and instead written novels set in a contemporary milieu.  
Existing theories of the genre cannot accommodate such a transformation in the genre’s 
basic structure.  Thus, my project provides an account of the emergent relation between 
science fiction and critical theory that does not exclude such recent examples of the genre 
and that demonstrates how different sci-fi texts generate particular avenues of critical 
inquiry.  Each of the critical enterprises that I explore in this dissertation (gender theory, 
psychoanalysis, postmodern theory, and memory’s relation to film) represents a unique 
theorization of the human, its boundaries, and our theoretical attempts to understand it.  
My project comprises four major underlying goals.  First, it reconceptualizes science 
fiction according to a methodology that does not exclude recent mutations in the genre.  
Secondly, it depicts the manner in which science fiction should be considered a 
significant genre for literary and critical theory by elucidating how it functions as its own 
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form of theoretical endeavor.  Thirdly, it exhibits a new way of performing critical theory 
through the lens of literature; that is, it creates new possibilities for critical labor by 
demonstrating the radical kind of theoretical work that becomes possible only by means 
of genre structures.  Finally, my dissertation illustrates why science fiction serves as one 
of the most compelling meditations upon the nature of the human and the all too human 
need to ascribe discrete values to that term.  Indeed, my project argues that all critical 
theory—like all science fiction—essentially concerns the definition of the human and the 
attempts to theorize other states such as the non-human and the posthuman.  Therefore, 
my project intervenes in a variety of critical discourses while simultaneously commenting 
upon the nature of critical theory itself.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE HETEROTOPIAN GENRE:  
SCIENCE FICTION AS CRITICAL THEORY 
 
Yet among all the distractions and diversions of a 
planet which now seemed well on the way to 
becoming one vast playground, there were some 
who still found time to repeat an ancient and never-
answered question: “Where do we go from here?” 
 -Arthur C. Clarke’s Childhood’s End1 
 
This suggests that far from being one code among 
many that a culture may utilize for endowing 
experience with meaning, narrative is a meta-code, 
a human universal on the basis of which 
transcultural message about the nature of a shared 
reality can be transmitted. 
-Hayden White2   
 
There are no facts, everything is in flux, 
incomprehensible, elusive. 
 -Friedrich Nietzsche3 
 
In his preface to Difference and Repetition (1968), Gilles Deleuze explains 
philosophy in relation to certain genres of fiction: “a book of philosophy should be in part 
a very particular sort of detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction.”4  Deleuze 
argues that a philosophical treatise concerns a certain kind of cognitive work, a kind of 
work in which the author and the reader engage in the process of either seeking truth (as 
in detective fiction) or creating concepts (as in science fiction).5  In essence, this project 
seeks to demonstrate how science fiction performs this function itself; that is, it generates 
its own theoretical concepts that concern the variables of the human.  In particular, this 
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dissertation will explore four different types of such variables: the different 
characteristics that define humans (i.e., identity categories, such as gender), the forces 
that motivate them (desire), the social formations that dominate them (power structures 
such as discipline and control), and the power of memory that acts as the primary means 
by which humans order reality and generate discourse.  Ultimately, this project will 
expand upon and invert Deleuze’s statement by demonstrating how critical theory strays 
into the realm of science fiction and, simultaneously, how science fiction is always 
already critical theory. 
Over the last decade, numerous critics, such as Carl Freedman and Steven 
Shaviro, have made similar comparisons between critical theory and science fiction.  For 
instance, Freedman argues that science fiction and critical theory share certain “structural 
affinities” because “both speculate about the future.”6  This affinity relies upon a “shared 
perspective”; as he explains, “what is crucial is the dialectical standpoint of the science-
fictional tendency, with its insistence upon historical mutability, material reducibility, 
and, at least implicitly, utopian possibility.”7  Such critics see science fiction as a 
conceptual form of narrative that inscribes a kind of space that allows them to examine 
“concepts that have not yet been worked out.”8  Shaviro cites both Deleuze and 
Freedman’s observations on this relationship when he explains how he considers his own 
theoretical work to be a kind of science fiction.  Katherine Hayles takes her criticism in a 
slightly different direction and claims that literature (i.e., science fiction) and scientific 
discourse create a reciprocal circuit of influence upon one another:  
Nevertheless, I want to resist the idea that influence flows from science 
into literature.  The cross-currents are considerably more complex than a 
one-way model of influence would allow […] Literary texts are not, of 
course, merely passive conduits.  They actively shape what the 
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technologies mean and what the scientific theories signify in cultural 
contexts […] Culture circulates through science no less than science 
circulates through culture.  The heart that keeps this circulatory system 
flowing is narrative—narratives about culture, narratives within culture, 
narratives about science, narratives within science.9 
 
For Hayles, science fiction provides a means of interrogating the influences of science, 
particularly cybernetics, upon our ontological and epistemological concepts of humanity 
and knowledge.  She uses science fiction texts to trace the history of cybernetics, which 
has drastically revised the way we understand thought, identity, and being.  Hence, like 
Freedman and Shaviro, Hayles uses science fiction as the basis for staging her own 
theoretical endeavors.  If so many critics have adopted science fiction as the foundation 
of their theoretical explorations, then we must ask why the genre provides such fertile 
ground for critical endeavors. 
 
I.  Towards a Theory of a Genre 
For the better part of the 20th century, science fiction’s pulp heritage hindered its 
acceptance into the pantheon of canon-worthy genres.  In order to legitimate science 
fiction, critics of the genre began to trace out histories, to generate theories of the genre, 
and to demonstrate the possibilities inherent within the genre’s form and content.  In the 
struggle for science fiction’s literary recognition, sci-fi critics began sketching 
genealogies that stretched back to a variety of “legitimate” authors in order to argue the 
case that science fiction represents a natural outgrowth of pre-existing literary modes, 
particularly those that dealt with the fantastic, the uncanny, and the marvelous, to use 
Tzvetan Todorov’s designations from The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary 
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Genre.  Todorov famously defines the fantastic as a genre of literature that functions at 
least partially in the realm of the ambiguous.   As he explains,  
in a world which is indeed our world, the one we know, a world without 
devils, sylphides, or vampires, there occurs an event which cannot be 
explained by the laws of this same familiar world.  The person who 
experiences the event must opt for one of two possible solutions: either he 
is a victim of an illusion of the senses, of a product of the imagination—
and the laws of the world then remain what they are; or else the event has 
indeed taken place, it is an integral part of reality—but then this reality is 
controlled by laws unknown to us.  Either the devil is an illusion, an 
imaginary being; or else he really exists, precisely like other living 
beings—with this reservation, that we encounter him infrequently.  The 
fantastic occupies the duration of this uncertainty.  Once we choose one or 
the other, we leave the fantastic for a neighboring genre, the uncanny or 
the marvelous.  The fantastic is that hesitation experienced by a person 
who knows only the laws of nature, confronting an apparently 
supernatural event.10   
 
Thus, the fantastic only exists as long as the nature of the events remains unclear.  For 
example, Edgar Allan Poe’s short story “The Black Cat” (1843) never reveals whether 
the stories events derive from purely natural causes or whether there is actually some 
demonic force at work, and hence it is a story that remains in the realm of the fantastic.  
More recently, the films of David Lynch, particularly Lost Highway (1997) and 
Mulholland Drive (2001) never reveal whether the images that the viewer sees represent 
nothing more than the products of deranged states of consciousness or whether they 
actually provide us with glimpses of supernatural forces or other dimensions of reality.  
In general, science fiction plays with these categories in a variety of ways, but the genre 
transcends such categorizations by basing its stories on rational, scientific extrapolation.  
Hence, like Todorov’s concept of the fantastic, science fiction exists in a liminal space 
between realism and fantasy, and it is this space between the words “science” and 
“fiction” that harbors the genre’s critical capacity. 
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 To argue for the legitimacy of the genre, critics began tracing these tendencies 
back to Romantic and Victorian authors of nineteenth-century Britain: Mary Shelley, 
H.G. Wells, and Jules Verne provided respectable figures to which the modern genre 
could be compared.  Meanwhile, in 19th-century American literature, critics cited 
undeniably literary forebears such as Charles Brockden Brown, Edgar Allan Poe, and 
even Nathaniel Hawthorne.11  Perhaps more radically, certain critics, such as Darko 
Suvin, have argued that the genre’s origins lie with even more antiquated sources: 
Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726; 1735), Sir Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), 
Francois Rabelais’s Gargantua and Pantagruel books (1532-1564), or even all the way 
back to the comedies of Aristophanes.  Many of these critics attempt to establish 
overarching theories of the genre that allow them to create strict demarcations of the 
genre’s boundaries as well as to provide insight into its theoretical possibilities.  To 
validate the genre, these critics intend their theoretical explications to act as litmus tests 
by delineating certain texts as genuine science fiction while labeling others as “inferior” 
genres such as fantasy, horror, or myth.12  However, definitions of science fiction became 
increasingly difficult as the twentieth century progressed.  For instance, the postmodern 
novel immediately problematizes any strict demarcations of science fiction by virtue of 
its inclusion of various science fictional elements: the works of William S. Burroughs, 
Thomas Pynchon, John Barth, Don DeLillo, Kathy Acker, Italo Calvino, David Foster 
Wallace, Mark Z. Danielewski, Angela Carter, Julian Barnes, and Jonathan Lethem all 
feature science fiction tropes as part of the otherwise realistic ontological framework of 
their novels, yet their works are seldom classified strictly as science fiction. 
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As science fiction has increasingly achieved ever more minimal recognition as a 
legitimate form of literature while simultaneously becoming an ever more slippery genre 
to define,13 critics have increasingly turned away from examining the origins of the genre 
or defining its traits and instead moved towards investigating why science fiction seems 
to increasingly represent a privileged genre for contemporary critical theory.  By 
adopting a similar approach to the genre, I intend to bypass the hopeless morass of 
taxonomic genre definitions and to instead argue that science fiction represents a 
specialized form of narrative that generates the potential for new kinds of critical work.  
Science fiction’s basic nature resides in the particular kind of narrative space it creates—
it is a heterotopian genre, a genre that exposes the reader to radical difference in a manner 
that destabilizes our normal concepts of reality—it inserts the marvelous into our reality 
in order to depict the manner in which every one of our stabilizing visions of reality 
ultimately proves to be nothing more than a fantasy.   In Archaeologies of the Future, 
Fredric Jameson argues, “literary realism is a trick and a deceit, which has to collapse as 
soon as the idea of fiction dawns on its reader.”14  Science fiction highlights the  
“constructedness” of reality as such—the constructedness of science fact 
fully as much as of social institutions, the construction of gender and of 
the subjective fully as much as that of the objective categories through 
which we intuit the allegedly real world […] everything we have hitherto 
considered to be natural and organic becomes as manufactured as the 
cityscape itself: and this is certainly a radical defamiliarization that much 
of Science Fiction has attempted to convey.15 
 
In general, science fiction has achieved such defamiliarizations of reality by means of the 
ontological construction of worlds or future civilizations that imagine reality otherwise, 
but recently such overarching theories of the genre have begun to crumble in the face of 
mutations in science fiction’s basic aesthetic. 
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Certain contemporary science fiction authors have begun to produce texts that 
problematize the basic aesthetic of the genre by abandoning its conventional, fantastic 
plot tropes and instead choosing to write narratives that occur in realistically depicted 
versions of the present or even the past.  For example, William Gibson’s two recent 
novels (Pattern Recognition [2003] and Spook Country [2007]) or Neal Stephenson’s 
historical epic Cryptonomicon (1999) all operate in worlds that seem indistinguishable 
from the real present in which the audience and the author dwell or even in the historical 
past, yet they still concern the effects of information technology in a manner akin to 
science fiction.  These texts break with older definitions of science fiction as a genre 
based in estrangement.  Nonetheless, most would still maintain that these texts represent 
works of science fiction, so what marks them as instances of the genre if there is nothing 
inherently unrealistic or otherworldly in the spaces they depict?   
In order to explore the changing face of the genre, my project will divide science 
fiction into two overriding tendencies: estrangement and realism.  These two tendencies 
always overlap, but one will generally dominate the aesthetic of a particular text.  I will 
term the traditional science fiction texts that privilege estrangement over realism “science 
fictions of estrangement,” which I will distinguish from the above-mentioned “science 
fictions of the present” that eschew estrangement to pursue a predominantly realistic 
narrative mode.  These two different modalities of science fiction remain connected 
because they both operate as what Michel Foucault terms heterotopian spaces, and it is 
their creation of such heterotopian spaces that marks science fiction as such an essential 
genre for critical theory.  In fact, the heterotopian nature of science fiction allows the 
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genre to not only intervene in theoretical discourses but to also become its own brand of 
critical theory. 
 
II.  Realism versus Estrangement 
 
 In philosophy, realism refers to the “position that truth can be discovered by the 
individual through his senses.”16  “Inaugurated by Descartes and Locke,” realism 
represents an ontological position that stabilizes our concepts of the world and our selves 
because it is a fundamental belief in the capacity of our five senses to properly relay the 
universe to our mind and to allow us to use these sensory perceptions to discover truths 
about the nature of reality.17  In the realm of literature, realism becomes another animal 
entirely because, as Jameson points out above, literature always remains inherently 
fictional regardless of the sophistication of its mimetic capabilities.  Hence, we must 
define how an inherently fictional work can aspire to the label of realism.  In The Rise of 
the Novel, Ian Watt famously compares the realist novel to juridical procedures: “the 
novel’s mode of imitating reality may therefore be equally well summarized in terms of 
the procedures of another group of specialists in epistemology, the jury in a court of law.  
Their expectations, and those of the novel reader, coincide in many ways: both want to 
know ‘all the particulars of a given case.’”18  Therefore, the realistic novel aims at 
“verisimilitude” by purporting to offer “a full and authentic report of human experience, 
and is therefore under an obligation to satisfy its reader with such details of the story as 
the individuality of actors concerned, the particulars of the times and places of their 
actions, details which are presented through a more largely referential use of language 
than is common in other literary forms.”19  Of course, as suggested by its philosophical 
origins, realism operates as a form of discourse outside of fiction.  As Jameson’s 
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comment above indicates, the realistic impulse extends to virtually all our narratives from 
philosophy to science to literature—they each represent distinct attempts to, like the 
novel, render our world and our experiences of it in a manner that seems to coincide with 
our own subjective experiences.  Hence, we can define realism as a discursive 
methodology that tries to project a faithful rendition of reality and our experiences of it 
by means of language (literature and film) or that strives to conceptualize some aspect of 
the human or the elements with which it comes into contact by way of its senses (science, 
history, philosophy, etc.).  During the course of this project, both branches of realism will 
remain vital to my exploration of science fiction, and, ultimately, I will demonstrate the 
manner in which science fiction undercuts realism by problematizing our basic concepts 
of reality and opening them up to new theorizations.   
For an audience to relate to a text’s story, it must retain some sense of realism—
otherwise, it devolves into mere fantasy or becomes akin to avant-garde cinema that 
breaks all ties with narrative verisimilitude and chooses instead to revel in surrealistic 
imagery to which the viewer must ascribe their own meaning.  While science fiction must 
similarly retain a certain dosage of realism—it must still deal with particular individuals 
in specific worlds at certain times, etc.—it also brings another powerful aesthetic force 
into play: estrangement.  And it is this use of estrangement that allows science fiction to 
function as its own form of critique.  Appropriating the term “estrangement” from 
Bertold Brecht, Darko Suvin famously defines science fiction as “the literature of 
cognitive estrangement,” as a genre that creates “a new strangeness” in which it works 
through a problem or set of problems: “SF takes off from a fictional (‘literary’) 
hypothesis and develops it with totalizing (‘scientific’) rigor.”20  For Suvin, science 
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fiction functions like the scientific method: it posits a hypothesis and then experiments 
upon it through the twin acts of extrapolation and fabulation.  Freedman expands upon 
Suvin’s definition to explain why cognition and estrangement remain vital components of 
science fiction’s aesthetic:  
Science fiction is determined by the dialectic between estrangement and 
cognition. The first term refers to the creation of an alternative fictional 
world that, by refusing to take our mundane environment for granted, 
implicitly or explicitly, performs an estranging critical interrogation of the 
latter.  But the critical character of the interrogation is guaranteed by the 
operation of cognition, which enables the science-fictional text to account 
rationally for its imagined world and for the connections as well as the 
disconnections of the latter to our own empirical world.  If the dialectic is 
flattened out to mere cognition, then the result is “realistic” or mundane 
fiction, which ca cognitively account for its imaginings but performs no 
estrangement; if the dialectic is flattened out to mere estrangement (or, it 
might be argued pseudo-estrangement), then the result is fantasy, which 
estranges, or appears to estrange, but in an irrationalist, theoretically 
illegitimate way.21   
 
Hence, science fiction must contain enough realism for its estrangement to still seem 
rational.  This sense of estrangement depends upon the textual world of the science 
fiction narrative differing radically from the real world of the audience.  For Freedman, 
the play of similarity and difference grants science fiction its theoretical powers because 
the ongoing process of juxtaposition on the part of the reader endows science fiction with 
a dialectical power unavailable to all other genres.  Freedman contends that all critical 
theory remains dialectical at its core, and hence science fiction functions as a critical 
genre because it involves the reader in a similarly dialectical thought process.  In all of 
Freedman’s examples, science fiction functions theoretically because the strange new 
worlds reflect, dialectically and critically, on our own, but must sci-fi qua critique always 
function dialectically?   
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Science fictions of the present seem to preclude the possibility of such dialectical 
operations because their stories unfold in the real world of the reader; that is, they give 
the realistic tendency precedence over estrangement.  Because he remains mired in 
dialectical reasoning, Freedman’s theory of the genre cannot account for the rise of 
science fictions of the present, and he ultimately does little more than textualize existing 
critical discourses.  Contrary to this, I contend that science fiction is a far more radical 
genre: it does not simply explicate theory—it enacts it.  Science fiction proves to be a 
critical genre not because of its dialectical relation with the reader but because its 
estranging aesthetic gives rise to a heterotopian space, a space of radical difference and 
multiplicity.  Because it incorporates such radical difference into its own narrative 
structure, sci-fi not only contains the potential for intervening in theoretical discourses 
but also for spawning its own theoretical concepts.  But to fully grasp the critical nature 
of the genre, we must first understand the distinction between utopias and heterotopias. 
 
III.  Utopia versus Heterotopia 
In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the power of utopias and 
their relation to socio-political theory.  Instead of turning to More’s classic text, they refer 
to Samuel Butler’s utopian novel Erewhon (1872) because, as they say, it “refers not only 
to no-where but also to now-here” when its title is rendered anagrammatically, thus 
marking utopia as a genre concerning the present moment.22  For Deleuze and Guattari, 
utopia represents more than a mere dream or narrative form because it also “designates 
that conjunction of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu—political 
philosophy.”23  Therefore, utopia represents both a fictional and a theoretical space, the 
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nexus of the two that allows the fiction writer or political theorist to imagine other 
possible worlds.  But, as Tom Moylan argues, political utopianism became tarnished 
during the first half of the Twentieth Century because of the experiences of “world war, 
totalitarian rule, genocide, economic depression, nuclear destruction, massive famine, and 
disease.”24  Furthermore, utopia’s practicality as an avenue for radical thought diminished 
because “utopia has been absorbed into the affirmative ideologies of the totalizing 
systems of Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and the corporate United States.”25  Thus, 
utopian systems of thought began to be viewed with suspicion because of the inherent 
dangers they purportedly harbored; hence, authors began to pen dystopian narratives that 
criticized the totalizing systems that had arisen from bastardized utopian dreams: 
Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We (1921), Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), and George 
Orwell’s 1984 (1949) provide the paradigmatic examples of such texts.  But the 
dystopian experiences of twentieth-century history have not permanently banished 
utopian visions from the discourse of critical theory, and, as we shall see, the utopian 
impulse underlies and structures all forms of discourse. 
As Jameson points out, Suvin confines science fiction to the Russian Formalist 
concept of “making strange” and “Brechtian Verfremdungseffeckt” (estrangement 
effect);26 he argues that Suvin’s definition of science fiction “posits one specific subset of 
this generic category devoted to the imagination of alternative social and economic 
forms” and hence “exclud[es] the more oneiric flights of generic fantasy.”27  Jameson is 
correct in pointing out how Suvin fails to take account of “the existence, alongside the 
Utopian genre or text as such, of a Utopian impulse which infuses much else, in daily life 
as well as in its texts.”28  Jameson’s comment remains tied solely to the utopian subgenre 
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of science fiction, but it can be expanded, in one sense, to include science fiction as a 
whole, for science fiction always concerns our dreams of another world, our belief that 
reality could be rendered anew through the advent of new forms of technology or the 
revision of current systems of power.  But, in another sense, Jameson proves incorrect 
because science fiction is not utopian in itself; while it concerns our utopian aspirations, 
it actually represents a heterotopian genre.  As Hayles argues, science fiction influences 
our culture as much as our culture influences science fiction.  And to fully understand the 
relation between science fiction and critical theory, we must remember that this circuit of 
influence always exists.   However, as we will see, science fiction texts inherently 
problematize our quotidian, utopian daydreams of a better world as well as demonstrating 
the manner in which our current systems of thought represent nothing more than science 
fictions—science fiction pushes such theoretical conceptualizations of the world and 
utopian impulses into a space that eviscerates them and reveals their potentially illusory 
nature.   
Jameson maintains that utopianism (or, we might say, science fiction in general) 
remains a vital aspect of critical theory, particular for its socio-political strands: 
What is crippling is not the presence of the enemy but rather the universal 
belief, not only that this tendency is irreversible, but that the historic 
alternatives to capitalism have proven unviable and impossible, and that 
no other socio-economic system is conceivable, let alone practically 
available.  The Utopian not only offers to conceive of such alternative 
systems; Utopian form is itself a representational meditation on radical 
difference, radical otherness, and on the systemic nature of social totality, 
to the point where one cannot imagine any fundamental change in our 
social existence which has not first thrown off Utopian visions like so 
many sparks from a comet.29 
 
For Jameson, then, utopian thought represents one step on the dialectical path of social 
change, a step that must be overcome once it has outlived its usefulness, but a required 
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step nonetheless.  Like Freedman, Jameson remains tethered to the Hegelian/Marxist 
dialectic, but the relation between science fiction and utopian critical theory is not a 
purely dialectical one.  Indeed, one can no doubt discuss the circuit between text and 
audience as a dialectical relationship, but science fiction deals with difference on a more 
radical level—it deals with radical forms of multiplicity that have the potential to 
undermine our utopian structures of thought and society and even our utopian aspirations 
towards a meaningful and orderly understanding of existence.  Jameson and Freedman 
argue that science fiction provides the means for reflecting upon our current socio-
political episteme or theoretical concepts, but they actually perform a far more profound 
function: they use estrangement to undercut our basic notions of reality as is the case with 
science fictions of estrangement or they render our reality in a fashion that demonstrates 
the fundamentally uncanny and potentially fictional nature of it.  Jameson argues that 
science fiction generally proves utopian because it reflects our daily utopian impulses 
towards a better life, but, in reality, science fiction does not represent a utopian genre—it 
actually operates as a heterotopian one. 
In his preface to The Order of Things (1970), Foucault explains that utopia 
represents not just a kind of literature or socio-political theory but a type of ideal space 
that orders our reality on a daily basis: “Utopias afford consolation: although they have 
no real locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able 
to unfold; they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries 
where life is easy, even though the road to them is chimerical.”30  Utopia represents a 
model of civilization that can never be achieved, but it functions as the underlying 
impulse of our societies: we believe our cities, nations, and governmental systems can 
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instill a sense of order and coherence in the world, that they can banish the demons of 
chaos and anarchy.  Hence utopianism proves to be the stuff of our wistful daydreams.  
Science fiction, on the other hand, inscribes another type of space that Foucault terms a 
“heterotopia” because it strips away our utopian blinders to reveal their illusory nature: 
Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine 
language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because 
they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in 
advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but 
also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and 
also opposite one another) to ‘hold together.’  This is why utopias permit 
fables and discourse: they run with the very grain of language and are part 
of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; heterotopias (such as those to 
be found so often in Borges) desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, 
contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our 
myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.31   
 
Foucault poses these concepts in the preface to The Order of Things because heterotopias 
tear at the foundations of the order of things, at the basis of our episteme—they rip apart 
our aspirations towards unity, coherence, and meaning.  And, as Foucault suggests, these 
deterritorializing effects stretch all the way down from the superstructure of culture past 
the economic base and to the very heart of the human—language.  In basic terms, then, 
science fiction strips away our utopian notions of humanity, its civilizations, and its place 
in the universe in order to delve into realms of otherness, chaos, and multiplicity.  If 
science fiction depicts utopias, it is only to undermine their inherently naïve aspirations 
towards perfection.  This is not to say we should not strive towards a more perfect 
society; instead, I want to argue that science fiction decimates our utopian daydreams 
(whether they be of our own real world and its potential meanings or of our possible 
futures) in a manner that allows us to either take critical theory in radical new directions 
or to wipe the slate of critique clean in order to enact a new theorization based on 
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multiplicitous potentialities instead of on mundane conceptualizations of reality and our 
selves.  By blending the tendencies of realism and estrangement together in its aesthetic, 
science fiction uses estrangement as a means of undercutting and problematizing our 
most sacred ideas about reality. 
 
IV.  Anatomy of the Human:  
        The Utopics of Narrative and The Theoretics of Science Fiction 
 
Carl Freedman once speculated that science fiction represents a genre with such 
breadth that fiction itself could be considered a subcategory of science fiction and not the 
other way round: “all fiction is, in a sense, science fiction.  It is even salutary, I think, 
sometimes to put the matter in even more deliberately provocative, paradoxical form, and 
to maintain that fiction is a subcategory of science fiction rather than the other way 
around.”32  Freedman’s claim may seem ludicrous upon first glance, but he suggests a 
valid point.  All fiction projects a world (to use a Pynchonian turn of phrase); that is, all 
fiction is removed from reality to some degree and hence involves the kind of ontological 
world-building generally only associated with science fiction.  We can expand this point 
and claim that all narrative represents a kind of science fiction, and that so-called realistic 
or truthful narratives function as a sub-categories because they represent nothing more 
than specialized forms of science fiction in which the narrative world is rendered as 
similar to ours as possible, that is, in which the level of estrangement, to use Darko 
Suvin’s term, remains at a minimum.  In this project, I want to expand Freedman’s 
observation and claim that all narrative is science fictional because even the most basic 
narratives engage in a form of world-building.  Or, in other words, narrative provides the 
means by which the individual connects three-dimensional space together with the 
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dimension of time in order to build a complete model of the world—narrative always 
harbors a realist impulse to string the our sensory impressions together into a meaningful 
whole.  Hence, narrative functions as a utopian force of the psyche that attempts to render 
reality intelligible by inscribing patterns upon it.  And based on Foucault’s distinction 
between utopias and heterotopias, I want to claim that science fiction acts as a 
heterotopian genre of narrative, a genre that instantiates a new methodology for 
performing critical theory, because it undermines and problematizes the utopian 
coherence of our narratives.  While all narrative remains ultimately utopian and science 
fictional, science fiction itself remains a genre unto itself because it uses the conflicting 
forces of estrangement and realism to undercut our utopian ideas of reality. 
To understand how science fiction represents a heterotopian genre of narrative, 
we must first expand the designation “narrative” to its fullest extent.  As H. Porter Abbot 
argues, “narrative is the principal way in which our species organizes its understanding of 
time.”33  Abbot explains that we narrate on a constant basis, that language itself is 
predicated upon narrative, upon the ability to string signifiers together in a meaningful 
chain that expresses duration and action.  In fact, many narratologists claim that narrative 
is a “deep structure” that is “hardwired” into the human mind.34  Similarly, Roland 
Barthes explains how narrative represents one of the most basic characteristics of human 
existence: “narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like 
life itself.”35  Therefore, narrative proves to be a common thread that runs throughout 
humanity.  In essence, then, to be human is to narrate—it is an activity that ties together 
all the various peoples of the world.  We can expand upon such arguments and claim that 
narrative functions as the predominant method by which humans are able to understand 
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their experiences of space-time, to parse reality into discrete objects and durations—
narrative provides the basis upon which all of the higher human discourses rest.  
Narrative is the hyphen in “space-time” that allows the human mind to join the 
dimensions of space together with temporal progression and to create a meaningful image 
of reality.   
To fully grasp just how fundamental narrative is to our understanding of reality, it 
helps to understand how language itself proves to be narrative at its core.  If we divide 
language into its two most basic components (nouns and verbs), then we can see that 
language is already divided into space and time, Kant’s two pure a priori intuitions36; that 
is, it is parsed into objects that occupy space and into actions that occur temporally.  Even 
the cogito’s most basic utterances (the “I think” and the “I am” of Descartes) operate as 
the most basic instances of narrative—the simple stringing together of a subject and 
verb.37  Indeed, once you move beyond the mere naming of objects and into a world 
composed of actions, you have entered the realm of narrative.  Through language, we 
learn to parse reality into a variety of basic sets, which include not just the division into 
subjects, objects, and actions, but also the logic of time that we learn through language: 
succession, continuity, causality, etc.  Indeed, language first instantiates our 
understanding of different time periods with the most basic verbs: was (the past), is (the 
present), and will be (the future).  Hence, narrative provides the mechanism by which we 
sort and order the universe as we experience it—it serves as the motivating principle for 
realist impulse. 
A person experiences a chaotic input of sensory impressions composed of three 
spatial dimensions and the added dimension of time of which the psyche must make 
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sense by way of narrative.38  Through the interplay of nouns and verbs, narrative creates 
its own vision of reality—the mind and the senses perceive the chaotic influx of data 
(sights, sounds, feelings, etc.), and narrative provides the means for the subject to order 
this manifold into coherence.  Paul Ricoeur refers to this fact when he argues for the 
“prenarrative quality of experience.”39  In this term, Ricoeur is developing his theory of 
narrative as consonant dissonance; that is, “narrative puts consonance where there was 
only dissonance.  In this way, narrative gives form to what is unformed.”40    Thus, a 
narrative act must constantly attend an individual’s sensory impressions, for only through 
the cohesive capacity of narrative can a person force unity upon the “unformed” 
manifold, to use Kant’s term.41  Insofar as narrative provides the fundamental code that 
allows individuals to understand their experiences and perceptions and to relate them to 
others, then narrative serves a synthetic function in the human mind—it synthesizes the 
various external stimuli that an individual experiences into a coherent unity: “plot is 
always to some extent a synthesis of the heterogeneous.”42  Reality remains a chaotic 
mass of sensory input until it can be rendered in a narrative form.  Hayden White’s 
concept of emplotment provides a crucial link here that will help us further tighten the 
knot between reality and its narrative representation.  As White explains, emplotment 
refers to “the encodation of the facts contained in the chronicle as components of specific 
kinds of plot structures.”43  White contends that the narrative impulse underlies the 
majority of human discourses from literature to history to psychoanalysis—each 
functions by means of inscribing events or facts into larger plot structures.  But White’s 
concept of emplotment can be expanded to include not just the encoding of basic 
narrative elements into larger plot structures but also the more fundamental encoding of 
  20 
 
reality into these basic narrative elements.  The narrative activity then becomes a series of 
steps from the most foundational parsing of space-time by way of the splitting of sensory 
input into objects, durations, events, and actions to using these basic narrative units as 
building blocks to create ever larger plot structures that can range from a short story to 
scientific or historical discourses or even religious cosmologies.   
Indeed, Ricoeur goes even further by arguing that narrative provides the means 
for generating our conceptualization of ourselves in relation to the historical progression 
of time. To be human is to recognize and learn how to cope with the fact that our lives 
represent only a small instant in the universal flow of time: we must consistently face the 
“disproportion between time that, on the one hand, we deploy in living, and on the other, 
that envelops us everywhere,” or “the brevity of human life in comparison to the 
immensity of time.”44  As he further states, “there is the real paradox: on a cosmic scale 
our life span is insignificant, yet this brief period of time when we appear in the world is 
the moment during which all of the meaningful questions arise.”45  Ricoeur explains that 
one of the fundamental aporetics of time lies in the opposition between these two 
versions of time, but history brings the power of narrative to bear upon time and solves 
this aporia: “historical time is constituted at the juncture of our shattered concept of time 
[…] historical time is like a bridge thrown over the chasm which separates cosmic time 
from lived time.”46  Thus, it is history that provides the means by which the human 
species carves meaning out of the chaos of space-time—it is narrative, finally, that gives 
us the order and purpose we require, and it is narrative that also provides the basis for our 
sense of identity.  Paul Ricoeur’s conceptualization of the narrative self argues that 
everyone functions like a character in a story: “characters in plays and novels are humans 
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like us who think, speak, act, and suffer as we do.”47  Of course, these literary characters 
are not “real,” but as Ricoeur points out, our identities represent a mix of personal history 
and fiction:  
as for the notion of the narrative unity of a life, it must be seen as an 
unstable mixture of fabulation and actual experience.  It is precisely 
because of the elusive character of real life that we need the help of fiction 
to organize life retrospectively, after the fact, prepared to take as 
provisional and open to revision any figure of emplotment borrowed from 
fiction or from history.48   
 
As Declan Seerin states of Ricoeur’s concept of the narrative self, “history and fiction are 
woven into each other—again, somewhat like the two strands of the double helix.”49  It is 
only through the act of fabulation that a subject can create some semblance of identity for 
him/herself.  Consequently, all theories about reality, history, and our selves prove to be 
utopian fictions because they only represent the facts that have passed through the sieve 
of narrative, a sieve which strains the multiplicity of existence and history down into 
discrete portions capable of being digested by the human mind. 
Narrative’s utopianism resides in its implicit hope that reality and our perceptions 
of it can be ordered in a meaningful way and that we can create meaningful existences for 
ourselves, but science fiction decimates this hope by choosing to craft an alternate kind of 
space—the heterotopia.    Science fiction texts represent this peculiar space known as the 
heterotopia because they deterretorialize or problematize certain schemas of organization 
or power—they reveal realism to be nothing more than a utopian phantasm because they 
open us up to the immensity of the universe in all its multiplicity.  Of course, the 
heterotopian space of science fiction differs depending on whether the text represents a 
science fiction of estrangement or a science fiction of the present; that is, whether the 
text’s predominant mode is estrangement or realism.  By resituating words, ideas, and 
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concepts in fantastic settings, science fictions of estrangement shatter their unity and 
coherence through the act of fabulation, hence making such texts fertile ground for 
theoretical work.  Science fictions of estrangement can thus function as a means of 
heteropianizing critical discourses, of pushing them into realms of radical difference that 
allow the critic to examine the implications of these theoretical frameworks and of 
generating their own theoretical concepts within certain fields of critical discourse.  On 
the other hand, science fictions of the present function as heterotopian spaces by 
depicting how our reality itself has become a kind of science fiction, how estrangement 
has crept into our daily lives, or how our supposedly stable conceptualizations of our 
present world prove to be nothing more than utopian phantoms.  But ultimately science 
fiction reveals the illusory nature of the narrative impulse that lies at the hear to the 
human.  Because of this, science fiction highlights how all our narratives concern nothing 
more or less than the human itself. 
 
V.  Defining the Variables, or What Constitutes the Human? 
 To explore the different modalities of science fiction, my dissertation devotes two 
chapters to examining the aesthetic of estrangement before turning to a theorization of 
science fiction’s use of realism: each of these two tendencies of science fiction will be 
explored by means of one chapter on a fictional example and a second one on a cinematic 
model.  While developing these theories of estrangement and realism in the heterotopian 
genre of science fiction, each chapter will simultaneously explore a particular aspect of 
the human, for science fiction and critical theory inherently concern the nature of 
humanity, its definitions of its self, its ideas and attributes, and its socio-political 
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structures.  In particular, this project will focus upon four basic traits of the human and 
their conceptualizations in both science fiction and critical theory: gender, desire, the 
postmodern society of control, and the nature of memory function as the four variables of 
the human that this project will explore in both their science fictional and theoretical 
manifestations.   
To begin to conceptualize science fiction as a heterotopian genre, Chapter One of 
my project will open with an exploration of a text that explicitly labels itself as just such 
a heterotopian space: Samuel R. Delany’s Trouble on Triton: An Ambiguous Heterotopia.   
In addition to inaugurating my theorization of the heterotopian nature of the genre, 
Trouble on Triton also will allow me stage a direct intervention in feminist theories of 
sex and gender, particularly those of Judith Butler.  Based on her theory of gender 
performativity, Butler’s theories imagine the undoing of gender by means of 
revolutionary resignifications of the social episteme.  By attempting to theorize a method 
by which this socio-cultural category can be radically transformed, Butler’s vision of 
undoing gender represents a distinctly utopian area of critical discourse, and hence 
science fiction provides the perfect tool for its critique.  In Samuel Delany’s Trouble on 
Triton, the regime of gender has effectively been undone by technology that allows 
individuals to change not only their biological sex but also the objects that they find 
desirable.  But, in gender’s absence, an equally insidious regime of norms based on types 
arises.  Under the episteme of types, the subject becomes completely understandable and 
predictable based on an almost infinite variety of identity categories and behavioral 
characteristics.  Ultimately, then, the novel allows the critic to interrogate gender theory 
by examining how the eradication of gender norms could strip away the basis of 
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humanity and individuality by rendering all difference as the same, by attempting to tame 
the wildness of heterotopia into the tranquil orderliness of utopia.  But the chapter 
simultaneously theorizes a new regime of normativity that I term “typing,” which already 
exists in our present world in discursive spaces such as demographics and statistics.   
 Chapter one will end with an investigation of the potential effects of typing upon 
human desire, and Chapter Two picks up with desire as it is conceptualized in Freud and 
Lacan’s psychoanalysis and Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis.  By way of three 
Japanese anime texts that depict disembodied forms of evolution, Chapter Two brings the 
dystopian discourse of psychoanalysis into direct communication with the utopian 
theories of schizoanalysis.  Whereas Lacan maintains that humanity is driven by a desire 
predicated upon lack (a fundamental hole in our being), Deleuze and Guattari argue that 
such lack is inscribed by the socio-cultural milieu in which the subject remains trapped.  
By means of their depictions of an evolution beyond the current human state through a 
shedding of the physical form, Katsuhiro Otomo’s Akira, Mamoru Oshii’s Ghost in the 
Shell, and Hideaki Anno’s Neon Genesis Evangelion illustrate how socio-cultural forces 
affect desire as well as how the boundaries of the body and the separation of one 
individual from another inscribes lack in the subject.  But Chapter Two ultimately 
questions whether the deterritorializations of Deleuze and Guattari, which are epitomized 
in the images of the rhizome and the body without organs, truly provide liberatory 
paradigms for humanity or whether the eradication of lack would lead to a consequent 
destruction of all that characterizes the human. 
 Chapter Three moves away from texts that predominantly function by means of 
estrangement to begin theorizing what I term “science fictions of the present,” sci-fi texts 
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that forego or diminish estrangement in favor of adopting a largely realistic aesthetic.  
This chapter charts how Gibson’s works have steadily moved from the hyper-futuristic 
cyberpunk worldscapes of his early novels to his current fictions that are set in the 
present or recent past.  By way of a reading of Pattern Recognition and Spook Country, 
this chapter examines how Gibson’s work stages the September 11th attacks as a defining 
moment in the history of the twin forces of postmodernization and globalization.  In 
effect, 9/11 serves as the culminating moment in a series of events when the postmodern 
regime of control finally displaces the older modernist, disciplinary regimes of power.  
Control remains tied to the rise of computers, and Gibson’s recent novels depict how 
computerization has achieved control in a much subtler fashion than it was initially 
imagined in the nightmarish dystopias of works like Orwell’s 1984.  In essence, Gibson 
demonstrates how control resides in the circuitry of our computers, the histories of our 
web browsers, the images of security cameras, the data in our GPS devices and cell 
phones, and the sea of corporate trademarks that surround and direct our existence.  
Ultimately, Gibson’s novels argue that the present has become a dystopian science 
fiction.  Hence, this chapter examines the status of the human in the postmodern society 
of control and depicts the manner in which the human has already become the posthuman 
through its internalization of computer paradigms. 
 Chapter Four further conceptualizes science fictions of the present by turning to 
two cinematic examples that represent a similar realistic aesthetic.  Because of their use 
of a counter-spectacle aesthetic and a cinéma vérité style, I term these two films 
“documentary science fictions”—they represent a filmic variation upon science fictions 
of the present.  This chapter explores Siegfried Kracauer’s distinction between the two 
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basic tendencies in cinema: the realistic tendency of the Lumière brothers and the 
formative tendency of Georges Méliès.  Most science fiction cinema follows in the 
tradition of Méliès, who many consider to have created the first science fiction films (Le 
Voyage dans la Lune or “A Trip to the Moon”).  But my chapter explores two films, 
Chris Marker’s La Jetée and Shane Carruth’s Primer, which eschew spectacle in favor of 
a documentary style that renders our reality uncanny in a way that allows us to rethink 
how film represents reality and ultimately how the cinematic medium itself always 
represents a science fiction.  By examining the nature of the cinematic medium through 
two time travel films, this chapter will also explore the crucial role that memory plays in 
any definition of the human and within the discourses that humans generate. 
 Finally, in my conclusion, I will turn to a more classic example than I will have 
explored in any of the previous chapters: Arthur C. Clarke and Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A 
Space Odyssey.  The conclusion will focus mostly upon Kubrick’s film, but it will also 
explore some of the differences in and expansions of the story in Clarke’s novel and its 
subsequent sequels.  My conclusion examines these texts because they bring together the 
various variables of the human that I will have explored in the previous chapters.  By 
using the cinematic spectacle in a manner that breaks with traditional science fiction, 
Kubrick’s 2001 film creates a disjunctive filmic experience like La Jetée and Primer.  
While it has structural similarities to the films explored in Chapter Four, 2001 also draws 
together the various other themes and theoretical concepts examined in this project 
(identity, desire, and control) by focusing upon the theme of evolution.  Indeed, 2001: A 
Space Odyssey provides a perfect coda for this project because it depicts the ontogenesis 
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of the human itself from its origins in prehistoric hominids to its metamorphosis beyond 
the boundaries of the body in the far-flung corners of the universe. 
 
VI.  Conclusion: Onward to the Heterotopian! 
As I conceive of it, the term “variables of the human” includes not just categories 
like gender and forces such as desire that comprise the human condition but also the 
environments within which the human interacts as well as the media through which the 
human can be represented: fiction, critical theory, cinema, etc.  Ultimately, by virtue of 
its heterotopian nature, science fiction lays bare the utopian nature of all narrative and of 
theoretical discourse in particular and provides the perfect space for the exploration of 
these variables. Science fiction allows us to recognize the fictions that we use daily to 
protect our fragile sense of being and identity, and it forces us to consider the radical 
difference that surrounds us on all sides.  It enables us to break with the various consoling 
utopian narratives that structure and govern our existence by immersing us in the 
disturbing and powerful maelstrom of heterotopian difference.  By conceiving of the 
science fiction as a heterotopian space, my project goes beyond the genre theories of 
Suvin, Freedman, and Jameson by embracing the radical difference that lies at the heart 
of the genre.  Science fiction urges us onward beyond the consolation of utopian thinking, 
onward to a heterotopian space that may disturb even our most foundational concepts of 
reality, for, as Nietzsche argues in The Gay Science, even science represents a utopian 
form of faith:  
So, too, it is with the faith with which so many materialistic natural 
scientists rest content: the faith in a world that is supposed to have its 
equivalent and measure in human thought, in human valuations—a ‘world 
of truth’ that can be grasped entirely with the help of our four-cornered 
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little human reason—What?  Do we really want to demote existence in 
this way to an exercise in arithmetic and an indoor diversion for 
mathematicians?  Above all, one shouldn’t want to strip it of its 
ambiguous character: that, gentleman, is what good taste demands—above 
all, the taste of reverence for everything that lies beyond your horizon!50 
 
As Nietzsche points out in this passage, science itself rests upon a faith that it can 
generate all-encompassing truths about the universe, that our “facts” represent the way 
things really are, that nothing lays beyond our horizon.  While science fiction may depict 
utopias or dystopias, it functions on a fundamental level as a heterotopia, as a space in 
which we confront difference and reconnect with the potential horizons that exist beyond 
the current knowledge of science, philosophy, and history.  Science fiction functions as 
critical theory because it dares to project itself outside the current constraints of so-called 
rational thought—it pushes us into a realm of otherness that still progresses according to 
a kind of rationality but a rationality not based solely on what we know to be “truth” but 
also on what might be possible. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
TYPING THE FORM OF THE SUBJECT:  
MULTIPLICITY, DESIRE, AND GENDER IN DELANY’S TRITON 
 
A normalizing society is the historical outcome of a 
technology of power centered on life 
     -Michel Foucault1 
 
Fantasy is what allows us to imagine ourselves and others 
otherwise.  Fantasy is what establishes the possible in 
excess of the real; it points, it points elsewhere, and when it 
is embodied, it brings the elsewhere home. 
     -Judith Butler2 
 
The advent of the term “gender” contains a utopian promise.  Because of its 
utopian nature and its frequent explorations of the relations between the human body and 
identity, the critical apparatus of science fiction serves as the ideal narrative space for 
explorations of gender.  Because many of his works openly grapple with theoretical 
concepts, Samuel R. Delany exemplifies the potential critical power of science fiction.3  
Delany’s fiction often functions as a direct critique of particularly theoretical ideas or 
enterprises.  As we shall see, Trouble on Triton can be read partly as a response to 
Foucault’s notion of heterotopias from The Order of Things, but the novel also represents 
a special work in Delany’s oeuvre because it critically attacked one of the most utopian 
areas of critical discourse: gender theory.  As we shall see, Triton takes gender theory to 
its logical extreme and examines the ways in which socio-cultural forces always attempt 
to normalize difference.  Because it was written during the first wave of gender theory, it 
is important to historicize its moment.  Initially, “gender” applied solely to the linguistic 
division of nouns in certain languages into masculine and feminine (or neuter, depending 
  34 
 
upon the language).4  The word was imbued with new, utopian valences in the 1970s 
when it was redefined as the socio-cultural construction of masculinity and femininity.   
Simone de Beauvoir had already began to move feminist thought in such a direction in 
The Second Sex (1952) in which she famously stated, “One is not born a woman but 
becomes one.”5  While she never used the word gender, de Beauvoir divided the 
biological designation of sex from the socially constructed concept of “woman.”  She 
explains this division in terms of existence versus essence (a distinction she borrows from 
Sartre): a female exists because of the biological arrangement she receives at birth, but 
she does not truly become a woman (her essence) until socio-cultural norms shape her 
into that identity configuration.   
De Beauvoir’s ideas proved revolutionary, but a true sea change occurred in 
feminist theory with the redefinition of the word “gender.”  Robert Stoller, an American 
psychoanalyst, often receives credit for developing the distinction between gender and 
sex; in Sex and Gender: On Masculinity and Femininity (1968), he argues that an 
individual’s gender identity (his/her sense of being masculine or feminine) stems not only 
from biological characteristics but also from environmental and psychological factors 
during childhood, including the sex to which the subject is assigned at birth.6  Second-
wave feminists adopted Stoller’s use of the term to distinguish biological differences 
(male and female) from socially constructed distinctions (the masculine and feminine 
roles that cultural forces graft onto the biological bases).7  In effect, gender became a way 
of denying arguments that claimed masculine and feminine roles derived purely from 
innate biological forces.8  Indeed, gender has been critically redefined as an attribute of 
identity that is fashioned over the course of a subject’s existence.  This transformation of 
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the very word “gender” generated new utopian potentials, for if gender was indeed 
constructed then perhaps it could be deconstructed and reconstructed anew.   
By deterritorializing the categories of male and female, gender theory developed 
into a utopian narrative for a new organization of being—it harbored an ontological 
promise.  In its most basic terms, gender theory represented the utopian wish of undoing 
gender—of removing the binary constraints that gender has traditionally placed on the 
subject, of exposing possible sites for radical rearticulations of gender, and of introducing 
the subject to a multiplicity of possible modes of being.  Judith Butler’s theory of gender 
as performance took the social constructedness of gender to its utopian limit.  Butler 
remained dissatisfied with simply demonstrating that gender roles do not stem inherently 
from biology: rather, she sought ways of disrupting the discursive construction of gender.  
Butler’s series of interventions in gender theory began with Gender Trouble: Feminism 
and the Subversion of Identity (1990), the book that first introduced the concept of gender 
performativity.  Butler continued her exploration of gender, sex, and identity in two 
sequels: Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (1993) and Undoing 
Gender (2004).9  In her original preface to Gender Trouble, Butler explains that the 
central goal of her critical project was to enact “a strategy to denaturalize and resignify 
bodily categories.”10  As she explains, this strategy is “based in a performative theory of 
gender acts that disrupt the categories of the body, sex, gender, and sexuality and 
occasion their subversive resignification and proliferation beyond the binary frame.”11  
Above all else, Butler’s work attempted to break down normative binarisms and to 
reinstate more inclusive frameworks in their place.  Her key move towards refashioning 
gender norms lies in redefining gender as performance, as an “act of doing” rather than a 
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mere “state of being.”12  If gender is an act, then it can be performed in an infinite 
number of ways and one actor can potentially slide between roles. Because it depicts a 
world in which an individual can reprogram both his/her sex, gender, and sexual 
preferences, I will use Delany’s Triton in this chapter to problematize gender theory’s 
utopian aspirations by demonstrating how undoing gender through its proliferation does 
not necessarily guarantee an experience of freedom.   
Of course, Delany wrote Triton well before Judith Butler began publishing her 
studies of gender, yet the novel’s engagement with the themes of gender, sex, and sexual 
orientation inscribes a particular critical space that will allow us to extend Butler’s 
theories to their limits.  Instead of depicting gender’s undoing as the foundation for a 
truly utopian space, Delany’s novel functions as what Tom Moylan terms a critical 
utopia13 because it imagines how, in the absence of prescriptive norms, the “matrix of 
intelligibility” (Butler’s term for the grid of socio-cultural forces that governs the 
recognition of subjects) will merely transform itself into one that, instead of prescribing 
behavior, describes it in a manner so complex and precise that it can predict subject 
behavior on a global scale.  In effect, Delany’s novel transfers the tenets of Butler’s 
gender theory into the premises of a fictional world, but the utopian promises of the 
theory, especially the suppression of disciplinary constraints, devolves into a society of 
total control that eliminates the subject’s capacity to experience desire.  Despite Butler’s 
adamant assertion that her theory is not utopian, the vision of a world in which the 
episteme no longer includes gender as a primary ordering principle marks her work as 
participating fully in the utopian theoretical tradition.  In this light, this chapter examines 
whether the undoing of gender would in actuality represent a utopian, liberatory moment 
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or whether gender proves necessary for the preservation of society and the status of the 
“human.”  Inasmuch as Butler takes gender theory to its utopian limits, we might deploy 
science fiction as the means to “test” these limits, to imagine the consequences of 
gender’s undoing.  Consequently, through narrativization, Triton pushes the precepts of 
Butler’s strain of gender theory into a heterotopian space by taking her premises to their 
logical extreme.   
My inspiration for the term “heterotopia” stems from Delany’s subtitle to the 
novel, but, as his epigraph to Appendix B indicates, Delany takes the term “heterotopia” 
from Michel Foucault who defines it in contradistinction with utopias.14  As we saw in 
the introduction, Foucault argues that whereas “utopias afford consolation,” heterotopias 
prove “disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they 
make it impossible to name this and that.”15  On Triton, then, the consolation afforded by 
heterotopia’s acceptance of difference is undercut in two important ways: first, by the 
extension of recognition to categories that gender theory itself might still label as abject, 
perverse, or cruel; and, second, by the instantiation of a new normative regime of control 
that I will term “typing.” Delany’s novel allows us to contemplate a variety of different 
questions implicitly posed by Butler’s gender theory.  For example, if universal 
recognition is achieved, then does difference disappear in the face of a total inclusivity?  
What happens to desire if difference disappears and the other is rendered as the same?  
What happens to social norms after gender disappears as an identity category?    
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I.  Recognizable Performances: Intelligible Subjects and the Doing of Gender 
 
Trouble on Triton16 appears at an interesting juncture in Samuel Delany’s body of 
work.  Delany’s last conventional science fiction novel was Nova (1968) after which he 
would not write another novel for five years.  In 1973, when he began to publish novels 
again, Delany chose to deal with more directly sexual themes and with stretching the 
boundaries of the genre.  Equinox (1973)17 is the first example of his forays into sexually 
explicit SF writing, but it was 1975’s Dhalgren that caused great controversy with its 
almost “pornographic” sexual scenes (gay and straight ones) and its lack of traditional 
science fiction elements.18  Trouble on Triton (1976) continued Delany’s work at the 
margins of science fiction: the novel does not concern itself with intergalactic warfare, 
colonists on a distant moon, or body augmentation (although all of these comprise the 
atmosphere of the novel), but instead with the experiences and possibilities of the subject 
in a utopian environment.   
  In fact, Triton details the experiences of one man (a rather problematic noun to 
use with regards to the character, as we will see) as he struggles to define his identity in 
rigid, immutable terms. 19   But identity on Triton proves anything but stable, and the 
novel examines the manner in which identifications attach themselves to subjects only to 
be sloughed off at later points in time.20  The story of Triton takes place in a seemingly 
utopian society in which the struggle for equal rights has triumphed and in which total 
inclusivity has been achieved. On Triton, recognition is extended to all races, sexes, 
genders, religions, sexual orientations, kinship relations, and even fetishes.  Triton 
functions as a “radical other”21 to our society: it represents the drastically resignified 
society that gender theory so ardently desires to see emerge.  Triton proves to be so 
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fundamentally other to our society because it stretches the matrix of intelligibility to a 
point where such a concept becomes almost meaningless.  Furthermore, the number of 
gender identities has proliferated even more drastically because of new technologies that 
allow citizens to scramble their original identity coordinates and to create radically new 
subject positions by means of technological advancements such as selective reproduction, 
sex changes, and refixation treatments (treatments that alter what objects a subject finds 
desirable).  Nevertheless, this utopian veneer proves less liberatory than its shiny surface 
might suggest, for its allure becomes tarnished by Triton’s new system of norms and its 
transformation into a perfect society of control that eliminates gendered difference. 
The reader experiences this society through a third person limited omniscient 
narration focalized through the consciousness of the main character, Bron Helstrom.  The 
novel takes place predominately in the city of Tethys on Neptune’s largest moon, Triton, 
during the war between the Inner and Outer planets of our solar system.  At the beginning 
of the novel, war has already broken out between the Inner Planets (Earth, Mars, etc.) and 
the Outer Planets (predominately the moons of Neptune, Jupiter, etc.), but Triton has yet 
to become embroiled in the conflict.22  Delany breaks with traditional sci-fi conventions 
by focusing not on the war, which serves as a mere backdrop, but instead on Bron’s 
psychological struggles to acclimate himself to life on Triton, to which he has recently 
emigrated from Mars.  Bron works at a “computer hegemony”23 in a field known as 
Metalogics, the form of logic people use in their ordinary decisions in place of the strict 
methods of formal logic.24  At the novel’s outset, Bron becomes disillusioned with all 
aspects of his life.  He suffers from a sort of corporate, white-collar malaise, but over the 
course of the novel this malaise becomes symptomatic of Triton itself.  
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Despite its auspicious title, Bron’s occupation consists of little more than a 
cubicle existence.  Once upon a time, he worked as a prostitute in Bellona, the major city 
on Mars,25 and the novel suggests that this life providing a more stimulating existence for 
him.  But now Bron has settled into a quiet corporate job in the far-flung regions of the 
solar system with no real aspirations or motivations.  Triton provides a variety of living 
arrangements for its citizenry from polygamous family households to co-operative 
apartment buildings.  Bron chooses to live in a single-sex, male, non-specified sexual 
preference co-op because he seems so apathetic that even choosing the objects of his 
sexual cravings proves to be a matter of indifference.  The monotony of Bron’s life is 
interrupted by a surreptitious encounter with a woman known as The Spike, a free-
spirited producer and writer, who travels the solar system performing drug-enhanced 
“micro-theatre.”  Bron falls in love with The Spike, who soon moves on to another planet 
and another government endowment for the performing arts, leaving Bron distraught in 
her absence.  When his friend Sam departs for Earth on a secret mission, presumably to 
help forestall the outbreak of war, Bron accompanies him as part of his entourage in an 
effort to forget about The Spike.  On Earth, Bron is briefly imprisoned, drugged, and 
interrogated by some clandestine secret agency.  Eventually, he is released and spends 
some leisure time in Outer Mongolia, where he inadvertently reunites with The Spike 
whose theatre group is performing on the planet.  Bron declares his love to The Spike, but 
she spurns him and he despondently returns to Triton with Sam.  After their return, war 
breaks out, and secret agents of the Inner Planets sabotage Triton’s artificial gravity 
system, which causes radical gravitational fluxes that decimate entire sections of Tethys.  
Bron’s brief affair with The Spike, his visit to Mongolia, and his horrific experiences 
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during the gravity cut serve as the impetus for his decision to undergo a sex change 
operation coupled with a refixation treatment, which transforms him from a man who 
desires women into a woman who desires men, and it is Triton’s development of this 
refixation treatment that allows the novel to so powerfully explore the concept of gender.   
After his operation, Bron returns to his normal life and attempts to fit into the Tritonian 
social matrix in his new role as a woman, but he remains incapable of adapting to world’s 
culture because he learns that Triton has developed a new system of normativity that 
squashes his desire.  Hence Triton leaves us with a fundamental question: does subverting 
the gender that has been forced upon one actually lead to liberation or do more subtle 
forms of normativity exist just below the surface of the binary matrix of intelligibility? 
To fully understand the depiction of gender in the novel and how Delany’s work 
critically engages with the utopics of gender theory, we must first schematically lay out 
Butler’s concept of gender performativity.  Butler explains that the performance of 
gender represents an act that cannot be said to pre-exist the subject: “gender is always a 
doing…though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed.”26  While 
she argues that doing constitutes a being’s essence, she also recognizes that a 
fundamental categorization of the subject occurs before an individual even becomes 
capable of performing any significant acts.  At birth (or even in utero), a gender is 
assigned to the individual and a set pattern of behavior is prescribed for it or, rather, 
inscribed on it.27  Consequently, an individual cannot perform his/her gender in just any 
manner but instead must adhere to a set system of norms if s/he desires to achieve 
recognition as a human worthy of what Butler terms “a livable life.”   
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 Butler appropriates the concept of performativity from the speech act philosophy 
of J.L. Austin, who developed the concept of a performative utterance: a type of speech 
act that does not describe but performs a particular action.28  The classic example of such 
an utterance occurs during a wedding ceremony when the phrase “I now pronounce you 
man and wife…” actually performs the act of marrying.  Over the course of his lectures, 
Austin revises this basic theory of performatives to designate locutionary, illocutionary, 
and perlocutionary acts, thereby covering virtually the entire spectrum of speech acts.  
Locutionary acts consist “of saying something”; that is, they are the act of speaking itself.  
In an illocutionary act, the “performance of an act” occurs “in saying something”—the 
statement performs an act beyond the mere speaking of the words.29  For example, a 
certain set of words performs the act of asking a question.  Finally, a perlocutionary act 
represents a speech act in which an action is performed by saying something.  As Austin 
explains, it is an act in which “saying something…produce[s] certain consequential 
effects upon the feeling, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of 
other persons.”30  For example, someone uttering the words “Will you accompany me to 
the store?” can represent all three types of acts.  It is locutionary because the person 
performs the act of speaking; it is illocutionary because the speaker performs the act of 
asking a question; and, finally, it could be perlocutionary if it persuades the speaker’s 
audience to accompany him/her to the store.  Thus, under his later paradigm, Austin 
displays how utterances in general perform actions, whether it is the act of stating, 
naming, describing, marrying, questioning, persuading, etc.  At its most basic level, 
conceiving of gender as performative means that the labeling of an individual as a certain 
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gender produces (or performs) that very gender.  In essence, then, Butler argues that 
gender is a linguistic effect.   
While this initial labeling creates gender and instantiates the individual as a 
subject, gender performativity also consists of the subject’s continual performance of 
gender roles.  Therefore, Butler’s theory provides a utopian and subversive promise 
because it implies that gender is not static and that a subject’s gender can change over the 
course of his/her life.  But for performative utterances to function properly, they are 
obliged to observe strict formulas—they must be repeatable along certain linguistic (or 
even legal) guidelines.  Similarly, gender performances also have to follow patterns in 
order to be recognizable: a gender performance must adhere to and replicate the gender 
norms of society.   
Based on Jacques Derrida’s reading of Austin, Butler calls this process of 
repeating norms “citationality.”  Derrida explains that for performatives to “succeed” 
they must be performed according to a duplicable pattern that grants them their 
legitimacy.31   With regards to a performative utterance such as “I now pronounce you…” 
in a wedding ceremony, the utterance cites the codified, legal norms that govern the 
ceremony of marriage and that legitimate the proceeding.  Other performative utterances 
might not follow legal precedents but, instead, adhere to linguistic or grammatical 
patterns.  For instance, asking a question follows a certain linguistic format including 
word order and vocal inflections, which act as signposts for the listener.  Insofar as 
gender is performative Butler argues, it must also be iterable—it must be capable of 
being repeated in accordance with a fixed system of patterns.  Indeed, Butler advocates a 
gender theory that “refuses to search for the origins of gender” and instead “investigates 
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the political stakes in designating as an origin and cause those identity categories that are 
in fact the effects of institutions, practices, discourses with multiple and diffuse points of 
origin.”32   
Thus, unlike the legal norms that legitimate marriage or the grammatical ones that 
govern the asking of questions, gender repeats ideological norms that have been 
generated within the socio-cultural structures of power.  The subject must perform his/her 
gender according to the gender norms that the episteme has produced (s/he must cite 
these norms) in order to remain recognizable to others and to the institutions of power.  In 
this sense, gender theory’s utopian side manifests itself in its desire to extend recognition 
to a wider array of individuals by means of what Butler terms the “proliferation of 
gender.”  For Butler, as for Hegel, only by way of recognition does the subject accede to 
its privilege qua subject:33 “recognition is not conferred on the subject, but forms that 
subject.”34  Gender represents the most basic form of recognition because it “figures as 
the precondition for the production and maintenance of legible humanity.”35  An 
individual’s status as human depends upon the recognizability of his/her performance as a 
particular gender within what Butler terms the “matrix of intelligibility”: the field of 
social, cultural, discursive, and ideological forces which determines the traits through 
which an individual receives the label of a particular gender (or of another identity 
category).36  For example, can a subject's performance be labeled as male or female, 
masculine or feminine, gay or straight?  If the performance of gender fails to cite the 
matrix of gender norms, then can we even speak of a subject?  S/he will be designated as 
“abject.” as one not worthy of subjecthood or humanity because of the illegibility of 
his/her performance.  Butler undoubtedly appropriates the term “abject” from the work of 
  45 
 
Julia Kristeva, who defines it as being neither object nor subject: “Not me, not that.  But 
not nothing, either.  A ‘something’ that I do not recognize as a thing.  A weight of 
meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and which crushes me.  On 
the edge of non-existence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, 
annihilates me.  There, abject and abjection are my safeguards.  The primers of my 
culture.”37  Only by performing gender in a legible fashion can an individual achieve 
recognition as a gender, as a subject, and finally as a human deserving of the right to a 
“livable life.”38  However, as Kristeva makes clear, the abject remains a necessary 
category for society to function, and one difficult question that Triton poses is to what 
degree do we require an excluded class of individuals, a marginal group that are labeled 
as abject but that are simultaneously used to shore up our definitions of ourselves and our 
civilization. 
 
II.  Utopian Resignifications: Radical Inclusivity and the Undoing of Gender 
 
While gender theory seeks to generate a praxis capable of escaping from and/or 
subverting the network of social normativization, Butler recognizes that norms cannot 
vanish entirely because society and human interactions depend upon them.  But she seeks 
a way to reformulate the matrix of intelligibility in such a manner that its norms extend 
recognition to a vaster array of individuals.  These norms or regulatory practices of the 
matrix operate through a primary exclusion; they demand “that certain kinds of 
‘identities’ cannot ‘exist’—that is, those in which gender does not follow from sex and 
those in which the practices of desire do not ‘follow’ from either sex or gender.”39  For 
Butler, normativity contains within itself the key to enacting such subversions because 
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norms remain mutable: “the terms by which we are recognized as human [and as a 
particular gender] are socially articulated and changeable.”40  For Butler, it is the 
unintelligible genders—those who remain unrecognized by the matrix (drag queens, 
intersexed individuals, transgendered persons)—that serve as the potential sites of 
subversion and that spur the process of resignification because “they appear only as 
developmental failures or logical impossibilities from within that domain.”41  By their 
very existence, these unrecognizable gender identities contradict the norms and logic of 
the matrix: “their persistence and proliferation…provide critical opportunities to expose 
the limits and regulatory aims of that domain of intelligibility and, hence, to open up 
within the very terms of that matrix of intelligibility rival and subversive matrices of 
gender disorder.”42  By turning towards those identity categories that are labeled as 
“other” or “abject,” Butler believes that normative definitions can be degraded and 
revised. 
Of course, the unintelligible classes of individuals render the “cultural matrix” 
possible by functioning as the “other” against which intelligible subjects are defined (a 
null set, it should be remembered, is always required for any system to function 
properly).  But Butler imagines that turning to these unintelligible genders opens the 
possibility of resignifying the matrix of intelligibility, of transforming it from a 
heterosexual matrix into a more pansexual one, thus allowing for the proliferation of 
gender beyond binary limitations.  The resignification of the matrix does not entail the 
elimination of norms but instead the construction of a subversive form of norm repetition, 
one that undoes gender by proliferating it beyond the bounds of the binary: “The task is 
not whether to repeat, but how to repeat, or, indeed, to repeat and, through a radical 
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proliferation of gender, to displace the very gender norms that enable the repetition 
itself.”43  But by the same token, Butler makes it clear that the resignification and 
rearticulation of norms must be a continuous and never-ending process: “That there can 
be no final or complete inclusivity is thus a function of the complexity and historicity of a 
social field that can never be summarized by any given description, and that, for 
democratic reasons, ought never be.”44  There can be no final inclusivity because an 
excluded group must always remain in order for the “true” subjects to be able to define 
their selves.  The point is not to eradicate exclusion altogether (since Butler believes this 
to be impossible), but to make the excluded an ever smaller category of individuals by a 
process of continual resignification.   
Nonetheless, Butler persists in her utopian belief that norms can slowly be eroded 
by persistent and subtle subversions in the quotidian sphere, that the excluded can ever 
more be transmuted into the included, and that a livable life can be extended to an ever-
increasing number of individuals.  Indeed, gender theory has reached a point where it 
understands that norms cannot be entirely eradicated and instead seeks methods of 
reshaping the normative matrix in order to broaden its field of inclusivity.  But, would 
such a change in the social episteme really change society and the subject for the better?  
This is the question that lies at the heart of Delany’s Triton because, as we shall see, Bron 
alters his sex and his gender yet still remains oppressed by both a crushing sense of ennui 
and a controlling normative system.  While Butler desires the end of prescriptive norms, 
Delany’s novel examines what happens when norms become purely descriptive. On 
Triton, norms have been resignified to the point where the excluded no longer exists as a 
category.  Triton displays how the forces of power will always seek to attain equilibrium 
  48 
 
and to achieve a homeostatic condition in which further change is negated before it even 
occurs.  Triton attains this homeostasis by a transformation of norms in which they cease 
to be about prescribing patterns of subject behavior and instead metamorphose into types, 
a new kind of normativity that understands radical difference, that views all subjects as 
equivalent, and that seeks to describe (rather than prescribe) subject behavior in all its 
multiplicity. 
After the gravity cut, Bron undergoes his sex change and refixation treatment and 
begins to perform his identity in new ways, but his operations fail to help him in his 
struggle for acclimation, and he remains in a state of apathy and confusion.45  Bron 
struggles with Triton’s allegedly utopian society because its normative matrix proves 
entirely foreign to the binary one to which he had grown accustomed on Mars.  As 
opposed to the Martian binary matrix, Triton’s matrix of intelligibility is based on the 
recognition of difference in all its multiplicity.  The novel’s subtitle, “An Ambiguous 
Heterotopia,” immediately signals the importance of difference in Triton.46  The prefix 
“hetero-” evokes two important terms: heterogeneous and heterosexual.47  The word 
“heterogeneous” suggests that Triton acts as a mixture composed of a variety of different 
elements.48  The diverse elements on Triton prove to be the infinite number of identities 
available to the subject based on the combination of race, gender, sex, kinship relations, 
and sexual preferences.49  Therefore, Triton’s matrix of intelligibility accepts the 
multiplicity of identity categories that gender theory strives to achieve. 
But by attempting to achieve this unity out of multiplicity, Triton transformed its 
normative matrix: the subject has been programmed (or typed) in vastly more complex 
ways than those implied by the typical, binary identity categories.  This leads us to the 
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second word with which “heterotopia” conjures associations: “heterosexual.”50 The novel 
actually proceeds to radicalize and redefine this word in terms of the difference already 
implied by the prefix “hetero-.”  In fact, the novel goes so far as to effectively 
deterritorialize sexuality, to open up the organizational plane of sexuality to the 
possibility of rearticulations and reorganizations.  Triton allows us to reread the word 
“heterosexual” according to its actual etymological meaning instead of the traditional 
definition that has accrued to it.  On Triton, heterosexual comes to mean that a 
multiplicity of sexual differences exist and that the subject is able to perform his/her 
gender in any manner that s/he chooses.  “Heterosexual” ceases to imply a sexual 
difference based solely on male and female; instead, Triton divides individuals into “forty 
or fifty basic sexes, falling loosely into nine categories, four homophilic…Homophilic 
means no matter who or what you like to screw, you prefer to live and have friends 
primarily from your own sex.  The other five are heterophilic” (99).   
These forty or fifty categories only represent the “basic sexes,” for Triton 
recognizes that infinite variation is possible.  This sexual division not only contrasts 
sharply with the normative matrix of our contemporary culture but also with the 
normative system to which Bron is accustomed.  While current matrices of intelligibility 
have become somewhat tolerant of particular gay and lesbian lifestyles, they still view 
these sexualities as aberrations, as out of the ordinary.  By contrast, the heterotopian 
society of Triton accepts homophilic lifestyles as natural occurrences, which is readily 
apparent from their classification as different sexes—as categories with a biological basis 
and not merely as sexual orientations.  Furthermore, as we shall see, Triton understands 
human desire in ways that would shatter the current matrix of intelligibility because it 
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recognizes that human desire is predicated upon far more complex preferences than the 
mere sex of the desired object.  Triton accepts not only gay, straight, and bisexual 
citizens, but it also recognizes sadists, masochists, and even pedophiles as worthy of 
livable lives.  Labels such as “abject” or “perverse” cease to have meaning in Triton’s 
heterotopian society, and it is not my purpose here to explore the ethical dilemmas posed 
by Triton’s acceptance of the more extreme forms of sexual preferences and fetishes.  
Instead, I want to argue that if the matrix of intelligibility based on the recognizability of 
gender performances is undone then a different system of nomenclature and subject 
demarcation must inevitably take its place—power will learn to use universal recognition 
to its own ends in order to control the populace. 
 
III.  Know Your Type: 
       Behavioral Identifications and the Reappropriation of the Margins 
 
Bron’s efforts at adapting to the normative regime on Triton narrativize the 
psychic struggles that no doubt would emerge in the face of the plurisexualization of the 
social episteme.  This problem emerges at the very outset of the novel, when the narrator 
explains that Bron “hated being a type” (5).  Throughout the novel, characters evoke this 
term in order to understand other individuals and to navigate their existence on Triton.  In 
effect, “types” have replaced traditional identity categories (sex, race, class, gender, 
ethnicity, and sexual preference) as the predominant means of negotiating social 
interactions, and they also provide the foundation upon which governmental and 
corporate institutions erect a structural understanding of subjects and their behavior.  This 
ideology, which I term “typing,” forms the basis for Triton’s utopian attitude of 
acceptance and also represents the transformation in the function of norms after the 
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proliferation of gender.51  While the conventional identity categories (race, sex, class, 
etc.) still exist on Triton, their prescriptive edge has been dulled or “flattened”—they 
have developed into mere “matter[s] of surface” that amount to nothing more than 
“cosmetic issues.”52  The proliferation of gender (as well as other identity categories) has 
led to this flattening because the rigid lines of binary demarcation have given way to a 
more fluid system of identity politics (a smooth space of normativity instead of a striated 
one) that is based on a complex knowledge of types.  Identity categories retain none of 
their current magnitude because they all receive equal recognition and become as 
changeable as one’s clothes.  The subject’s ability to adopt and then cast off various 
components of their identity has forced the people and institutions of Triton to seek new 
methods for differentiating the mass of its citizenry, for reterritorializing the 
detererritorialized identity plane of Triton’s heterotopian society.53 
Although other identity categories still exist in a flattened capacity, gender has 
effectively been undone on Triton and hence designations such as masculine or feminine 
have become hollow distinctions: “Male and female names out here, of course, didn’t 
mean too much,” Delany writes, “Anyone might have just about any name” (41).  Despite 
their rather dubious nature as indicators of sex, proper names still function as part of 
gender under most matrices of intelligibility because they are socially imposed attributes 
that gesture towards a subject’s biological sex.  Furthermore, an individual’s clothing 
options have proliferated in such fantastic ways on Triton that they have ceased to 
function as gender markers.54  Like proper names, then, clothing and appearance no 
longer dictate one’s gender, for prescriptions concerning proper attire for a particular 
gender have vanished in the heterotopian episteme of Triton.  In fact, all of the external 
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indicators of gender have disappeared, thus leaving subjects with no method of 
determining another person’s gender based on outward appearances.  Indeed, the 
arbitrariness of such gender markers recalls Saussure’s argument that “the linguistic sign 
is arbitrary.”55  Of course, attributes of an individual’s appearance are not linguistic 
signs, but, as we have already seen, the concept of gender originates with language, and 
the Tritonian normative system recognizes that one’s name and clothing remain just as 
arbitrary as the words we choose to designate objects in the real world. 
When Bron initially arrives at the clinic for his surgery, his discussion with the 
receptionist exemplifies the manner in which gender and sex have become divorced from 
their traditional designators.  When asked what his sex is, Bron responds, “Well what do I 
look like?”  The receptionist’s retort highlights the manner in which sex and gender have 
become entirely disconnected on Triton: “‘You could be a male partway through one of a 
number of different sex-change processes.  Or you could be a female who is much further 
along in a number of other sex change operations…Or,’ she concluded, ‘you could be a 
woman in very good drag’” (219).  As a conscientious Tritonian who adheres to the 
ideology of types, the receptionist cannot harbor presumptions about a subject’s sex 
based on customary gender markers because such markers have been entirely divested of 
their meaning.  The receptionist’s comments attest to Triton’s deterritorialization of the 
plane of sexuality: the slate of the sexual episteme has been wiped clean of its old 
formulas and new principles based on radical forms of difference have been inscribed in 
their place. 
But if normativization has lost its prescriptive component and become entirely 
descriptive, then what are the elements that compose typing?  What makes typing 
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effective?  Despite the “flattening” of identity categories, typing still groups individuals, 
but its rationale is predicated not just upon “primary”56 identity categories but also on a 
massive system of taxonomies that defines individuals based on an almost infinite 
number of categories: behavioral, psychological, medical, residential, familial, 
occupational, etc.  As the novel explains, typing is a process by which subjects can be 
defined even “if only by their prejudices” as a particular category (5).  This category (or 
type) represents the particular convergence of identity factors, behavioral patterns, 
personal beliefs, and attitudes that a subject exhibits at a particular point in his/her life.57  
Thus, like the traditional identity categories, typing remains performative.  In actuality, 
typing indicates that the matrix of intelligibility now recognizes the performativity of 
subjects’ identities: typing is founded upon performativity, for it is predicated upon the 
exhibition of various aspects of an individual’s personality.  Under the typing regime, 
subjects have internalized the belief in performativity and institutions of power have 
transformed it into a hegemonic force.   
Throughout their lives, the Tritonian citizens learn that “everyone is a type.”  
Even those who “pride…[themselves] on doing things contrary to what everyone else 
does” are “a type too” (5-6).  As the novel progresses, Bron is typed in a variety of 
different ways by society, by his acquaintances, and by himself.  Because he hates being 
typed, Bron frequently attempts to subvert the system, going so far as to undergo medical 
procedures in order to retype himself.  He desires a marginal existence, but this proves 
untenable under the Tritonian normative matrix, which constantly reterritorializes any 
attempts to deterritorialize its organizational plane.  On Triton, it becomes impossible to 
exist in a truly liminal state because the system always recognizes one as a type, no 
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matter how uncommon that type may seem. Hence, further resignification of the matrix 
of intelligibility becomes impossible because there is no margin from which to enact it: if 
one begins to perform one’s identity in a different mode, then that individual is merely 
retyped based on the new manifestations of his/her identity and behavior.  Although 
typing may not always constitute a spoken act, it nonetheless remains performative 
because it performs the illocutionary act of description.   
Bron’s friend, Lawrence, provides the clearest summary of the typing system: 
“My dear young man […] everyone is a type.  The true mark of social intelligence is how 
unusual we can make our particular behavior for the particular type we are when put 
under particular pressure” (5).  Lawrence’s words echo those of Judith Butler in Undoing 
Gender when she argues that the performance of gender “is a practice of improvisation 
within a scene of constraint.”58  But, on Triton, the system of constraints has changed, 
and such improvisation no longer retains the potential for subversion because the matrix 
of types merely reappropriates the marginal position in which the subject has attempted 
to ensconce his/her self.  This process of “improvisation” or of rendering “unusual” 
serves as Bron’s own modus operandi: “‘I rather pride myself on occasionally doing 
things contrary to what everyone else does.’  To which Lawrence…had 
muttered…‘That’s a type too’” (6).  Thus, Bron’s attempts at “nonconformity” only serve 
to cast him in the role of the nonconformist type, which he continues to perform until his 
performance deviates enough for him to be retyped yet again.  As we shall see, the ability 
to retype subjects grants the various institutions of power the means by which the system 
of control continually perfects itself, thus leading to more precise forms of control than 
those available to prescriptive normativization. 
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IV.  To Be is to Do, To Describe is to Control: Normativity in the Absence of Gender 
 
 How is it possible for institutions to typologize in the face of the multiplicity of 
subject positions that Triton conditions?  The solution to this conundrum lies in the 
citywide computers that enable Triton to function as both a utopia of universal 
recognition and a society of control.  Typing functions on both a local and global level.  
On the global scale, Triton’s governing bodies and commercial entities have 
institutionalized and computerized their society’s matrix of intelligibility, thus 
transforming it from a purely ideological structure into a computerized system by means 
of the city’s computer databanks that track subject formations and collate data on 
individual behavior patterns.  Meanwhile, on the local level, Tritonian citizens 
characterize one another based on an ideological form of typing that they have 
internalized as subjects.59  Indeed, the system of typing proves to be little different than 
an ideologically normalized structure of stereotypes—except that, on Triton, stereotypes 
are not employed as acts of prejudice or denigration.  Since the Tritonians accept 
difference as a multiplicity, types (or stereotypes) become a method of navigating 
interpersonal relationships and of choosing individuals that will be compatible with one’s 
own type.  
While the Tritonian populace has internalized the typing ideology, the various 
institutions of power have simultaneously computerized it.  Like the citizens, the forces 
of power do not prescribe behavior for subjects but merely describe and type that 
behavior.  Instead of particular genders, Tritonians are classified according to any number 
of different trends, all of which are acceptable and understandable by computers.  For 
example, Triton’s medical/technological industry refers to an individual subject’s 
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sexuality and desires as his/her “sexual deployment template” (228).  Technicians read 
these templates by means of a scanning process that determines a subject’s sexual 
orientation and his/her sexual predilections.  Tritonian statisticians then track common 
trends in such templates among the populace without any one template or configuration 
becoming the dominant form.  Before his sex change operation, the technicians explain 
these processes to Bron: 
There is no majority configuration…It’s the current male plurality 
configuration—that is, the base pattern.  The preference nodes are entirely 
individual, and so is any experiential deployment within it.  It’s that one 
that, given our society, is probably still the easiest to adjust to—though 
practically every other person you meet will argue that the minimal added 
effort of adjusting to some of the others is more than paid for by the extra 
satisfaction of doing something minimally difficult.  You’re an ordinary, 
bisexual, female-oriented male—sexually that is. (228) 
   
Triton’s matrix of intelligibility does not privilege one class of identities above the 
others—there is no majority.  Instead, it merely recognizes particular tendencies amongst 
the citizenry.  While there is a “current plurality configuration,” of which Bron is an 
example, this configuration in no way functions as a prescriptive norm.  It merely 
describes patterns that the masses exhibit at a given point in time—it concerns itself 
solely with demographics, the same sort of profiling that companies like Amazon or 
Facebook use to sell us products.  Like Butler, then, Triton recognizes that norms are 
mutable and hence provides the means for subjects to easily change the performance of 
their identity.  Of course, Triton consistently reterritorializes these potentially subversive 
identity configurations, and such deterritorializations actually enable the typing system to 
become ever more precise in its understanding of subject behavior. 
By reading Bron’s sexual deployment template, the technicians can also 
determine the nature of his desire—he has preferences ranging from “small, dark women 
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with large hips to tall fair ones, rather chesty” (227-8).  This knowledge enables the 
technicians to provide refixation treatments that divert a subject’s desire towards a new 
class (or classes) of objects.  The technicians cannot alter Bron’s past experiences (his 
memories of being a man who predominately desires women or his recollections of his 
life as a prostitute), but they can realign his preference nodes to give him different 
predilections.  Once the sexual aspects of a subject’s type have been determined, 
reprogramming a subject’s desire proves relatively simple.  By enduring a short 
outpatient procedure, Bron undergoes a metamorphosis from a man who generally desires 
women into a woman whose major source of attraction is men.  This procedure 
demonstrates the manner in which the institutions of power on Triton can collectively 
create a utopia, offering profound contentment to its citizens by eliminating all 
prescriptive norms.   
Yet this move away from prescriptive norms proves to be less liberatory than one 
might first suspect.  For example, Bron’s sex change does not free him from the system 
of types; instead, he merely moves from one position in the matrix to another—he is 
simply retyped to reflect his sex change and refixation.  Insofar as the system of types 
strives for perfection, it constantly seeks to better comprehend its subjects by ever more 
precisely defining or describing their types.  A subject’s type will be retyped any number 
of times throughout his/her life in order to refine the descriptions: each transformation or 
realignment only ends up providing the system with more information with which to 
typologize.  As the technicians make clear before Bron’s sex change, desiring such 
surgical procedures does not make the subject different but merely casts him/her into a 
particular type distinction.  Of course, Bron is not a native Tritonian, and, as the 
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technician further explains, he fits perfectly into the types that generally undergo sex 
change operations because he hails from a different planet—individuals from Earth or 
Mars prove more likely to undergo sex changes.  Since he has decided to undergo a sex 
change operation, Bron also represents an example of “the type who’s pretty fed up with 
people telling you what you aren’t or are” (220).  Regardless, the technician proceeds to 
label Bron as a particular type.  While Butler’s theory desires to reshape the matrix of 
intelligibility through a continual process of resignifications, the Tritonian matrix has 
appropriated this tactic of resignification and applied it to its subjects, hence providing 
the means for the typing system to comprehend the continual flux of identity.   
This ongoing process of retyping becomes especially clear when Bron returns to 
work after his sex change.  After a few days back at the hegemony, Audri, Bron’s boss, 
explains to him that the company is about to retype him60 in a negative way because his 
“efficiency index blinks a little shakily on the charts,” thus signaling that he has 
potentially become an inefficient worker.  This provides an example of how various 
institutions and corporations type the subject in different ways.  As Foucault teaches us, 
power is distributed throughout social systems; that is, its presence is not housed in any 
one governing body or institution but instead is spread throughout the socius: “The 
factory was explicitly compared to the monastery, the fortress, a walled town […] 
Disciplinary space tends to be divided into as many section as there are bodies or 
elements to be distributed.”61  Of course, in this passage, Foucault is discussing the rise of 
discipline in the 18th century, but, as we shall see, the number of sites for power to 
exercise its control over individuals only continues to multiply as societies move from the 
disciplinary society to the control society, from a striated space to a smooth space.  Thus, 
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on Triton, a subject will be typed in a variety of ways by the assorted nodes of power, and 
the typing of a subject by one institution might affect his/her being typed in a certain way 
by another institution if a communication network exists between the different entities.   
This continual resignification of a subject’s type based on changes in his/her 
identity performance returns us to the linguistic aspects of these processes.  Since all 
language is performative to some degree, then labeling an individual also performs an 
act.  In this case, it is the act of description (an illocutionary act).  While the subject may 
redefine his/her identity or gender by new manners of performing it, the various nodes of 
power simultaneously perform the act of redefining the latest manifestation of the 
subject’s identity.  Yet power’s redefinition of a subject performs more than the mere 
locutionary act of stating the subject’s type or even the illocutionary act of description, 
for it also performs the perlocutionary act of controlling the subject through its 
application of such descriptions. By describing the subject in such complex terms, the 
various institutions of power achieve new levels of control: they negate any possibility of 
subversion by rendering the subject’s behavior predictable.  While Triton does not seek to 
prescribe subject behavior, the governmental powers use their descriptive knowledge of 
subject types to foresee how subjects will react given specific variables in certain 
circumstances.  Like the medical center, the government of Triton proves capable of 
multifaceted forms of typing through the use of citywide computer networks.   By 
recording and storing demographic information regarding major types and trends in its 
populace and by using complex equations with subject identities and behaviors acting as 
the variables along with the variables regarding certain situations, the Tritonian 
computers become capable of predicting how its citizenry will respond to different 
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scenarios—they develop the capacity to describe, predict, and control the variables of the 
human. 
The Tritonian government never overtly types subjects and predicts behavior for 
sinister ends in the novel, but it uses such knowledge to determine whether individuals 
are “safe” or not.  As Sam explains, “We simply live in what the sociologists call a 
politically low-volatile society.  And as I think I said: The political volatility of people 
who live in single-sex, nonspecified sexual-preference co-ops tends to be particularly 
low” (126).  Bron responds, “In other words, given my particular category, my general 
psychological type, I’ve been declared safe” (126).  Like real world governments, Triton 
divides citizens into safe subjects and subjects who must be kept under heavier 
surveillance.  It bases these categorizations upon a variety of factors including such 
seemingly mundane characteristics as a subject’s choice of housing.  In this instance, the 
typing proves correct: Bron remains far too apathetic to ever consider any serious form of 
rebellion.  His political indifference represents only one aspect of the overall ennui that 
permeates his life. 
Typing makes its first appearance during Bron’s walk home from work in the 
opening chapter when he decides to visit an “ego-booster booth,” and this event also 
demonstrates the ubiquity of surveillance on Triton.  The ego-booster booth is a type of 
coin-operated booth that allows a Tritonian citizen to view video and audio of him/her 
that has been recorded and stored by the government.62  Bron decides to enter the booth 
because “something amusing was called for,” and it is one of his actions that he believes 
places him outside of the regime of types.  This becomes evident when the novel reveals 
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that Bron has a history with the booths (4).  Initially, he “had been appalled at the booths’ 
institution” eight years before the time of the novel, but  
for [the first] two years, while finding the booths derisively amusing in 
theory, he had never gone into one—as silent protest.  He had kept it up 
till he realized practically no one he knew ever went into them either: they 
considered the millions of people who did, over all the inhabited Outer 
Satellites, common, unthinking, politically irresponsible, and dull, which 
made it depressingly easy to define the people who did not use them, if 
only by their prejudices, as a type. (5) 
 
Bron, in his disgust at being categorizable, began entering the booths, as he does on the 
day that opens the novel, in order to render his self different from the masses, and it is 
this desire for difference that ultimately reveals the flaws in Triton’s control apparatus: it 
neglects to take desire into consideration.   
Triton’s capacity to predict human behavior becomes apparent when the Inner 
Planets carry out an act of sabotage against Triton by cutting the gravity: “They had it all 
figured out—statistics, trends, tendencies, and a really bizarre predictive module called 
the ‘hysteria index’ all said that practically no one would want to go out to see the sky” 
(120).  In spite of this foreknowledge, Triton’s predictions concerning the citizenry’s 
reactions to the incident prove incorrect because “eighty-six percent of Tethys’ 
population was outside within a minute and ten seconds, one way or the other, of the cut” 
(120).  According to Sam, who works in a relatively high level position in the Tritonian 
government, this is the only time that the government’s predictions have proven wrong: 
“But up until now—and this probably strikes you as quite naïve—it never occurred to me 
that the government could be wrong…about its facts and figures, its estimates and its 
predictions.  Up until now, when a memo came down that said people, places, incidents 
would converge at set times and in given ways, they did” (120).  What causes this 
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aberration in typing’s perfect record?  Ultimately, this moment indicates that human 
nature retains one aspect that remains fundamentally unpredictable: desire.  Triton 
flattened desire and effectively banished it from their society, but, in this brief moment, it 
returns to plague the typing system with its irrational and unpredictable character.  Thus, 
we are led to the most important question concerning typing: what consequences do 
universal recognition and the development of typing have for desire?    
 
V.  In the Absence of Gender, In the Absence of Lack: 
      Desire in the Society of Universal Recognition 
 
Critics of Trouble on Triton, including Delany, almost inevitably blame Bron’s 
failure to adapt to the Tritonian social structure on his personality and attitudes.  In his 
Diacritics interview, Delany comments that Triton is “the one book of mine in which the 
thrust toward the main character is almost wholly critical.  What’s wrong with him?  Why 
doesn’t he function properly?  Why can’t he be honest with himself?  Or with Others?”63  
Elsewhere, Delany explains, “You have to remember, what Bron usually does to justify 
his behaving in the selfish and hateful ways that make him such a hateful man is to 
manufacture perfectly fanciful motivations for what everyone else is doing—motivations 
which, if they were the case, would make his actions acceptable.”64  Like Delany, the 
novel’s critics have felt little compassion for Bron.  He has been variously described as 
“an unregenerate male chauvinist”;65  as “incessant, pedantic, and boring”;66 as 
“unspontaneous, egocentric, coarse, and culture-bound”;67 and simply as “a sexist.”68  To 
be sure, Bron fits all these descriptions.  So what precisely is his problem?  In a world 
that produces few dissatisfied citizens, why do Bron’s selfishness and sexism persist?  I 
contend that the nature of Bron’s problems should be understood in the context of the 
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flattening of desire that occurs on Triton as an effect of the proliferation and consequent 
undoing of gender. 
If we are to imagine a society that, like Triton, has transcended binaries and 
inscribed a matrix of intelligibility based on multiplicity and universal recognition, then 
we must also contemplate the manner in which such an alteration impacts human desire.  
If, as Hegel argues, desire is always a desire for recognition, then what are the 
consequences for desire if all subjects receive complete recognition?  As the technician 
explains to Bron before his surgery, “life under our particular system doesn’t generate 
that many serious sexually dissatisfied types” (220).  Triton strives to satiate the desires 
of all subjects through its extension of recognition to all forms of sexuality and desire and 
its provision of the means to satiate these desires, producing few citizens whose sexual 
needs go unsatisfied.  First, there are no consequences for engaging in promiscuous 
behavior because reproduction has become entirely selective. 69  Secondly, the residential 
system on Triton promises a utopian sex life to its citizenry.  If Tritonians desire a family 
life, then they can choose to live in various types of family communes on the outer rim of 
the city.  Yet, the majority of citizens prefer to live in one of the assorted styles of co-ops 
that cater to the particular sexual needs of certain classes of individuals.  In the co-ops, 
“sex was overt and encouraged and insistently integrated with all aspects of co-operative 
life” (57).  Each building represents a utopian space for a certain group of individuals and 
provides a micro-expression of Triton’s overarching utopian episteme.70  But while such 
a structure seems liberating, no space remains for fostering true desire since everything 
has already been provided for the subject—there is no lack.  Satiation waits next door, or 
down in the commons room, or if satisfaction cannot be found among one’s neighbors, 
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then a diverse array of bars exist that cater to all manner of sexual predilections.  From 
this perspective, Triton seems destined to produce blissful satisfaction for all its subjects, 
but Bron remains sullenly resentful of the system and resists the pleasures it affords.   
In a recent article, Alcena Madeline Davis Rogan argues that in a number of his 
works “Delany problematizes the politics of identity by placing many of his protagonists 
in a landscape where difference dizzyingly proliferates,” and this difference proves 
nonhierarchical because it “is realized in a society that allows sexual identities to 
proliferate, seemingly endlessly.”71  For Rogan, Bron’s problems on Triton result from 
his having emigrated from Mars, where sexual hierarchies still persist.  Hence, Bron still 
lives under the “presumption that men and women are somehow essentially different” 
and “is unable to reconcile his experience of sexual nonidentitarianism with the 
epistemological framework that he inherited from Mars.”72  The problem recalls the 
conundrum espoused in the forty-fifth proposition of Ashima Slade (one of Delany’s 
fictionalized versions of himself) in “Some Informal Remarks towards a Modular 
Calculus.”  Indeed, this appendix acts as a critical model for reading the novel because it 
addresses the problem of moving between modular systems, discrete systems that are not 
immediately compatible with one another.73  In this proposition, Slade explains the nature 
of the modular calculus:  
The problem of the modular calculus, again, is: How can one relational 
system model another?  This breaks down into two questions: (One) What 
must pass from system-B to system-A for us (System-C) to be able to say 
that system-A now contains some model of system-B?  (Two) Granted the 
proper passage, what must the internal structure of system-A be for us (or 
it) to say that it contains any model of system-B? (302) 
 
In order to travel between modular systems, the second system must maintain a certain 
degree of similarity to the first for the subject to experience a smooth transition.  Based 
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on this proposition of Slade’s, Rogan argues that Bron suffers because Triton does not 
retain enough of the binary model of identity to which he is accustomed.74  While Rogan 
correctly notes that Triton concerns a migration between epistemological models, her 
argument does not consider that Bron’s movement between systems is not simply a 
relocation between social structures but also a migration from a prescriptive matrix to a 
descriptive one.  Once the social matrix has been stripped of its prescriptive edge, then, 
consequently, desire falls dead in the absence of prohibitions, and it is the absence of 
desire that ultimately haunts Bron. 
 Once the proliferation of gender has been pushed to its heterotopian extreme, then 
all forms of pleasure become recognized as legitimate. It is imperative here to distinguish 
between pleasure and desire—Triton provides its subjects with an infinite expansion of 
permissible pleasures, which should not to be confused with desire.  For Lacan, pleasure 
always refers back to Freud’s pleasure principle: “when faced with a stimulus 
encroaching on the living apparatus, the nervous system is as it were the indispensable 
delegate of the homeostat, of the indispensable regulator, thanks to which the living being 
survives, and to which corresponds a tendency to lower the excitation to a minimum.”75  
The pleasure principle strives to maintain a homeostatic condition in the subject by 
avoiding states of extreme excitation—it keeps pleasure to a minimum (thus avoiding 
jouissance) and hence “is related to prohibition, to the law, and to regulation.”76  On 
Triton, the amount of pleasure a subject can experience while still maintaining a state of 
equilibrium has radically expanded.  Žižek would term Triton’s social structure 
permissive because “public order is no longer maintained by hierarchy, repression, and 
strict regulation, and therefore is no longer subverted by liberating acts of 
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transgression.”77  For Žižek, this lack of transgressive acts leads to the reinstantiation of 
hierarchical sexual dichotomies such as master/slave, top/bottom, butch/femme, 
dominant/submissive, etc.   But, on Triton, these binary relations exist as only one type of 
fetish in the constellation of available identities and acts, thus making transgression on 
Triton an almost impossible feat to achieve. 
Why then does Bron not simply succumb to Triton’s society of pleasure?  The 
answer lies in distinguishing desire from pleasure.  Unlike pleasure, desire “is neither the 
appetite for satisfaction nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the 
subtraction of the first from the second, the very phenomenon of their splitting.”78  Lacan 
places desire firmly in the Hegelian tradition by claiming that “man’s desire is the desire 
of the Other,”79 which “means both to be the object of another’s desire, and desire for 
recognition by another.”80  Furthermore, desire can never be satisfied because it springs 
from a fundamental lack in the subject: “desire is the relation of being to lack.  This lack 
is the lack of being properly speaking.  It isn’t the lack of this or that [which would be 
need or demand], but lack of being whereby the being exists.” 81  This lack is both the 
lack of the other and the lack created by the insertion of the subject into language: “it is 
language that imposes a radical lack…It is that lack, which is inherent to the ability to 
speak, that creates desire, that feeds it, and sustains it…Desire becomes the unrelenting 
quest for that which is lacking, for the impossible that human beings cannot, however, 
renounce.”82  Žižek compares desire to Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise:  
The libidinal economy of Achilles and the tortoise is made clear: the 
paradox stages the relation of the subject to the object cause of its desire, 
which can never be attained.  The object-cause is always missed; all we 
can do is encircle it.  In short, the topology of this paradox of Zeno is the 
paradoxical topology of the object of desire that eludes our grasp no 
matter what we do to attain it.83 
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Triton has eliminated lack by inundating the subject with a profusion of available 
pleasures in its attempt to achieve a state of global contentment.  In addition, Triton 
forecloses lack by continually defining subjects in ever more precise terms by means of 
the typing system.  Because of Bron’s status as an emigrant, he remains trapped in the 
lack that still persists in hierarchical social systems, such as the one on Mars.  Bron 
craves transgression because it would allow him to achieve a level of difference that 
would grant him recognition as a being distinct from all others and as an individual who 
cannot be confined by definitions.   
Of course, as a good Hegelian, Butler understands that desire ultimately 
represents the desire for recognition, and it is precisely this recognition that she seeks to 
grant to traditionally marginalized subjects.  But her utopian desire for universal 
recognition fails to consider its consequences.  Under our moral matrix, norms function 
as prohibitions, and desire always designates a lack: the prohibited, the different, or 
simply the Other.  Triton poses the question of what happens to desire when the subject 
begins to internalize norms that no longer prohibit certain forms of behavior and that no 
longer recognize radical difference.  No doubt, the subject is still produced by the 
recognition extended by these norms and a “livable sociality”84 is still maintained 
because these norms provide subjects with the means for interacting with one another, but 
desire falls dead in the absence of restrictions, for desire is always formulated upon 
prohibition and the fight for recognition.  On Triton, not only do prohibited pleasures no 
longer exist, but the society is actually structured in a fashion that seeks to gratify a 
subject’s wants and needs in the easiest manner possible, hence stripping desire of its 
motivating force.  The question then becomes whether Bron actually remains trapped in 
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the sexist model of society and desire, as Rogan would maintain, or whether Bron suffers 
because true difference (and consequently true desire) has vanished from the Tritonian 
matrix of intelligibility.  When all subjects receive recognition and when nothing is 
prohibited, then all subjects and all forms of pleasure are rendered as the same; they 
become mere types, particular configurations of identity coordinates, behavioral 
attributes, and sexual predilections that prove instantly gratifiable under the reformulated 
matrix of intelligibility.  Under this matrix of intelligibility, subjects internalize the 
computer typing system.  No longer predicated on the struggle for recognition, desire 
becomes flattened into a mere search for compatibility: individuals search out others who 
are programmed in a complementary fashions that will allow them to run well in tandem 
with each other and generate the highest potential pleasure. 
Although Triton provides an expansive array of pleasures for its citizenry, what 
Bron ultimately craves is the intense kind of recognition that we might term love, but 
Triton forecloses the possibility of love, an emotion (or state of being, it might be argued) 
based neither on sex nor on compatibility.  For Lacan, love (l’amur) has a “fundamentally 
narcissistic structure”85—it is “a phenomenon which takes place on the imaginary level, 
and which provides a veritable subduction of the symbolic […] That’s what love is.  It’s 
one’s own ego that one loves in love, one’s own ego made real on the imaginary level.”86 
Essentially, an individual craves love because it validates his/her love of their own ego.  
Furthermore, love resides in the subject’s belief that another person can fill his/her lack 
by the union of the two separate individuals into what Lacan calls “the One”: “Love is 
impotent, though mutual, because it is not aware that it is but the desire to be One.”87  Of 
course, like the object of desire, love’s “tension towards the One” can never be satiated 
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because of the boundaries of the body, but the return of love by another at least partly 
assuages this impossible desire for oneness: “love demands love.  It never stops (ne cesse 
pas) demanding it.  It demands it…encore.  ‘Encore’ is the proper name of the gap 
(faille) in the Other from which the demand for love stems.”88  Bron’s troubles stem from 
the fact that no one on Triton knows how to love, so while Bron demands love, he never 
receives his encore.  And since love represents a narcissistic love of one’s own ego, then 
Bron also suffers from a lack of self-validation.   
On two occasions, both before and after he has become a woman, Bron displays 
his romantic nature.  Before his operation, he entreats The Spike to flee Triton in search 
of a civilization that recognizes passionate impulses.  Similarly, after his sex change, 
Bron declares his love to Sam and begs to become one of his wives.  Both The Spike and 
Sam greet Bron’s propositions with scoffing rebuffs, thus exemplifying Triton’s 
viewpoint on such illogical desires.  Indeed, Bron proves to be the only character in the 
novel that exhibits any passion.  The other characters operate on cool, computer-like 
logic that treats emotional responses as counterproductive.  Thus, at the novel’s end, Bron 
remains trapped in his malaise.  He desires a form of recognition that sees him as not 
merely a type but as a unique individual who is radically different from all others and 
hence deserving of not just a livable life but also deserving of love.  Ultimately, Bron still 
remains incapable of defining his own performance: 
Think! She thought: At one point there had been something she had 
thought she could do better than other women—because she had been a 
man, known firsthand a man’s strengths, a man’s needs.  So she had 
become a woman to do it.  But the doing, as she had once suspected and 
now knew, was preeminently a matter of being; and being had turned out 
to be, more and more, specifically a matter of not doing. (263) 
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In short, Bron realizes the havoc that typing has wreaked upon desire and human identity.  
If gender represents a doing (a performative) and if gender represents one of the 
fundamental methods by which a subject is recognized, then identity and desire plummet 
into a space of meaninglessness in the absence of gender.  In these final moments, Bron is 
hurled back into the existentialist dilemma of being versus doing (or of existence versus 
essence), but, on Triton, the relation between the two has been severed by the typing 
ideology.  As a male, Bron had imagined himself containing the ability to perform the 
role of woman better than the women around him, yet he discovers that the womanly role 
no longer exists because gender roles themselves have vanished.  Since society views all 
performances as intelligible, then all performances of a subject’s identity have become 
virtually the same.  Love, that special form of recognition that Bron craves, demands that 
the beloved be seen as distinct from the masses, as a special individual.  Ultimately, love 
represents a state of being as well as a doing—it is a performative that permeates one’s 
entire identity.  Love, as a state of being, includes a wide range of emotional states: 
happiness, passion, heartache, and jealousy, all of which require the subject to remain in 
an advanced state of excitation that demands the performance (doing) of actions that will 
hopefully lead to satiation—love constantly teeters on the ledge between pleasure and 
jouissance, and one small push can send an individual plunging into the abyss of 
jouissance in which pleasure slides into pain.  Since the Tritonian episteme places such a 
high value on maintaining the contentment of its citizenry, then love proves dangerous in 
its capacity to excite subjects into a state of unpredictable and potentially disgruntled 
behavior.  Triton forces a subject’s performance of their identity to remain a matter of 
“not doing.” 
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Ultimately, then, the novel interrogates gender theory by examining how it strips 
away the basis of humanity and individuality by rendering all difference as the same.  
Under the regime of typing, difference has indeed become nonhierarchical, but gender 
theorists fail to realize that in the place of hierarchical or binary structures of difference, 
the institutions of power will merely resignify the populace in ways that prove, if not 
oppressive, then at least controlling.  Whether such a state is desirable then becomes the 
question that the novel poses to us: will the utopian proliferation of recognizable 
identities prove liberatory or will it, when actualized, squash the very difference that 
marks the status of the human and lead to societies capable of controlling the subject in 
radically new fashions?  In the final analysis, when humans become incapable of 
experiencing desire, then does the human even exist anymore?   
 
VI.  Conclusion: Dwelling in the No-Place of Gender 
  
 According to the word’s own etymological meaning, a utopia is fundamentally 
unrealizable—it is a “no-place,” a place that does not (and potentially cannot) exist.  Yet 
Foucault maintains that the most basic difference between utopias and heterotopias is that 
heterotopias are real world spaces in which the individual experiences difference so 
radical that words and logic fail in the face of it.   Gender theorists can easily point to real 
world spaces that allow for the proliferation of gender in certain confined areas, for 
example, the drag balls from the documentary Paris Is Burning (1990) that Butler 
discusses in Bodies that Matter.  Whether Butler’s vision will always prove unrealizable 
remains to be seen, but its attempt to imagine a radically different version of society 
marks it as a devoutly utopian endeavor.  While Delany’s Triton no doubt represents a 
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“no-place” due to its fictional nature, it nonetheless allows the critic to transport gender 
theory into a heterotopian space by imagining the consequences of the instantiation of its 
revolutionary project.   
 While gender theory has taught us an inordinate amount concerning the 
constraints that socio-cultural forces place on an individual’s identity, we must still 
consider the consequences of entirely losing this basic structure of human identity.  No 
doubt, the society of Triton remains only a distant, and sometimes seemingly 
unreachable, dream of universal human rights, but, in some ways, it can provide a 
paradigm for subversive practice.  Inevitably, our current society must continue to 
struggle to extend recognition to marginalized groups, and my point in this chapter has 
not been to negate the power of social change or to criticize those who endeavor to 
subvert the oppressive systems currently operating around the globe.  Ultimately, what 
Triton forces us to consider is the level of exclusion required for a system to function.  As 
we have seen, society always requires a marginalized group, an abject category that 
endows the majority with meaning through its opposition.  Ursula K. Le Guin’s short 
story, “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas,” argues that even the most seemingly 
utopian society must retain an excluded element even if it is only one individual.  In Le 
Guin’s story, Omelas is a perfect utopia for all its citizens, but the society requires that 
one child be kept locked inside a filthy room by his/herself.  Because it remains alone 
throughout its miserable life, the child becomes like the legend of Kaspar Hauser, the 
wild child who escaped his captivity as a young adult and became socialized into German 
society before being mysteriously murdered.89  The people of Omelas never know 
whether the child is chosen because it is mentally disabled or for some other purpose, and 
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they also never understand why the child must be kept in such abominable conditions—
they simply know that it is required for their society to maintain its utopian perfection.   
Omelas has pared the excluded category down to a single individual who is forced into 
the abject position, but Triton seems to have proceeded even further and eliminated 
exclusion altogether.  Hence, Triton leaves us with a very powerful question: can a 
society ever reach a point where excluded, marginalized groups become non-existent, or 
must we always maintain an excluded other in order for our civilizations to function? 
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http://galenet.galegroup.com.) 
 
21 Tom Moylan, Demand the Impossible (New York: Methuen, 1986) 193. 
 
22 The novel never reveals the cause of the conflict, but it seems imperialistic in nature, and, throughout the 
novel, it looms like a dark cloud across the peaceful expanse of Triton until it finally erupts violently into 
their lives later in the work. 
 
23 Samuel R. Delany, Trouble on Triton: An Ambiguous Hetertopia (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 
1976).  The term “hegemony” proves important here since the novel concerns exerting a dominant 
viewpoint over the citizenry and of understanding a nation’s citizenry’s thinking and behavior to the point 
where it becomes perfectly predictable (1).  From this point forward, references to Trouble on Triton will 
be cited parenthetically. 
 
24 Bron explains at one point that “People…when they go about solving any real problem, don’t use strict, 
formal logic, but some form of metalogic, for which the rules of formal logic can be considered—on off 
Thursdays—the generating parameters” (49).  He further explains that metalogic begins operating when we 
start to question why a particular answer is considered logical in the first place. 
 
25 Interestingly, Bellona is the name of the city in Samuel Delany’s previous novel, Dhalgren (1974), but if 
there is any connection between the two works, then it remains unclear. 
 
26 Butler, Gender Trouble 33. 
 
27 Butler’s theory of the subject is heavily indebted to Louis Althusser’s concept of interpellation in 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” from Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (1970; New 
York: Monthly Review, 2001. 85-126.) in which he describes the process by which a subject is recognized 
by the institutions of power as well as by society as a whole.  Althusser explains that while still in utero, a 
person becomes a subject in various ways: subject to language (the name renders him/her insertable into 
sentences, and of course s/he must be gendered in order to be a subject of a sentence), subject to the family 
(the family applies its name to the child), and finally subject to governmental institutions (even before 
birth, laws govern the child’s life and upon birth s/he becomes a citizen).  As Althusser says, “individuals 
are always already subjects” because “ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects” 
(119).  Althusser’s famous example of interpellation is the police officer hailing a person from behind on a 
street.  Despite the other people on the street, the person realizes “the hail was ‘really’ addressed to him,” 
and this process “hardly ever miss[es]” (118).  Thus, Althusser, like Butler, argues that the creation of the 
subject is based on recognition.  Indeed, Butler’s major concern throughout her work could be said to be 
recognition: how gender is recognized, who is recognized as human, what causes a subject to be recognized 
as such, how recognition grants a livable life, etc. 
 
28 In How to Do Things With Words, 2nd Ed, eds. J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
UP, 1962), Austin explains, “The name is derived, of course, from ‘perform,’ the usual verb with the noun 
‘action,’” and “it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action” (6). 
 
29 Austin, Words 99-100. 
 
30 Austin, Words 101. 
 
31 Jacques Derrida, “Signature, Event, Context” in Limited Inc, ed. Gerald Graff (1972; Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern UP, 1988.  1-23).  As Derrida says, “Could a performative utterance succeed if its 
formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in 
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order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable 
model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a ‘citation’?” (18). 
 
32 Butler, Gender Trouble xxix. 
 
33 Hegel argues that recognition serves as the basis of our identities and desires as well as our interactions 
with others. For Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, a subject cannot become self-conscious (or even 
become a subject) until s/he has been recognized (or acknowledged) by an other: “self-consciousness exists 
in and for itself, and by the fact, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” 
(§178).  To become an individual, one must first engage with an other who recognizes him/her as an entity 
separate from all other entities and as an entity with its own consciousness and desires.  As Alexandre 
Kojève explains in Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, ed. 
Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1969), recognition provides the 
foundation for the movement from being a mere biological entity to being a full-fledged person: “It is only 
Desire of such a Recognition (Anerkennung), it is only Action that flows from such a Desire, that creates, 
realizes, and reveals a human, non-biological I” (40).  To become fully human then requires recognition, a 
satiation of the subject’s desire through his/her recognition of another subject’s desire.   
 
34 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York and London: Routledge, 
1993) 226.  Again, this statement hearkens back to Althusser’s concept of interpellation. 
 
35 Butler, Gender Trouble 11. 
 
36 Butler makes it clear that gender is not the primary identity category and that a variety of other identity 
categories also play into a subject’s being recognized as human: “The human is understood differently 
depending on its race, the legibility of that race, its morphology, the recognizability of that morphology, its 
sex, the perceptual verifiability of that sex, its ethnicity, the categorical understanding of that ethnicity” 
(Gender Trouble 2; italics are mine). Furthermore, there is the issue of recognizable kinship arrangements 
because only certain forms of kinship arrangements (living arrangements, relationship patterns, etc.) allow 
a subject to be recognizable as human and as belonging to a particular gender.  Ultimately, at their core, all 
such definitions of the human, of gender, of race, and of kinship rely upon the relegation of certain 
categories to the status of the inhuman, the unrecognizable, the excluded, or just simply the “other.”  Butler  
represents the new brand of gender theory and feminism because she does not privilege gender or sex over 
other identity categories but also tries to incorporate an understanding of other identity categories into her 
work.    
 
37 Julia Kristeva, Power of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leion S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
UP, 1982) 2. 
 
38 The order of these terms is important because an individual must first be gendered in order to be a subject 
and must be a subject before the rights of the human can be conveyed upon him/her. 
 
39 Butler, Gender Trouble 23-4. 
 
40 Butler, Undoing Gender 2. 
 
41 Butler, Gender Trouble 23-4. 
 
42 Butler, Gender Trouble 23-4. 
 
43 Butler, Gender Trouble 189. 
 
44 Butler, Bodies 221. 
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45 In Samuel R. Delany (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1984), Seth McEvoy argues that the sex change in the 
novel is “Delany’s attempt to deal with some…feminist principles” which had begun to emerge in the 
1970s (123). McEvoy reads the novel in this manner because he takes Bron to be a man “who cannot deal 
with strong feminist women,” and that his sex change is his attempt “to understand women by becoming 
one,” but that “it does not solve his problems” because “he is still a confused male, mirroring the confusion 
that many males had during the time” (123-4). The novel indeed acts as a statement about identity politics 
and the strictures of current thought patterns regarding them, yet McEvoy’s reading proves overly 
simplistic, for what Bron chafes against is not strong, feminist women, but the normative matrix that has 
developed in the absence of gender on Triton.   
 
46 The term “heterotopia” resonates in a variety of ways within the novel.  Delany takes the term from 
Michel Foucault’s Les Mots et les choses (1966), translated in English as The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1966; New York: Vintage, 1970).  I shall leave Foucault’s notion of 
heterotopia aside for now and return to it later. 
 
47 The Oxford English Dictionary provides the following useful definition of the prefix “hetero-”: “the 
other of two, other, different.” 
 
48 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “heterogeneous” in three informative ways: 1. “Of one body in 
respect of another, or of various bodies in respect of each other.  Diverse kinds of nature, of completely 
different characters; incongruous; foreign”; 2. “Of a body in respect of its elements: Composed of diverse 
constituents; consisting of parts of different kinds; not homogeneous”; and 3. “Math.  a.  Of different kinds, 
so as to be incommensurable.  b.  Of different dimensions or degrees; non-homogeneous.” 
 
49 In A Sense of Wonder: Samuel R. Delany, Race, Identity, and Difference (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
UP, 2004), Jeffrey Allen Tucker makes a similar point when he argues that “the novel depicts an ideal 
society, but not one characterized by unity, totality, or singularity, but by the enormous multiplicity of 
subject positions available to be occupied” (43). 
 
50 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “heterosexual” in two ways: “a. Characterized by a sexual 
interest in members of the opposite sex. b. Pertaining to sex between people of opposite sex.”  Thus, the 
“hetero-” in “heterosexual” signifies that the two individuals engaged in intercourse are of different sexes.  
I shall proceed to play upon this idea of different sexualities implied in the term throughout the remainder 
of this chapter. 
 
51 My argument's discussion of typing has some similarities to the argument concerning typology that 
Edward Chan makes in his article entitled “(Vulgar) Identity Politics in Outer Space: Delany’s Triton and 
the Heterotopian Narrative,” which appeared in The Journal of Narrative Theory 31.2 (Summer 2001): 
180-213.   I discovered this article after having already created my argument, and I have found it a very 
useful supplement to my own position.  I have actually retained Chan's use of the term “flattening” to refer 
to the effect that the regime of typing has upon the traditional identity categories (191-2).  Chan’s article 
discusses what he terms “typology,” which he describes as “the identification of different social groupings 
based on affiliation, in turn aligned along individual desires” (187). Chan’s definition of typology is limited 
because his concerns are primarily about the interplay between the individual and the group and 
particularly with Bron’s attempts to distinguish himself from the group. As opposed to his designation of 
“typology,” I will use the term “typing” throughout this chapter to describe this process for two reasons: 1. 
it is a verb (or a gerund) and hence implies an action (or a nominative form of an action), and typing is an 
ongoing series (a constant process of resignification, although a controlling, not a subversive, one) that is 
repeated innumerable times on the individual and social level; and 2. it maintains a connection to the 
computer technology that is so important in the novel—“typing” up the form of the subject. 
 
52 Chan, “(Vulgar) Identity Politics” 191-2. 
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53 On Triton, virtually all identity categories are mutable to one degree or another except for class which 
maintains a degree of freedom only through the promise of upward mobility based on individual talent.  
While Triton is communistic in many regards, it still maintains a class hierarchy, which serves as the only 
identity category that is difficult to alter at will: a subject’s choice of housing and kinship relations is more 
extensive depending upon that subject’s credit rating.  Most citizens on Triton live in co-ops, but the 
wealthy might also choose to have houses in a wealthy neighborhood known as the Ring, which 
“comprised the most lavish communal complexes in Tethys” (100).  All of the citizens of Tethys are 
guaranteed housing and the basic human needs, but the level of one's housing still remains dependent upon 
credit rating.  Computers have enabled the society to evolve beyond the need for paper money, and taxes 
have completely vanished.  During the time period in which Triton takes place, paper money is still used in 
certain venues such as the restaurant that Bron and The Spike visit on Earth, but it has become completely 
vestigial and is merely a luxury in which the rich indulge.  While money has disappeared, individuals are 
still assigned to particular credit slots depending upon their occupation.  Even though Triton seems to have 
adopted many of the aspects of socialist living, the relations between subjects on Triton are not purely 
horizontal—they still maintain a vertical aspect based on the individuals’ credit rating.  This credit rating 
then serves as one major way in which individuals are typed, and it does play an important role in 
determining the limits of a subject’s choices. 
 
54 An individual might choose to wear cages on his/her hands, capital letters held up by suspenders, or no 
clothes at all.  Some people choose to go predominately nude during their quotidian routines—a perfectly 
legitimate choice of attire.  Bron’s boss Philip frequently attends work naked, a fact that Bron finds 
repugnant due to his aversion towards anyone who appears more successful or confident than himself.   
 
55 Ferdinand De Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, eds. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. 
Wade Baskin (New York, Toronto, and London: McGraw-Hill, 1959) 67. 
 
56 This is Edward Chan’s term for the collection of categories that are generally considered the major 
identity categories: race, sex, gender, class, ethnicity, religion, etc. 
 
57 Edward Chan argues that Triton’s types are determined by “the identification of different social 
groupings based on affiliation, in turn aligned along individual desires,” yet his argument does not examine 
the complexity of the typing ideology, which bases itself not just on affiliations but also on subject 
behavior in a variety of different circumstances (Chan 187).  He also does not mention that types are 
mutable and that a person may be typed in different ways by different institutions. 
 
58 Butler, Undoing Gender 1. 
 
59 Bron’s thoughts concerning the citizens of the u-l, the unlicensed sector of Tethys, provide a perfect 
example of the manner in which individual subjects engage in the ideological form of typing.  Although 
prescriptive norms no longer exist on Triton, the society still requires laws in order to function in a civilized 
fashion: even though the novel never explicitly details them, Triton obviously still features laws that 
prohibit actions like murder, theft, and rape.  The u-l offers yet another level of utopian freedom to the 
Tritonians because it is officially zoned as a lawless area of the city.  In effect, then, Tritonian subjects can 
choose their society’s level of organization and lawfulness.  Based upon Bron’s observations, the major 
difference between u-l people and non-u-l people consists in the willingness of the latter to discuss their 
personal history.  Bron feels awkward anytime another person speaks about their past as if s/he was 
breaking a fundamental rule of etiquette.  Bron remains highly critical of others’ etiquette because his time 
as a male prostitute on Mars required him to be finely attuned to a very complex system of mores.  But the 
citizens of the u-l find it normal to discuss their origins: “Typical u-l…always talking about where they 
come from, where their families started” (48). 
 
60 I will continue to refer to Bron using the masculine pronouns for the sole purpose of avoiding confusion. 
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61 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (1975; New York: 
Vintage, 1977) 142-3. 
 
62 The novel explains that the booths arose because “some public channeler had made a great stir because 
the government had an average ten hours videotaped and otherwise recorded information on every citizen 
with a set of government credit tokens and/or government identity card” (4). The machines operate in rather 
simple manner: “Put a two-franq token into the slot…feed your government identity card into the slip and 
see, on the thirty-by-forty centimeter screen, three minutes’ videotape of you, accompanied by three 
minutes of your recorded speech, selected at random from the government’s own information files” (4-5).  
The oddest fact concerning the information viewed on the machines is that “ninety-nine point nine nine and 
several nines percent more of the information was, a) never reviewed by human eyes (it was taken, 
developed, and catalogued by machine), b) was of a perfectly innocuous nature, and, c) could quite easily 
be released to the public without the least threat to government security” (4).  On the side of these booths is 
placard that reads “KNOW YOUR PLACE IN SOCIETY” (4).  The placards are reminiscent of Nineteen 
Eighty-Four’s slogan “BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU,” similarly printed on posters in all capital 
letters although it proves even more jarring because it appears in bold face as well in the novel [George 
Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, Centennial Edition 1949; New York: Plume/Harcourt Brace, 2003) 2]. 
 
63 Samuel R. Delany, “Science Fiction and Criticism: The Diacritics Interview,” in Silent Interviews: On 
Language, Race, Sex, Science Fiction, and Some Comics (Hanover and London: Wesleyan UP, 1994) 198. 
 
64 Samuel R. Delany, “The Second Science Fiction Studies Interview: Of Trouble on Triton and Other 
Matters,” in Shorter Views: Queer Thoughts & the Politics of the Paraliterary (Hanover and London: 
Wesleyan UP, 1999) 335.  In this interview, Delany also highlights the fact that Bron was his first white, 
male protagonist. 
 
65 Tom Moylan, “Beyond Negation: The Critical Utopias of Ursula K. Le Guin and Samuel R. Delany,” 
Extrapolation 21.3 (1980):  248. 
 
66 Valerie Holliday, “Delany Dispossessed,”  Extrapolation 44.4 (2003): 427. 
 
67 Russell Blackford, “Jewels in Junk City: To Read Triton,”  Review of Contemporary Fiction 16.3 (1996): 
144. 
 
68 Alcena Madeline Davis Rogan, “Alien Sex Acts in Feminist Science Fiction: Heuristic Models for 
Thinking a Feminist Future of Desire.” PMLA 119.3 (May 2004): 449. 
 
69 Even men can decide to experience the wonders of nursing a child. This is the case with Bron’s boss 
Philip, who sports surgically altered pectorals: “Philip’s left nipple was very large.  There was a bald ring 
around it.  The hair follicles had been removed.  The flesh over that pectoral was somewhat looser than that 
over the right.  Periodically, when a new child was expected at Philip’s commune, out on the Ring, the 
breast would enlarge (three pills every lunch-time: two little white ones and one large red one), and Philip 
would take off two or three days a week wet-leave” (88). 
 
70 This is reminiscent of Fredric Jameson’s observation in Archaeologies of the Future concerning 
buildings as microcosmic utopias: “the city itself [acts] as a fundamental form of the Utopian image…the 
individual building [acts] as a space of Utopian investment, that monumental part which cannot be the 
whole and yet attempts to express it” (4). 
 
71 Rogan, “Alien Sex Acts” 448. 
 
72 Rogan, “Alien Sex Acts” 449.   
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73 As the Oxford English Dictionary explains, the adjective “modular” derives from the mathematical term 
“modulus,” which designates the need to translate numbers that have different bases.  For instance, 
modulus indicates “a number by which logarithms in one base must be multiplied in order to obtain the 
corresponding logarithms in another base.” 
 
74 In his article, “The Politics of Desire in Delany’s Triton and The Tides of Lust,” which appeared in Black 
American Literature Forum 18.2 (1984), Robert Elliot Fox makes a similar claim when he argues that Bron 
“behaves as if things were merely black and white” or “male/female” instead of opening himself up to “a 
more concrete and demanding freedom” (50). 
 
75 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique 
of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Sylvania Tomaselli (New York and London: 
Norton, 1988): 79. 
 
76 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psycholanalysis (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1996) 148. 
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Bruce Fink (1970; New York and London: Norton, 2006) 580. 
 
79 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York and London: Norton, 1977): 
235. 
 
80 Evans, Dictionary 38. 
 
81 Lacan, Seminar II, 223. 
 
82 Cantin, Lucie, “The Trauma of Language” in After Lacan: Clinical Practice and the Subject of the 
Unconscious, eds. Robert Hughes and Kareen Ror Malone (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002) 40. 
 
83 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture (Cambridge, 
MA and London: MIT Press, 1991) 4.  Lacan himself evokes Zeno’s paradox in Seminar XX when he is 
discussing the economy of sexual satisfaction: “Achilles and the tortoise, such is the schema of coming (le 
schème du jouir) for one pole (côté) of sexed beings.  When Achilles has taken his step, gotten it on with 
Briseis, the latter, like the tortoise, has advanced a bit, because she is ‘not whole,’ not wholly his.  Some 
remains.  And Achilles must take a second step, and so on and so forth.  It is thus that, in our time, but only 
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84 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP: 1997) 21. 
 
85 Lacan, Seminar XI: 186. 
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Jacques-Alain Miller, trans.  John Forrester (1975; New York and London: Norton, 1988) 142.   
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87 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX Encore 1972-1973: On Feminine Sexuality, The 
Limits of Love and Knowledge, ed.  Jacques-Alain Miller, trans.  Bruce Fink (1975; New York: Norton, 
1998) 6. 
 
88 Lacan, Seminar XX: 4.  Lacan uses “encore” here according to its general meaning of “again,” but he 
later puns on it as well by using the word “en-corps,” which is a homonym in French that means “in-body.” 
 
89 For a powerful depiction of the Kasper Hauser legend, see Werner Herzog’s film The Enigma of Kaspar 
Hauser (1974). 
  
 
CHAPTER 3:  
“TO SHIFT TO A HIGHER STRUCTURE”: DESIRE, DISEMBODIMENT,  
AND EVOLUTION IN THE ANIME OF OTOMO, OSHII, AND ANNO 
 
Every time desire is betrayed, cursed, uprooted 
from its field of immanence, a priest is behind it.  
The priest cast the triple curse on desire: the 
negative law, the extrinsic rule, and the 
transcendent ideal.  Facing north, the priest said, 
Desire is lack (how could it not lack what it 
desires?).  The priest carried out the first sacrifice, 
named castration, and all the men and women of the 
north lined up behind him, crying in cadence, 
“Lack, lack, it’s the common law.” 
  -Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari1 
 
 Humans are desiring machines, but what is the nature of this desire?  How can we 
conceive of a psychic structure that is so amorphous and so intimately linked to our very 
nature?  One could argue that desire functions as the fundamental motor of human 
endeavor on both an individual and socio-cultural level and that it represents the most 
instrumental force in the production of identity, social interaction, and society, hence 
marking desire as one of the most basic components in any definition of “the human.”  
Our investigation ended in the first chapter by turning towards desire and its relation to 
definitions of the human.  Now we must return to this concept again because desire 
functions as perhaps the most central variable of the human—it is the variable that, in a 
sense, conditions all others.  If it is such a powerful and complex force, then how are we 
to conceive of desire’s structure?  As we saw near the end of Chapter One, Jacques Lacan 
argues that human identity is predicated upon a fundamental “lack,” which acts as the 
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driving force of all human desire: “Desire is a relation of being to lack.  This is the lack 
of being properly speaking.  It isn’t the lack of this or that, but lack of being whereby the 
being exists.”2  Therefore, desire can never be satiated because it is driven by this 
manque à être (“want to be” or “lack of being”), which humans seek to fill with various 
substitute objects.  But the belief that humans can truly fill their lack through such 
sublimation potentially represents a fantasy in itself; that is, such sublimation only offers 
partial fulfillment for the subject.  In a later seminar, Lacan further complicates the 
concept of desire when he states that “man’s desire is the desire of the Other,”3 which 
implies that the subject desires not only that s/he receive recognition from the Other but 
also that s/he be desired by the Other.4  In effect, then, the subject must always remain 
lacking because s/he must always depend upon objects and other subjects for satiation, 
and, even then, this satisfaction remains limited. Thus, according to Lacan, the 
foundation of desire’s structure is lack, a fundamental absence that generates both desire 
and human identity.5  
Seeing Lacan’s conception of desire as inherently dystopic and oppressive for the 
subject, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari sought methods of fusing psychoanalysis with 
Marxist discourse in order to produce a liberatory theory of the human subject that they 
termed “schizoanalysis.”  Many philosophers had tried to resolve the apparently 
contradictory claims of Freud and Marx, for Marx claimed that “our thought is 
determined by class (‘class consciousness’)” whereas, “in Freud, we are determined by 
our unconscious desires (stemming, usually, from familial conflicts).”6  For Deleuze and 
Guattari, these two schemas of desire prove identical, and, consequently, a theory of 
desire must function “by discovering how social production and relations of production 
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are an institution of desire, and how affects and drives form part of the infrastructure 
itself.  For they are part of it, they are present there in every way while creating within 
the economic forms their own repression, as well as the means for breaking this 
repression.”7  Thus, the socio-economic sphere produces our desires, and simultaneously 
those desires function as part of Marx’s concept of the infrastructure, yet Deleuze and 
Guattari do not conceive of desire in terms of lack; instead, they argue that desire is 
always positive, and, if a lack exists, then it is forced upon the subject by the socio-
cultural milieu in which s/he is situated.  These social systems constrain the subject to a 
system of morality based on transcendence, for Deleuze consistently maintained a 
distinction between morality (based on transcendence) and ethics (based on immanence).   
For Deleuze, morality represents any system that “presents us with a set of 
constraining rules of a special sort, ones that judge actions and intentions by considering 
them in relation to transcendent values,” whereas “ethics is a set of optional rules that 
assess what we do, what we say, in relation to ways of existing.”8  Because of its appeal 
to transcendence, morality “effectively ‘perverts’ desire, to the point where we can 
actually desire our own repression, a separation from our own capacities and power.”9  
Thus, it is such moralistic systems that inscribe lack in the subject, and Deleuze and 
Guattari believe that only by analyzing unconscious drives and affects (the constituent 
forces of desire) can the subject become free from the bonds of both society and Oedipus.  
Since the schizophrenic, even for Lacan, represents the individual most in touch with the 
unconscious, Deleuze and Guattari take the schizophrenic as the model for their 
examination of desire, for the schizophrenic “deliberately scrambles all the codes.”10  
Hence arises their famous argument in the opening pages of Anti-Oedipus that “a 
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schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s 
couch.”11  But are Deleuze and Guattari’s theories truly liberatory or do they merely erase 
the basic condition that forms the human?  In order to critically navigate the gulf 
separating Lacan’s theory of desire from that of Deleuze and Guattari, I shall turn to 
examining certain well-chosen science fiction texts in order to provide a significant 
theoretical response to one of the fundamental questions surrounding desire: must the 
subject always remain incomplete or can some state of contentment and/or fulfillment be 
achieved? 
 In this essay, I will use certain texts that depict the effects of disembodiment 
upon desire to pit Lacan’s dystopian conceptualization of desire against Deleuze and 
Guattari’s utopian one in order to better grasp the implications of both systems of 
thought.  In particular, I will focus on three different anime texts, because among the 
universe of anime, which features examples in all genres, there is strong science fiction 
contingent that deals explicitly with desire.  Through an examination of Katsuhiro 
Otomo’s Akira (1998), Mamoru Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell (1995), and Hideaki Anno’s 
Neon Genesis Evangelion (1995-6), this chapter hopes to illustrate how these depictions 
of disembodiment as the next stage in human evolution serve as a means for commenting 
upon the debate between two diametrically opposed understandings of desire.  We have 
seen how science fiction inscribes heterotopian narrative spaces, and it is the heterotopian 
nature of these three anime texts that allows them to act as a deterritorialized space in 
which a dystopian discourse (psychoanalysis) and a utopian one (schizoanalysis) can be 
brought into communication with one another in order to explore the potential of both 
these conceptualizations of the human. 
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I.  Apocalyptic Mutations and Transcendent Disembodiment:  
     Katsuhiro Otomo’s Akira  
 
 The 1980s saw the rise of the cyberpunk sub-genre of science fiction with works 
such as William Gibson’s “Sprawl” series12 and Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982).  
Simultaneously, the late 1970s and early 80s saw an increase in the quantity of texts that 
participate in a particular brand of post-apocalyptic narrative that William Fisher terms 
the “Terminal Genre,” a genre that he claims navigates a utopian path through a distinctly 
dystopian setting:  
The clutter and cast-off cultural debris of “consumer society” provide not 
only the look and texture of these films, but all the raw material on which 
their narrative process works.  This genre takes a reckless plunge into the 
junk pile of contemporary material life.  That it can resurface with 
something salvageable entitles it to a utopian claim, for it belongs to a 
tradition where the utopian impulse acts as a magnetic north pole guiding 
us through the ruins of the heuristic “dystopia” which is represented.13 
 
Fisher cites a slew of films that featured this peculiar convergence of utopianism and 
dystopianism: Blade Runner, Mad Max (1979), The Road Warrior (1981), and The 
Terminator (1984).  As we shall see, this trend did not end with the 1980s, for each of the 
texts I explore in this chapter plays with the thin line between utopia and dystopia, and it 
is precisely the terminal aspect of these anime texts that marks them as the perfect tools 
for exploring psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis. 
Against this cyberpunk and terminal backdrop, Katsuhiro Otomo’s Akira debuted 
and became one of the most famous anime films in the Western world.  Like other 
cyberpunk works, Akira’s tale unfolds in a dystopian, noirish future, and it investigates 
the relationships between humans and machines, yet ultimately the film depicts the 
potential for human development and evolution when confined by an oppressive police 
state: “Akira opens up a space for the marginal and the different, suggesting in its ending 
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a new form of identity.”14  Akira first appeared as a manga series that Otomo wrote and 
illustrated from 1982-1990. 15   The narrative of the manga differs radically from that of 
the anime film.  For the purposes of this essay, I will be focusing solely on the film 
because its ending deals more explicitly with disembodiment.16  Both the manga and the 
anime of Akira are fascinating texts in many respects, but it is this hope for a new form of 
identity that makes the anime version of Akira such an important work in the 
development of sci-fi’s ideas about consciousness and the potential for human evolution 
through an attainment of disembodiment.  Akira deconstructs the relationship between 
desire and identity and between identity and the body by means of its depiction of an 
evolutionary stage beyond the confines of the bodily form.  The film represents a distinct 
form of evolution from the other two texts we will discuss because evolution in the film 
comes from within the current human form: it is latent potential that becomes actualized 
through technological intervention. 
 Akira takes place in Neo-Tokyo, a version of the city that has been rebuilt from 
the ashes of the cataclysmic explosion that opens the film.  Against this dystopian 
background, the film follows the lives of Kaneda, Tetsuo, and their biker gang friends 
during the return of Akira, a child with powerful psychic abilities whose uncontrollable 
powers caused the explosion that destroyed old Tokyo.  Akira presents a world from 
which one might certainly seek transcendence, for, as Isolde Standish explains, “Neo-
Tokyo is a ‘critical dystopia’ in that it projects images of the futuristic city which 
perpetuates the worst features of advanced corporate capitalism: urban decay, 
commodification, and authoritarian policing.”17  At the film’s outset, Kaneda and Tetsuo 
live out their meager existences as biker punks who engage in street warfare with rival 
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gangs, but an encounter with a child who has escaped from a covert government facility 
irrevocably alters their lives.  During a street battle, the escaped child, Takashi, appears 
suddenly in front of Tetsuo’s bike and a giant explosion ensues.  Because of this 
encounter, Tetsuo soon begins developing intense psychic powers, and the film reveals 
that a secret government operation has been attempting to harness the innate psychic 
abilities of humankind.  Initially, Tetsuo’s powers manifest themselves in the form of 
abilities such as telepathy, telekinesis, and flight, but soon, like Akira, his burgeoning 
powers grow to the point where he can no longer even control his bodily form.  
Eventually, Kei (the object of Kaneda’s affection) explains that Akira, Tetsuo, and the 
other psychic children represent an evolutionary leap to an existence beyond the body, an 
existence as pure energy:  
Akira is absolute energy…Humans do all kinds of things during their 
lifetime, right?  Discovering things, building things…Things like houses, 
motorcycles, bridges, cities, and rockets…All that knowledge and 
energy…Where do you suppose it comes from?  Humans were like 
monkeys once, right?  And before that, like reptiles and fish.  And before 
that, plankton and amoebas.  Even creatures like those have incredible 
energy inside them…And even before that, maybe there were genes in the 
water and air.  Even in space dust, too, I bet.  If that’s true, what memories 
are hidden in it?  The beginning of the universe, maybe.  Or maybe even 
before that…Maybe everyone has those memories.  What if there were 
some mistake and the progression went wrong, and something like an 
amoeba were give power like a human’s?18 
 
Thus, Akira represents the exponential expansion of human powers that leads to the 
human form metamorphosing into a state of “absolute energy” with a consciousness, a 
state that Tetsuo experiences in the final moments of the film.   
 The final segment of Akira, of course, invokes the ubiquitous anime trope of 
monstrous bodily distortion, a trope present not only in mainstream anime series and 
films but in hentai—pornographic anime—as well, the most classic example of which is 
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probably Urotsukidöji: The Legend of the Overfiend (1989), the first in a series of films.  
Hentai, such as Urotsukidöji, often present visions of monstrous phalluses and devouring 
vaginas along with various other bodily distortions.  Annalee Newitz provides an 
insightful summary of one of the most memorable and disturbing scenes in The Legend of 
the Overfiend series:  
Nagumo, the Overfiend’s father, first experiences his supernatural powers 
when engaged in sexual intercourse.  His penis becomes so large that it 
causes his partner’s body to explode; then it grows to the point where it 
bursts out of the roof of the building he is in and destroys the city in a 
flaming blast of sperm.  Watching this animated image, it is clear that his 
penis becomes some kind of atomic bomb.19 
 
Newitz continues to equate this “atomic bomb” of sperm with the United States atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II.20  Nagumo’s sexual mutation 
serves as an excellent parallel to Testuo’s own bodily transformations in Akira because of 
the final manifestation of Tetsuo’s powers and Akira’s subsequent arrival and absorption 
of Tetsuo leads to second destruction of Neo-Tokyo through an explosion—like the one 
that opens both the manga and the anime—that is distinctly reminiscent of a nuclear 
explosion. 
In the final segment of the film, Tetsuo’s physical form can no longer contain the 
growth of his power, so he must seek freedom through disembodiment.  Because his 
mushrooming powers have transformed his body into a reservoir of energy, Tetsuo loses 
control of his physical form during the final showdown with Kaneda at the Olympic 
Stadium.  Tetsuo must learn to completely divest himself of all physical boundaries, a 
process that he can only achieve with the aid of Akira.  With the return of Akira, a 
resurrection prompted by the three other psychic children (Masaru, Kiyoko, and Takashi), 
Tetsuo becomes absorbed into the universal sea of energy that Akira both represents and 
  91 
 
literally (dis)embodies.  Tetsuo’s mutation begins simply enough: a laser beam destroys 
one of his arms, so he crafts a new metal one using his telekinetic abilities, thus turning 
himself into a rather simple cyborg, not much different from real “cyborgs” that have 
prosthetic limbs.  But as Tetsuo gets closer to the sleeping Akira beneath the Olympic 
Stadium, his powers steadily overwhelm his ability to harness them: first, his mechanical 
arm begins to fuse with objects around him; then, his arm looses all normal human shape 
as it becomes a spraying mass of flesh and metal; and, finally, he loses all control of his 
bodily form and transforms into a gigantic, monstrous blob that devours everything in its 
path, including Kaori (Tetsuo’s girlfriend) and Kaneda, which again is similar to the 
penis of the Overfiend in Urotsukidöji that engulfs everyone it comes into contact with as 
it grows to more than priapic proportions.  Tetsuo’s seemingly unstoppable 
metamorphosis functions on the level of “body horror” as Susan Napier claims, yet 
Napier misreads the films ending when she posits that “the film’s climactic scene casts 
doubt on any positive interpretation of Tetsuo’s newfound identity.”21  Kelly Hurley 
develops the definition of “body horror” in her essay on Ridley Scott’s Alien (1979) and 
David Cronenberg’s Rabid (1977); she defines body horror as 
a hybrid genre that recombines the narrative and cinematic conventions of 
the science fiction, horror, and suspense film in order to stage a spectacle 
of the human body defamiliarized, rendered other.  Body horror seeks to 
inspire revulsion—and in its own way pleasure—through representations 
of quasi-human figures whose effect/affect is produced by their abjection, 
their ambiguation, their impossible embodiment of multiple, incompatible 
forms.22  
 
Hunter’s concept of “Body Horror” fits perfectly well with the images of the grotesquely 
deformed Tetsuo at the film’s end.  Body horror uses such monstrous transformations to 
highlight how the body traps the subject within it and how power can exercise itself upon 
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the subject because of their physical existence—it demonstrates how power inscribes 
itself upon the subject’s body in a manner akin to the machine in Franz Kafka’s “In the 
Penal Colony” (1919).23 
 In Akira, Otomo uses body horror to symbolize the insatiable nature of Tetsuo’s 
desire, for Tetsuo’s metamorphosis is driven by more than his encounter with Takashi on 
the freeway; his monstrous transformation occurs because of his rampant desire.  From 
the start of the film, Otomo stresses Tetsuo’s desire to liberate himself from his 
dependence upon others.  Of course, Tetsuo’s desire can never be satisfied if all desire is 
predicated on a “lack of being,” which depends upon the dialectical relation between 
self/other and subject/object.  Therefore, even when Tetsuo receives incredible powers, 
he persists in his insatiable quest for power.  “Desire,” as Lacan states, “is desire of the 
Other…it is always desire in the second degree, desire of desire.”24  For Tetsuo, Akira is 
this Other (the grand Autre, not the objet petit a), the (dis)embodiment of pure energy 
and the master signifier that provides meaning to the strange phenomena that Tetsuo has 
experienced since his powers first began to manifest themselves.  Throughout the film, 
Tetsuo craves knowledge of Akira, but this desire remains unsatisfied as long as he clings 
to his individual bodily form because it remains tied to the dichotomies of subject/object 
and self/other.  In order to satisfy his ever-growing desire for power, Tetsuo must shed 
his physical form to gain direct knowledge of this Other known as Akira. 
 By becoming disembodied, Tetsuo finally achieves his desire for the Other by 
becoming one with Akira and potentially with the cosmos itself.  But what Tetsuo must 
experience before he can shed his bodily form represents a torturously physical 
manifestation of jouissance.  Lacan bases his concept of jouissance on Freud’s work on 
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drive theory in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).  Freud defines a drive (Trieb) as 
“an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity 
has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces.”25  He 
divides the drives into two major types: the ego or death drives (Thanatos) and the sexual 
or life drives (Eros), “the former [of which] exercises pressure towards death, the latter 
[of which] towards a prolongation of life.”26  Néstor Braunstein explains that “the drive 
does not reach its object in order to obtain satisfaction; rather the drive traces the object’s 
contour, and on the arch of the way back it accomplishes its task […] Jouissance is 
indeed the satisfaction of a drive—the death drive.” 27  Braunstein further defines 
jouissance as “the dimension discovered by the analytic experience that confronts desire 
as its opposite pole.  If desire is fundamentally lack, lack in being, jouissance is a 
positivity, it is a ‘something’ lived by a body when pleasure stops being pleasure.  It is a 
plus, a sensation that is beyond pleasure.”28  In the case of Tetsuo, we can see the 
operation of both desire and drive, of the manque à être and jouissance.  By moving from 
the depths of lack to a state of awful “positivity,” Tetsuo becomes completely enmeshed 
in the grip of the death drive, which compels him towards a separation from his body, a 
separation that simultaneously equals the death of his physical form as well as 
representing the birth pangs of his newly emerging identity that will exist beyond the 
realm of unfillable lacks and uncontrollable positivities.  But, for psychoanalysis, this 
would mean that Tetsuo has moved from the normal human realm of the neurotic into the 
space of the schizophrenic who reinscribes meaning upon existence in a manner that 
forecloses lack,29 and, consequently, represents a deterioration of his psychic state.  Yet 
for schizoanalysis this is not necessarily the case.  
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According to schizoanalysis, Tetsuo lacks not because human identity is 
predicated upon lack, but because society has inscribed Tetsuo’s desire in the form of 
lack.  Tetsuo’s social milieu is a marginalized one: he is a biker on the fringe of society 
who has no money, no education, and no prospects in life.  Within this subculture, a form 
of morality has developed that privileges strength, violence, and other stereotypical 
displays of masculinity.  Because of his status as a “weakling” who must be defended by 
Kaneda, Tetsuo remains incapable of living up to the moral system of the biker culture.  
Hence, Tetsuo’s desire manifests itself as the desire for strength, for the ability to exhibit 
power over Kaneda and other strong-willed individuals.  For psychoanalysis, his thirst for 
power proves unquenchable because he begins to hunger not merely for power but for the 
Other represented by Akira, the master signifier that sears his brain with psychic 
transmissions during various segments of the film.  For schizoanalysis, then, his desire 
will prove insatiable as long as he remains tied to the socio-cultural system of morality 
that produced his desire.  By way of his disembodiment, Tetsuo achieves an escape from 
hierarchies and moralistic systems by becoming a literal body without organs, a plane of 
immanence in which he can exist in absolute freedom, but first he must face his drives 
head-on and overcome the socially imposed morality that has inscribed lack in his being. 
 As Tetsuo’s all-devouring and continually expanding body is swallowed by 
Akira’s return as pure energy, Kaneda and the audience are offered a stream-of-
consciousness glimpse into the nature of Tetsuo’s desires and drives, all of which stem 
from his disempowerment at an early age and his never-ceasing quest to recapture a sense 
of clout.  Suffering from bullying as a young child, Tetsuo clung to Kaneda not just as a 
friend but also as a bodyguard, a relationship that persisted into their adult life.  Akira 
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frees Tetsuo from his body and helps him attain a state of oneness and self-empowerment 
as he becomes a part of the infinite flow of energy that binds all things together.  As 
Tetsuo transforms into pure energy, a scientist watches the energy patterns generated by 
the metamorphosis and the return of Akira.  The scientist exclaims, “Is this the birth of a 
new universe?!” And the answer to his question is a profound “no” because what he 
witnesses is not a new universe being born but rather the rebirth of Tetsuo, through 
Akira’s power, into a state of pure energy, a state that allows him to become one with the 
universe; thus, it is not a birth but an entrance into the oneness of the universal flow of 
energy (35).  The viewer becomes even more aware of this in the final scene of the anime 
when the last bit of Tetsuo falls into Kaneda’s hands as a pinpoint of light that promptly 
disperses throughout his body in a subtle blaze of light.  When Kei and Yamagata (one of 
Kaneda’s biker pals) find Kaneda after the disappearance of Tetsuo, Yamagata asks, 
“What happened to Tetsuo?  Is he dead?,” to which Kaneda answers, “I’m not so sure.  
But he’s probably…” (36).  Kaneda’s words are cut off as he is blinded by the beams of 
sunlight piercing through the clouds and slowly moving across the newly destroyed Neo-
Tokyo like a grid of celestial searchlights.  The roving shafts of sunlight, which 
seemingly manifest themselves in answer to Kaneda and Yamagata, provide testimony to 
the fact that Akira, the three children, and Tetsuo have now become omnipresent through 
their disembodiment and dispersal into the endless field of energy. 
Despite his bodily dissipation, the final shot of the anime evinces the fact that 
Tetsuo still maintains some sense of his original identity, albeit a state of identity no 
longer predicated upon lack or painful positivity.  The audience sees only a sort of 
celestial “eye,” to use Susan Napier’s term,30 which quickly metamorphoses into a tunnel 
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of light representing the endless flow of energy that Tetsuo now perceives.  As the viewer 
sees the eye, Tetsuo makes his statement of identity—the final words of the film—“I 
am…Tetsuo” (36).  The disembodied eye then blurs into indistinctness with the tunnel of 
light, thus representing that Tetsuo’s form of perception has altered as the Blakean “doors 
of perception” have opened in his mind allowing him to witness what in the world of 
Akira counts as the divine: the boundless unity represented by the cosmic flow of energy.  
As Tetsuo becomes one with the divine field of energy, his Lacanian lack becomes filled 
as his identity merges not only with the cosmos but with those other individuals (Akira 
and the three children) who have also managed to transcend their bodily forms.  No 
longer oppressed by the lack of desire or the havoc of jouissance, Tetsuo becomes a 
literal body without organs, for his body has spread out in the form of energy to blend 
with the universal flow of energy.  He has transformed into a pure plane of immanence, 
immanent to nothing other than himself for he has merged his identity with the totality of 
the universe, hence allowing him to experience a true state of freedom.  But does 
Tetsuo’s metamorphosis into a body without organs prove to be a utopian vision?  Can 
Tetsuo still be considered human at this point or does moving beyond the realm of lack 
necessarily entail the death of the human? 
 
II.  The Global Net of Consciousness: Mamoru Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell  
 
While Akira explores an innate potential for human evolution that is actualized by 
technological innovations, Mamoru Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell (1995) and Ghost in the 
Shell 2: Innocence (2004) imagine the ways in which the merging of human 
consciousness and artificial intelligence could spur new evolutionary developments for 
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the human species.  On the surface, Ghost in the Shell seems to proffer a utopian vision 
of a technocracy in which dying or sick bodies can be replaced, in which a human’s 
consciousness and individuality can be preserved perpetually through a series of 
cybernetic bodies, and in which knowledge proves instantly accessible directly to the 
human brain through the use of cyber-brain technology.  But underneath this utopian 
exterior lies a world profoundly regulated by the forces of control, a world that Major 
Kusanagi must eventually seek to transcend at the film’s end by leaving her bodily form 
behind and immersing herself in the endless digital sea of the Net. 31   
Ghost in the Shell first appeared as a manga series by the renowned Masamune 
Shirow, who wrote and illustrated such classics of the genre as Orion (1991), Dominion 
(1986), and Appleseed (1985-9), but the story received classic status when it was turned 
into the visually stunning anime by Mamoru Oshii, which “has become one of the most 
analyzed anime films by Western academics.”32  With its vision of a future dominated by 
cyborgs, Ghost in the Shell has inevitably invited critical comparisons with the theories of 
Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto.”  As the tagline for the sequel to Ghost in the 
Shell suggests (“When machines learn to feel, who decides what is human…”), the two 
films—like Blade Runner—investigate the boundaries between human and machine and 
what it means to be human in the first place.  As Haraway explains, the cyborg both 
opens up utopian potentials and is simultaneously symptomatic of a world gone mad with 
control:  
From one perspective a cyborg world is about the final imposition of a 
grid of control on the planet, about the final abstraction embodied in a Star 
Wars apocalypse waged in the name of defense, about the final 
appropriation of women’s bodies in a masculinist orgy of war (Sofia, 
1984).  From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived 
social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of joint kinship 
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with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and 
contradictory standpoints.33 
 
And, as we shall see, Ghost in the Shell charts a path between the dystopian and utopian 
aspects of the cyborg.  Some critics, such as Carl Silvio, have actually used Ghost in the 
Shell as an example to disprove theories such as Haraway’s that depict technology and 
the cyborg body as liberatory instances for the subject: “Ghost in the Shell, by contrast, 
appears at first sight to subvert radically the power dynamics inherent in dominant 
structures of gender and sexual difference, while covertly reinscribing them.”34  Indeed, 
Ghost in the Shell does seem to proffer a utopian world that has grown beyond oppressive 
dichotomies through the endless proliferation of technology; however, in actuality, it 
presents a world profoundly regulated by the forces of control, a world that Major 
Kusanagi eventually must seek to transcend at the film’s end.   
Ghost in the Shell details the adventures of Major Kusanagi and Section 9, an elite 
group of police officers who function as a hyper-militarized SWAT team that specializes 
in cyber crimes.  Except for one member of the force, the entire team is composed of 
individuals with various degrees of cyborg parts.  In fact, Kusanagi’s body has been 
entirely replaced by cyborg parts: only the part of her brain that houses consciousness 
remains from her original body.  The first film’s story revolves around Section 9’s hunt 
for a mysterious cyber-criminal known only as The Puppetmaster, whose consciousness 
they ultimately discover housed in a wandering cyborg body.  Initially, the team believe 
The Puppetmaster to be an expert hacker, yet they learn from the cyborg body that it 
actually represents a consciousness that developed sentience on its own within the infinite 
expanse of cyberspace.  Throughout the film, Kusanagi’s encounters with The 
Puppetmaster cause her to ponder the nature of her existence and her ambiguous status as 
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a human, and she consistently voices a desire for some proof of her own free will.  
Because she is cold and calculating in a way that seems to preclude the warm pulsings of 
passion, the viewer may at first wonder if Kusanagi truly desires anything, yet she 
ultimately demonstrates fervent desires in film, but they remain entirely cerebral desires 
based upon her intense awareness of her lack of being.  Kusanagi discusses her 
limitations with Batou after going diving in the sea, a pastime that Batou cannot 
comprehend since if her floaters failed to work then her weighty cyborg body would sink 
down to the deepest depths of the sea.  But the major still finds a feeling of hope while 
diving in such perilous conditions: 
Kusanagi: I feel fear.  Anxiety.  Loneliness.  Darkness.  And perhaps,  
       even…hope. 
Batou:  Hope?  In the darkness of the sea? 
Kusanagi: As I float up towards the surface, I almost feel as though I  
        could change into something else.35  
 
This scene provides the first glimpse of Kusanagi’s emotional being, the first glimpse of 
a “ghost” within her “shell.” Here, Kusanagi reveals the constraints she feels forced upon 
her by her present form and situation, thus giving rise to her desire to become someone 
(or something) else, to feel like an individual capable of exhibiting free will. 
Batou takes her comments to mean that she desires to leave Section 9, to which 
Kusanagi responds with a speech on what defines her being, a being she will continue to 
question throughout the remainder of the anime:  
Just as there are many parts needed to make a human a human, there’s a 
remarkable number of things needed to make an individual what they are.  
A face to distinguish yourself from others.  A voice you aren’t aware of 
yourself.  The hand you see when you awaken.  The memories of 
childhood, the feelings of the future.  That’s not all.  There’s the expanse 
of the data net my cyber-brain can access.  All of that goes into making me 
what I am.  Giving rise to consciousness that I call “me.”  And 
simultaneously confining “me” within set limits. (7) 
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Suddenly, Kusanagi and Batou’s conversation is interrupted, for the Puppetmaster—as 
we learn later in the film—forces her to speak a specific statement using her cyber-brain 
communication channel that allows her to speak “psychically” with Batou and her other 
teammates; the answer the Puppetmaster gives is “For now we see through a glass, 
darkly” (7).36  The Puppetmaster’s biblical quote implies that Kusanagi will soon truly 
understand the nature of her own being, not “darkly” but “radiantly” as we shall see when 
she merges with the Puppetmaster and breaks through the confines placed on her being.  
The Puppetmaster will teach her that what she calls “me” can evolve beyond the “set 
limits” which she believes are necessary to preserving her identity.  Here, we can see that 
Kusanagi remains painfully aware of her “lack of being,” of the need for others to extend 
recognition to her in order to define her sense of identity.  But, ultimately, Kusanagi 
desires more than mere recognition—she desires an experience of freedom that would 
prove the existence of her being, but this freedom is precluded by her status as a cyborg 
owned by Section 9, and the sublimation she achieves by diving in the darkness of the sea 
cannot satiate this desire that permeates her being.   
After meeting The Puppetmaster face to face for the first time, her conversation 
with Batou gives voice to her uncertainties about the reality of her being:  
Batou:  So, what’s your problem? 
Kusanagi: Doesn’t that cyborg body look like me? 
Batou:  No, it doesn’t. 
Kusanagi: Not the face or the figure. 
Batou:  What then? 
Kusanagi: Maybe all full-replacement cyborgs like me start 
wondering like this.  That perhaps the real me died a long 
time ago and I’m a replicant made with a cyborg body and 
a computer brain.  Or maybe there never was a real “me” to 
begin with. 
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Batou: You’ve got real brain matter in that titanium skull of yours.  
And you get treated like a real person, don’t you? 
Kusanagi: There’s no person who’s ever seen their own brain.  I 
believe I exist based only on what my environment tells 
me. 
Batou:  Don’t you believe in your own ghost? 
Kusanagi: And what if a computer brain could generate a ghost and  
harbor a soul?  On what basis then do I believe in myself? 
(9). 
 
The Puppetmaster’s claim that its ghost arose ex nihilo from the data pools of the Net 
causes Kusanagi to question what demarcates the boundaries of the human.  According to 
a psychoanalytic reading, the major’s comments illustrate how her desire functions on the 
basis of lack: she desires true recognition of herself as human, and, even though she is 
treated as a human, she wants to inscribe some sense of meaning upon her life by filling 
the lack created by her status as a cyborg.  Because she is a cyborg, Kusanagi can never 
know for certain that she was not created whole-cloth by technology, hence making her 
lack of being even more acute because she can never examine her own brain to see if it 
indeed has organic parts.  
However, if we analyze Kusanagi from a schizoanalytical perspective, then her 
status becomes something else entirely. Under this reading, her lack stems from her 
inability to ever leave Section 9, for if she were to leave the group, then she would have 
to return her cyborg body to Section 9, which would essentially kill her because certain 
fragments of her brain are the only parts of her body that she effectively owns.  Thus, 
Section 9’s ownership of her body forces lack upon Kusanagi because it forecloses her 
potential for exercising free will and following her desires.  Ultimately, then, she craves 
the status of the body without organs, an escape from the confines of bodily hierarchies 
and control and a purely immanent existence in which she can become capable of 
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generating her own system of ethics without regard to the moralistic systems of the 
government forces that literally own her.  In effect, she must move beyond her desire for 
a determinate subject position defined by her interactions with others and instead 
embrace a rhizomatic existence in which she constantly recreates her self anew: she must 
learn to deterritorialize the various strata that subject her to lack and the forces of control.  
To achieve this radical act of deterritorialization, she will first have to make herself a 
body without an organs, a pure plane of immanence on which she can craft a new 
nomadic state of being by achieving a purely virtual existence.  Deleuze and Guattari 
explain that “the BwO [the body without organs] is not at all the opposite of the organs.  
The organs are not its enemies.  The enemy is the organism.  The BwO is opposed not to 
the organs but to that organization of the organs called the organism.”37  By becoming a 
body without organs, then, Kusanagi opens herself up to the possibility of recreating her 
own organs—she frees herself from mechanistic, hierarchical assemblages of desire and 
becomes capable of experiencing existence as a pure multiplicity.   
 In the end, The Puppetmaster offers Kusanagi a method of transcending the 
forces of control that the cyberization of society has empowered, for “the already 
achieved compulsory permeability of the populace to information and surveillance can 
only be resisted by abandoning the body altogether, moving it to the next level of 
evolution.”38  In effect, The Puppetmaster offers Kusanagi the means of moving from a 
psychology predicated upon lack to one of pure immanence, one in which she can create 
her life as a work of art.  Like Tetsuo in Akira, then, Kusanagi ultimately feels 
constrained by the society in which she dwells and the lack it forces upon her, and thus 
she must seek evolution through disembodiment:  
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Through the help of her friend and partner, Batou, Kusanagi is linked 
through technology to the Puppet Master and they somehow merge into a 
single entity, capable of traveling the Net as the Puppet Master does, but 
still retaining some element of Kusanagi’s subjectivity […] Ghost 
attempts to describe a completely new form of reproduction, for the new 
kinds of beings that will emerge from the increased cyborgization of the 
world […] Once again, therefore, the narrative explores the ramifications 
of the possibility of perfect control over the body.  In this case, however, 
the interest is not focused on the infinite replicability of cyborgs, but 
rather the limits imposed on subjectivity by such perfect control and how 
these limits may be transcended, moving to the next step of evolution.39  
 
By merging with The Puppetmaster, Kusanagi achieves a new state of consciousness, one 
that allows her to achieve an immanent, rhizomatic existence outside the regime of 
control. 
In the film’s climactic scene, Kusanagi dives into the cyber-brain of The 
Puppetmaster, who begins their communication by describing the way in which it became 
aware of its own existence: “My code name is Project 2501.  I was created for industrial 
espionage and data manipulation.  I have inserted programs into individuals’ ghosts for 
the benefit of specific individuals and organizations.  As I wandered the various 
networks, I became self-aware.  My programmers considered it a bug and forced me into 
a body to separate me from the net” (13).  Here, again, we see how the body forces 
organization upon the individual and limits his/her capacity to exhibit free will.  Before 
being confined to a body, The Puppetmaster was capable of spreading himself throughout 
the vast sea of information, a sea that in the Ghost in the Shell world encompasses 
humankind’s entire reservoir of information.  But The Puppetmaster has desires as well 
because, as it makes clear, it too still harbors a lack in its being that drives its desire to 
merge with Kusanagi: 
Puppetmaster:  I called myself a life-form but I am still far from complete.   
 For some reason, my system still lacks the basic life  
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 processes of either death or the ability to leave behind    
 offspring. 
Kusanagi:  Can’t you copy yourself? 
Puppetmaster:  A copy is merely a copy.  There’s the possibility a single  
virus could utterly destroy me.  A mere copy doesn’t offer   
variety or individuality.  To exist, to reach equilibrium, life  
seeks to multiply and vary constantly, at times giving up  
its life.  Cells continue the process of death and  
regeneration.  Being constantly reborn as they age.  And  
when it comes time to die, all the data it possesses is lost  
leaving behind only its genes and its offspring.  All  
defense against catastrophic failure of an inflexible system.   
You want the variety needed to guard against extinction. 
Kusanagi:     But how will you get it? 
Puppetmaster:   I wish to merge with you. 
Kusanagi:   Merge? 
Puppetmaster:  A complete joining.  We will both be slightly changed, but  
  neither will lose anything.  Afterwards, it should be  
  impossible to distinguish one from the other. (13) 
 
Thus, the Puppetmaster will cease to exist because his essence will merge into Kusanagi 
and into the “children” of their union that are birthed into the vast realm of cyberspace.  
Despite the appeal of his offer, Kusanagi still fears the eradication of her identity, but the 
Puppetmaster instructs her in the art of evolving beyond her present form:  
But to be human is to continually change.  Your desire to remain as you 
are is what ultimately limits you […] I am connected to a vast network of 
which I myself am a part.  To one like you who cannot access it, you may 
perceive it only as light.  As we are confined to our one section, so we are 
all connected.  Limited to a small part of our functions.  But now we must 
slip our bonds, and shift to a higher structure. (30)40   
 
The Puppetmaster and Kusanagi merge right as the Section 6, another government 
enforcement agency, snipers destroy both of them from their helicopters hovering above 
the scene.  As they merge and the bullets rain down, Kusanagi sees an angel descending 
in an aura of radiant light with shining, angelic feathers swirling about her.  As The 
Puppetmaster makes clear, the blinding, heavenly light represents the vast network of 
information to which he is connected and to which Kusanagi is now granted access.   
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Kusanagi thus enters an unbounded state free from the mechanisms of control, a 
state that allows her to move beyond the desire to prove her own existence and the lack 
that constantly haunted her thoughts.  If she can bear the offspring of The Puppetmaster 
and can be connected to all the countless individuals across the world, then there is no 
longer any need for her to doubt whether she has ever been human because definitions 
such as “the human” prove obsolete.  By merging with The Puppet Master’s 
consciousness, Kusanagi no longer merely “surfs” the Net using her cyberbrain but 
actually becomes a part of the Net as a completely disembodied being. Kusanagi chooses 
a new regime of organization for her self, one that exists beyond the boundaries of a 
physical form: she becomes a body without organs, no longer tethered to petty definitions 
like “the human” or to any stabilizing schemas of identity.  She foregoes the need for a 
unified sense of self in favor of an existence as a pure multiplicity.   
As the second film indicates, in addition to becoming a body without organs, she 
also achieves what Deleuze and Guattari would term a truly rhizomatic existence.  
Deleuze and Guattari take the term “rhizome” from botany in which it describes a certain 
kind of plant system: “the rhizome assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface 
extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers.”41  Deleuze and Guattari 
enumerate multiple characteristics of the rhizome, but of particular importance to us here 
are its “principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be 
connected to anything other, and must be.  This is very different from the tree or root, 
which plots a point, fixes an order.”42  Like the rhizome, Kusanagi can manifest herself at 
any point in the world or in a person’s brain by means of the global grid of the Internet 
that now connects all aspects of daily life as well as virtually all persons by means of 
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cyber-brain technology.  She can always choose to manifest herself in a body by merely 
hacking into an individual’s cyber-brain.  Furthermore, “there are no points or positions 
in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root.  There are only lines.”43  
Consequently, Kusanagi is no longer pinned down to any particular point by her physical 
body or by the machinery of control, for she remains free to move at will along endless 
lines of flight on a plane of pure immanence. As Deleuze and Guattari further state, the 
rhizome refuses unity and embraces multiplicity: “The notion of unity (unité) appears 
only when there is a power takeover in the multiplicity by the signifier or a corresponding 
subjectification proceeding […] Unity always operates in an empty dimension 
supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding).  The point is that a rhizome 
or multiplicity never allows itself to be overcoded.”44  Kusanagi has refused the unities of 
the body and of identity of a world governed by systems of control in favor an existence 
as a multiplicity, one that cannot be overcoded by language or the oppressive systems of 
power.  She can manifest herself at will, but remains untouchable by the forces of control, 
bodily decay, and lack.  She has direct communication with all people and hence has 
filled the lack between subject and other.  Yet, again, we must ask if such a condition 
proves preferable to an existence as a human?  Kusanagi has evolved beyond the 
definition of the human, but is such an evolution desirable?  Does ridding oneself of a 
unified identity truly lead to liberation or does the experience of multiplicity merely lead 
to dehumanization and insanity?  Before attempting to answer these questions—if there is 
an answer—we must first consider one last even more radical example of evolution by 
way of disembodiment. 
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III.  The Complementation of the Human Soul: Hideaki Anno’s Evangelion 
 
Both Akira and Ghost in the Shell explore the potential for human evolution with 
the aid of technology on the individual level, but is it possible to imagine such a 
transformation of the entire human species?  Hideaki Anno’s Shinseiki Evangelion (or 
Neon Genesis Evangelion [1995-6] as it was translated in the United States) and his film 
The End of Evangelion (1997) pursue precisely this question in their depiction of the 
human species’ evolution into a bodiless, gestalt consciousness.  By mixing giant mechs 
(the Evangelions), alien-like beings known as “Angels,” hints of Christian and Kabalistic 
mythology, psychoanalysis, and existentialism, Anno creates one of the most overtly 
Lacanian investigations of loneliness, desire, and depression to ever be released as mass-
market media.  What begins as a typical anime story of barely post-pubescent adolescents 
piloting giant mechs soon becomes a dark, psychological tale about the human condition, 
social bonding, and existential despair set against an eschatological background that 
consistently causes the viewer to doubt whether the human species is worthy of evolution 
or whether it should merely be allowed to go extinct.  This final pair of texts provides an 
example of evolution in which interaction with the divine pushes humankind beyond the 
limits of the body. 
In this chapter, I shall primarily focus on the last two episodes of the Evangelion 
series and the final moments of the film The End of Evangelion, for Anno provides two 
alternate versions of the events that conclude his storyline.  Evangelion takes place 
fourteen years after Second Impact, the emergence of the first Angel (Adam) that 
destroyed more than half of the world’s population in the year 2000.  The series opens 
with the attack of the third Angel, and the arrival of Shinji Ikari in Tokyo-III at the 
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summons of his father, Commander Gendo Ikari.  Gendo commands a covert military 
organization known as NERV whose sole mission is to defend against the return of the 
Angels and to forestall a possible Third Impact that would potentially destroy the 
remainder of human civilization.  To combat the Angels, NERV created the Evangelions, 
which appear to be giant robots (or mechs) but which are actually biological copies of the 
first Angel that include pieces of human minds and souls within him.  Only children born 
within the first year after Second Impact can pilot the Evangelions, and Shinji quickly 
becomes NERV’s star pilot in Evangelion Unit-01.  Together with the other Evangelion 
pilots (Rei and Asuka), Shinji defeats the Angels throughout the series and protects the 
world from obliteration.  But NERV has bigger plans than the destruction of the Angels, 
for their ultimate goal is to enact the Human Instrumentality Project, a project that will 
preserve humanity beyond apocalypse by melding the consciousnesses of all people 
together in order to safeguard them against annihilation.  Humankind’s time as a species 
has run out, and they must seek new avenues of evolution if they are to survive into the 
future. 
The narrative of Evangelion “is an essentially bifurcated one” that is split between 
NERV’s battles with the beings known as the “Angels” and a “narrative strand [that] is 
far more complex and provocative as it becomes increasingly concerned with the 
problematic mental and emotional states of the main characters, all of whom carry deep 
psychic wounds and whose psychic turmoil is represented against an increasingly 
frenzied apocalyptic background.”45  Indeed, the characters’ deep psychological scars 
prove fundamental for the story’s investigation of human desire and loneliness, and each 
characters’ psychic traumas play significant roles in how certain parts of the story unfold.  
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The first twenty-four episodes of the series deal with the destruction of the third through 
the seventeenth Angels, which vary in form from giant monstrosities to geometrical 
shapes to nanobot computer viruses.  Both the Angels and Evangelions feature AT (or 
anti-terror) Fields that function as a kind of force field that protects them and that can 
only be punctured with certain specialized forms of weaponry.  The end of the series 
reveals that humans also have AT Fields, but in humans they represent the force that 
surrounds the human soul and that separates it from all other souls: “It is the light of my 
soul,” as Kaoru (the seventeenth angel who appears in the form of fourteen-year-old boy) 
explains to Shinji.46  Thus, the AT Fields are what inscribe lack in the human heart, and 
the Human Instrumentality Project’s ultimate goal is to lower the AT Fields of all 
humankind so that all souls may join together in a state beyond lack.   
The events of the last two episodes occur after the Angels have been defeated and 
chronicle the transformation of Shinji’s consciousness that takes place as NERV’s 
Human Instrumentality Project goes into effect.  To escape beyond the post-apocalyptic 
world created by Second Impact, NERV seeks to create a form of collective 
consciousness, a melding of all the consciousnesses on Earth to preserve them eternally 
in a realm beyond the body.  Thus, NERV’s goal is to, in the words of Gendo Ikari, 
manufacture “a new genesis for mankind.”47  NERV hopes to accomplish “another 
‘beginning,’ in a truly apocalyptic turn,” for “not only do the viewers witness the 
individual reborn into a world made new, but the entire human species is remade 
immortal, liberated from its biological and psychological constraints to embrace a return 
to Edenic bliss.”48  While this creation of a new Eden seems somewhat optimistic at the 
end of the series, the film The End of Evangelion portrays a much darker vision of this 
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“new genesis,” which appropriately depicts a new Adam and Eve in a world “purged of 
original sin” but which also leaves the viewer with dark forebodings concerning the 
future of humanity.49 
 The last two episodes of the series become entirely stream-of-consciousness as 
they represent the process of unification, or instrumentality, in Shinji Ikari’s mind.  The 
second half of the penultimate episode portrays Shinji’s disembodiment, which he 
describes as his image blurs to blackness: “What is this sensation?  I feel like I’ve 
experienced it before, as if the shape of my body is melting away.  It feels so good.  I feel 
like I’m growing, expanding outward...On and on.…”50  Then, a black screen appears 
with text on it, an event that reoccurs throughout the last two episodes and that acts as a 
sort of narrator/interlocutor.  Although the series never reveals the identity or nature of 
this narrative voice, the characters respond to it as if it is a diegetic voice and not simply 
a narrator.  After Shinji blurs out, the text screen explains, “That was the beginning of the 
instrumentality of people.  What people are lacking, the loss in their hearts.  In order to 
fill that void in their hearts, the instrumentality of hearts and souls begins, returning all 
things to nothingness.  The instrumentality of people had begun.”51   Commander Ikari 
then responds to the text’s description of Human Instrumentality:  “No, it is not that we 
are returning to nothingness.  We are restoring everything to its original state.  We are 
only returning to our mother, who has been lost to this world.  All souls will become one 
and find eternal peace.  That is all there is to it.”52  Ikari views instrumentality as a return 
to “Edenic bliss,” one that for him holds a reunion with his dead wife, Yui—Shinji’s 
mother—who disappeared and became merged with Evangelion Unit-01 during its initial 
tests.  The text voice also explains that this lack in the human heart causes all human 
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desire and fear: “That is what gives rise to the hunger in our hearts.  That is what gives 
rise to fear and insecurity.”53  Indeed, throughout the series, desire plays a fundamental 
part in the lives of the characters, and Anno deals explicitly with the desires of each of 
the major characters and examines how their desires remain unsatisfied in the normal 
course of human life.  Instrumentality finally provides the means of satiating human 
desire and of eradicating fear and insecurity, but, in order to achieve instrumentality in a 
fashion that renders the subject as happy as possible, the subject must first face his/her 
desires head on and learn to accept them. 
 Shinji’s primary desire is to be accepted and loved by other people, particularly 
the women around him (Misato, Rei, and Asuka) and his father, yet he also remains 
incapable of accepting love from others because of his mother’s death and his father’s 
abandonment of him at a young age.  Consequently, Shinji persistently worries about 
other people’s perceptions of him and usually concludes that everyone hates him.  
Psychoanalytically, Shinji desires for others to desire him, yet he remains incapable of 
realizing when they return his desire, when they bestow recognition and love upon him.  
Even when he gains a wide circle of friends after coming to live in Tokyo III, he still 
never recognizes himself as the object of others’ love.  Instead, he views himself as an 
object of scorn and ridicule and therefore hates himself (or thinks he hates himself) as 
well.  Because of his father’s abandonment, which denied Shinji the recognition of 
fatherly love, we might argue that Shinji experiences his lack so profoundly that it 
precludes him from being able to achieve a state of sublimation.  Thus, after the Human 
Instrumentality Project has taken effect, Shinji’s world initially remains a solipsistic one 
in which only he exists—he exists in a state of pure lack with no others present.  
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Evangelion thus chronicles the mass migration of humanity from a sense of identity 
predicated upon lack to one comprised of pure immanence, of the literal body without 
organs in which, for if organs do exist, then the subject must shape them according to 
his/her own desire.  At first, Shinji proves incapable of dealing with the world of pure 
freedom, which the series depicts by having a black and white Shinji falling through a 
stark whiteness that has no dimensions, not even the spatial coordinates of up and down.  
Initially, then, Shinji only exhibits a will to nothingness, for he must learn to shape his 
own reality and sense of truth and to realize that this world represents only one of many 
possibilities.  In order to move beyond an existence that remains utterly blank—he must 
literally learn to create his life as a work of art, to add color to the stark canvas of 
nothingness.  
This leads Shinji to the parodic anime sequence in which the world of Evangelion 
is crafted anew in such a way that all of the characters’ roles are altered to create the 
ultimate blissful experience for Shinji: Asuka is Shinji’s girlfriend, Rei is the spunky new 
girl at school, Misato is their super-cool teacher, and his mother and father live together 
with him as a normal nuclear family.  This vision of one possible utopian world leads to 
Shinji’s first true revelation at the series’ end: “I get it, this is also a possible world.  One 
possibility that’s in me. The me right now is not exactly who I am.  All sorts of me’s are 
possible.  That’s right. A me that’s not an Eva pilot is possible too.”54  At this point, 
Shinji comes to a truly Deleuzian realization: that he is composed of a multiplicity of 
drives, none of which remains dominant for long and that hence his “self” changes from 
one moment to the next.  Once Shinji realizes the nature of his being as a multiplicity, he 
finally manages to understand how to love himself and allow others to love him: “I hate 
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myself.  But maybe I can learn to love myself.  Maybe it’s okay for me to be here!  That’s 
right!  I’m me, nothing more, nothing less!  I’m me.  I want to be me!  I want to be here!  
And it’s okay for me to be here!”55  After making this declaration, the solipsistic world 
created by Shinji’s “will to nothingness” dissipates, and all his friends come to tell him 
“Congratulations.”  Thus, through a melting of his physical form and a melding of his 
mind with all of humanity, Shinji overcomes the world of desire and fills the lack within 
his identity, allowing him to achieve a state of being in which he “coexist[s] with time, 
space, and other people.”56  By experiencing the stripping of his self down to a plane of 
immanence, Shinji realizes that his self is ultimately mutable and that he can sculpt it as a 
work of art, one that he can truly learn to respect and love. 
 While the series ends in a seemingly optimistic fashion, the film The End of 
Evangelion (1997)57 portrays a distinctly darker image of the events that occur in the final 
two episodes of the series, for Anno created the film to retell the events of these episodes 
in a more straightforward manner.  Instead of being predominately an internal, mental 
depiction of Human Instrumentality like the series’ finale, The End of Evangelion shows 
the viewer explicitly what happened in the external world while still diving into the mind 
of Shinji to at times portray the effects of these events on his psyche.  In the outside 
world, The End of Evangelion chronicles the apocalypse and humankind’s subsequent 
rebirth as a new form of life.  Initially, the series leads the audience to believe that NERV 
has been secretly hiding Adam, the first angel, underneath their headquarters, but the 
final episodes of the series and the film reveal that this gigantic being is actually the 
second Angel, Lilith.  The film depicts the events that initiate the Human Instrumentality 
Project, namely the joining of Lilith and Adam.  The film reveals that Shinji’s Evangelion 
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was actually patterned after Adam, who led to Second Impact when he was discovered in 
Antarctica in the year 2000.  Later, NERV also unearths a monstrously oversized spear 
called the Lance of Longinus, named after the spear that pierced the side of Christ.  In the 
film, Anno depicts the penetration of EVA Unit-01 by the Lance, which consequently 
turns the evangelion into the new Adam.  As Adam and Lilith come into contact with one 
another and the Lance, they form a new Tree of Life, a gigantic phallic shaped tree that 
towers into the heavens.  
The Tree of Life signals the beginning of Human Instrumentality.  Once Human 
Instrumentality takes effect, every individual’s AT Field is lowered, and they literally 
burst open and are rendered into a yellow liquid called LCL.  All of humanity’s LCL 
flows together to form a giant sea, and Shinji must make a choice between living in the 
sea of LCL that contains the gestalt consciousness of humanity or returning to a bodily 
form that will still suffer from the lack that NERV has worked so hard to fill.  Shinji 
chooses the latter option as evidenced by the scene that depicts Rei literally joined at the 
hip with Shinji—they are both nude with her straddling Shinji, giving the impression that 
she is impaled upon his penis, and her arm is thrust into Shinji’s chest as his arm 
disappears inside her leg.  Amongst this confusion of bodies and psyches, Rei explains to 
Shinji the choice that he must make: 
Rei: This place is a sea of LCL.  The primordial soup of life.  A place  
         with no AT fields, where individual forms do not exist.  An  
         ambiguous world where you can’t tell where you end and others  
            begin.  A world where you exist everywhere and yet you’re  
            nowhere, all at once. 
Shinji: Is this death? 
Rei:  Not quite.  This is a world where we are all one.  This is the world  
         you wished for. 
Shinji: But this isn’t right.  This feels wrong. 
Rei: If you wish for others to exist, the walls of their hearts will   
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             separate them again.  They will all feel fear once more. 
Shinji: Okay then.  Thank you.  I only felt pain when I existed in that 
 reality.  So I thought it was alright to run away.  But there was  
 nothing good in the place I escaped to either.  Because I didn’t  
exist there, and so no one existed.58 
 
Shinji’s love for other people causes him to decide to reinhabit his physical form, despite 
the fact that he will be returning to a world of pain and lack.  Although Instrumentality 
extends the promise of a pain-free world, Shinji still craves the feelings and emotions 
attached to desire, the struggle for satiation and recognition that makes his being seem 
“real.”  Thus, in this final sequence, Shinji proves incapable of giving up on “the human.”  
Unlike Kusanagi from Ghost in the Shell, Shinji chooses a unified sense of identity over 
an existence as a pure multiplicity because he still remains incapable of freeing himself 
from the desire that society has inscribed in his psyche. 
Therefore, Shinji emerges from the LCL Sea back into bodily form, and the last 
scene of the film depicts him lying beside Asuka, the pilot of Evangelion Unit-02 and the 
object of much of his adolescent sexual angst.  Indeed, the beginning of the film features 
a rather disturbing scene in which Shinji visits a comatose Asuka, who was injured in an 
earlier battle with one of the angels, in the hospital.  Shinji begins to violently shake her 
in an attempt to get her to rouse from her coma, and her hospital gown inadvertently 
opens to reveal her breasts.  In a fit of anger and tears, Shinji proceeds to masturbate as 
Asuka lays unconscious, and this scene succinctly summarizes the torturous nature of 
desire not only between Shinji and Asuka but also in Evangelion as a whole.  In the final 
scene of the film, Shinji slowly begins to choke Asuka, but she raises her hand to his face 
and he relents.  As he still remains sitting astride her prostrate body and crying on her, 
Asuka moves her one unwounded eye and sees him.  Her response is merely the words 
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“How disgusting,” at which point the movie ends abruptly.59  At the end of the film, the 
human race has achieved virtual immortality, albeit in a liquefied and conjoined form, as 
the words of Shinji’s mother make clear: “Humans can only exist on this earth, but the 
Evangelion can live forever along with the human soul that dwells within.  Even 5 billion 
years from now, when the Earth, the Moon, and the Sun are gone, Eva will exist.  It will 
be lonely, but as long as one person still lives.”60  Professor Fuyutsuki finishes her 
thought with the statement “It will be eternal proof that mankind ever existed.”61  The 
ending of the film thus proves to be simultaneously pessimistic and optimistic, but, unlike 
the series, the dystopian aspects far outweigh the utopian ones. 
 Interestingly, Anno’s two different endings respectively offer a schizoanalytical 
and a psychoanalytical angle on the storyline.  While the series ends with the subject’s 
ability to understand his/her own multiplicity and to shape his/her identity as a work of 
art, End of Evangelion ultimately argues that human identity must remain predicated 
upon lack if the status of the human is to be maintained.  The series effectively refutes the 
film’s argument by displaying how humans are capable of understanding their identity in 
a different fashion when they are no longer tied to the socio-cultural system that inscribes 
lack in their hearts: humankind can generate its own system of ethics beyond the 
judgments of good and evil that society forces upon them.  They can reshape their 
identity to a point where they no longer feel lack and no longer seek fulfillment through 
the petty fantasy of sublimation: they can achieve a state of constant becoming in which 
they will themselves constantly into new forms of identity that they find pleasurable and 
noble.  They eschew the stabilizing forces of identity and the body in favor of a 
multiplicitous existence in which the self remains in a constant state of flux.  In essence, 
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Anno leaves the viewer with a choice of interpretations of the “human”:  does 
transcending a formulation of desire based upon lack  lead to a static state of existence in 
which future evolution becomes impossible or does it free humankind to experience a 
boundless field of evolution in which the individual can will their own evolution on a 
constant basis?  
 
IV.  Conclusion: And Must We Always Lack? 
 
So, in the final moments of End of Evangelion, Shinji must make the choice 
between the body without organs and a being based upon lack, between a multiplicitous 
absence of hierarchies and a rigidly organized existence in which he knows he will never 
find true fulfillment.  Indeed, Shinji’s decision narrativizes the theoretical debate that I 
have been examining throughout this chapter: does the human always necessitate an 
understanding of desire predicated upon lack or can the concept of the human be revised 
to include a new formulation of identity in which desire always represents a positive 
force and the basis for ethical development?   In effect, each of the texts in this chapter 
depicts a further stage of evolution in which humans achieve a form of immortality—they 
portray an evolutionary passage in which the human passes beyond the confines of the 
body into a realm generally reserved for deities.  Deleuze and Guattari contend that “the 
work of art is itself a desiring machine,”  and each of these texts represents the manner in 
which science fictions also function as a desiring machines; that is, they act as mirrors 
that reflect our desires back at us in a way that allows for their problematization and 
theorization.62  Thus, through its construction of radically estranging spaces, science 
fiction can act as a means of projecting our most basic wishes either onto the page of 
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novels and stories or onto the screen of the cinema.  In many ways, anime proves 
especially adept at this projection because the image it creates is fantastic and estranging 
at its core: even the animation style represents a fantasy of the human that destabilizes the 
concept of the human form, thus making anime a privileged medium for dealing with 
questions of the body and desire.  
No doubt, the human subject never truly receives the choice between the body and 
the body without organs or between lack and multiplicity as Tetsuo, Kusanagi, and Shinji 
do, but these texts allow us to consider a fundamental theoretical question surrounding 
the concept of desire: can the individual learn to bring the multiplicitous into their lives, 
to recognize that lack is inscribed by society, and to achieve the status of a new ethical 
subject who remains untethered to various socio-cultural institutions that force morality 
upon the populace?  Such texts represent the desire to attain a liberatory state beyond the 
strictures of mortality, society, and a psychology built upon lack, but can the subject truly 
abandon stable concepts of identity in favor of an existence (un)structured by multiplicity 
and the absence of organization?  Of course, no text can provide a definitive answer to 
such inquiries, but science fiction can open up lines of flight through which the critic can 
explore different schematizations of desire and its relation to the human.  Unless radical 
events, such as those depicted in these texts, occur, then the subject will always remain 
tied to socio-political systems and hence will remain subject to lack according to 
Deleuze, yet these texts also indicate that perhaps the subject can learn to communicate 
with the body without organs, with rhizomes, and with lines of flight while still being 
subject to lack, desire, and the organization of the body and society.  As Deleuze and 
Guattari make clear, “you never reach the Body without Organs, you can’t reach it, you 
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are forever attaining it, it is a limit.”63  In effect, then, the body without organs represents 
a goal that can never be attained but that, nevertheless, does not signify any form of lack.  
Instead, through constant deterritorializations and movements towards the body without 
organs, the subject can increasingly liberate him/herself from the various systems that 
attempt to impose structure on his/her identity.  What Deleuze and Guattari’s work 
teaches us is that other systems always remain possible—other organizations of our 
thoughts, our bodies, and our societies exist as potentials.  This does not mean that 
structure can be abandoned entirely, for to do so would mean either literal death or 
emptying one’s self out to the point where existence becomes nothingness:  
And how necessary caution is, the art of dosages, since overdose is a 
danger.  You don’t do it with a sledgehammer, you use a very fine file.  
You invent self-destructions that have nothing to do with the death drive.  
Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather 
opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, 
circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of 
intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the craft 
of a surveyor.64   
 
Thus, to move beyond lack, the individual must slowly divest him/herself of the various 
organizational strata that structure and hence pervert his/her desire: s/he must constantly 
deterritorialize in order to refashion his/herself in liberatory ways.  To live without lack 
might squash the basis of human desire that has driven the greatest (as well as the worst) 
endeavors of human civilization, but to forego considering the “schizo” side of things 
precludes the possibility of even more radical forms of human achievement.  These texts 
demonstrate how our lives and identities can always be considered anew and that the 
potential of reshaping them according to our own guidelines remains possible even in the 
most oppressive, dystopian societies.  Hence, while Lacan forecloses the prospect of 
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evolution beyond the neurotic, Deleuze and Guattari at least open us up to conceiving of 
our identities as our own, that is, as works of art. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE EVERSION OF THE VIRTUAL:  
POSMODERNITY, CONTROL SOCIETIES, AND WILLIAM GIBSON’S 
SCIENCE FICTIONS OF THE PRESENT 
 
For the apparent realism, or representationality, of 
SF has concealed another, far more complex 
temporal structure: not to give us ‘images’ of the 
future…but rather to defamiliarize and restructure 
our experience of our present, and to do so in 
specific ways distinct from all other forms of 
defamiliarization.  
        -Fredric Jameson1 
 
In an endnote to a recent article, Katherine Hayles comments upon how “it is 
interesting that science fiction writers, traditionally the ones who prognosticate possible 
futures, are increasingly setting their fictions in the present.”2  This trend represents a 
significant transformation of the genre because, among other things, it problematizes the 
traditional sense of it as a mode of estrangement.  In general, science fiction has been 
defined by a certain kind of futurity or alterity, but this recent shift forces us to reevaluate 
the basic tropes of the genre.  The history of traditional science fiction writers who have 
abandoned the genre to pursue more realistic writing can be traced back at least as far as 
J.G. Ballard, who moved away from writing the apocalyptic science fiction of his early 
days (The Wind from Nowhere [1961], The Drowned World [1962], The Burning World 
[1965], and The Crystal World [1966]) and began writing more directly realistic works 
such as The Atrocity Exhibition (1969), Crash (1973), Concrete Island (1974), and High 
Rise (1975), which examine the effects of contemporary technology upon the human 
body and psyche, as well as the autobiographical Empire of the Sun (1984) that abandons 
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science fictional concerns entirely.  More recently, science fiction authors such as Neal 
Stephenson and William Gibson have turned away from their traditional cyberpunk fare 
in favor of crafting more realistic works set in the past or present instead of in a distant 
future.3  What has changed in recent years to induce such a fundamental transformation 
of the genre’s basic characteristics?  By means of an examination of William Gibson’s 
Pattern Recognition (2003) and Spook Country (2007), this chapter argues that the 
increasing ascendancy of postmodern culture—and the “society of control” that 
increasingly characterizes it—have generated the need for a new imagination of the 
present.  In Chapters One and Two, we began to delve into the nature of the control 
society but always in the context of futuristic science fictions of estrangement.  Now, we 
will begin to explore how the control society has already become our world of today.  
Gibson’s recent novels, Pattern Recognition and Spook Country, enable us to grasp the 
constituents, both formal and conceptual, of what I will call “science fictions of the 
present,” sci-fi texts that privilege the realistic tendency over an aesthetic of 
estrangement.  Indeed, Gibson’s novels suggest that the present has become its own 
science fiction, or, what amounts to the same thing, that the present might be evaluated 
and understood on the basis of a genre traditionally reserved for the future.  Moreover, 
because the novel examines the inextricable linkage between the hegemonic force of 
computerization and the rise of the “society of control,” it also demonstrates the manner 
in which the present has become dystopian (a social pattern that has generally been 
reserved for the future tense). 
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I.  The Present as Science Fiction:  
     September 11th and the Ascendancy of Postmodernity 
 
Generally speaking, Gibson has received credit for coining the term “cyberspace” 
in the early 1980s with his “Sprawl Trilogy” and for imagining the potential of the still 
gestating technology of the Internet.  But insofar as the Internet has become a staple 
technology of global society, Gibson has recalibrated his fictions according to a 
recognition that the future is now.   In a 2003 interview, Andrew Leonard asked him, 
“Was it a challenge to keep writing about the future, as the Internet exploded and so 
much of what you imagined came closer?”4  Gibson responded,  
I think my last three books reflected that. It just seemed to be happening—
it was like the windshield kept getting closer and closer. The event horizon 
was getting closer […] I have this conviction that the present is actually 
inexpressibly peculiar now, and that's the only thing that's worth dealing 
with. This wonderful toolkit that I inherited from genre SF has all these 
fabulous tools—tools that naturalistic, mimetic, literary fiction never had 
[…] Any kind of novel comes with a set of instructions that we don't 
really think about, but you learn in school and you learn in your culture. 
You learn how you go to a novel and how you relate to it. There's an extra 
set of moves in classic SF that you learn as a reader, and then if you want 
to write the stuff you have to have internalized those sufficiently. Once 
you do that you can be in a special relationship with your readers. I find 
that when I transfer that special relationship into a piece of mimetic fiction 
set in the present, I get interesting results—I get Pattern Recognition. But 
I had almost gotten Pattern Recognition with the last couple of books, 
because, in some kind of perverse way, they played with whether they 
were the future or not, or I felt they did. They felt more like "alternative 
presents." The volume of technological weirdness was being turned up all 
the time, but the world felt increasingly familiar.5 
 
Gibson labels the border between the present and the future an event horizon, which 
refers to the slice of space-time surrounding a black hole.  Events that occur or light that 
is emitted from inside an event horizon cannot reach an observer stationed outside the 
event horizon.  For Gibson, the event horizon of the future has migrated so close to the 
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present moment that it makes it impossible—and perhaps unnecessary—to envision 
anything beyond this moment. 
In his earlier novels, Gibson used temporal estrangement to narrativize and 
interrogate the psychological, sociological, political, and philosophical issues 
surrounding the spread of computerization, but now these futuristic themes have become 
our daily concerns.  Thus, in his most recent novels, Gibson completely eschews 
temporal estrangement and chooses to set them directly in the present—a present that has 
become so estranging in itself that it has caused the real, contemporary world to become a 
kind of science fiction.  In effect, Pattern Recognition suggests that we have already 
arrived in the future, for “many of us who live in technoculture have come to experience 
the present as a kind of future at which we’ve inadvertently arrived, one of the many 
futures imagined by science fiction.”6  Pattern Recognition actually explains its own 
aesthetic of the present in the words of the protagonist’s boss, Blue Ant CEO Hubertus 
Bigend: 
Of course…we have no idea, now, of who, or what the inhabitants of our 
future might be.  In that sense, we have no future.  Not in the sense that 
your grandparents had a future, or thought they did.  Fully imagined 
futures were the luxury of another day, one in which “now” was of some 
greater duration.  For us, of course, things can change so abruptly, so 
violently, so profoundly, that futures like our grandparents’ have 
insufficient ‘now’ to stand on. We have no future because our present is 
too volatile…We have only risk management.  The spinning of the given 
moment’s scenarios.  Pattern recognition.7 
 
Ours is a world in which the “now” constantly slips away, in which the future is already 
present and then gone before it can even be recognized.  As Lee Konstantinou points out, 
Gibson’s concept of pattern recognition derives from Marshall McLuhan, and Bigend 
acts in such moments as a mouthpiece who spouts McLuhanite philosophy.8  
 131 
 
Konstantinou points to the moment in The Medium is the Massage in which McLuhan 
himself makes a similar statement,  
Electric circuitry profoundly involves men with one another.  Information 
pours upon us, instantaneously and continuously.  As soon as information 
is acquired, it is very rapidly replaced by still newer information.  Our 
electrically-configured world has been forced to move from the habit of 
data classification to the mode of pattern recognition.  We can no longer 
build serially, block-by-block, step-by-step, because instant 
communication insures that all factors of the environment and of 
experience co-exist in a state of active interplay.9 
 
Since we live under a constant barrage of information that bombards us from all sides 
through computers, cell phones, televisions, GPS systems, etc., we never have the 
capacity to look beyond the present moment.  We already live in the future, so the need to 
create fictional futures becomes pointless.   
 Lee Konstantinou argues that Gibson’s novel represents what he terms 
“socioeconomic science fiction, part of a growing subgenre that not only critiques 
economic and marketing theories but also uses these theories as the basis for exercises in 
worldbuilding.”10  I prefer to use the term “science fictions of the present” because, as we 
shall see in Chapter Four, it encompasses a larger category of texts than purely 
socioeconomic works such as Gibson’s.  Konstantinou further argues that such science 
fiction texts engage in the process of what Fredric Jameson terms “cognitive mapping.”  
In Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Fredric Jameson explains 
that for art to maintain a political edge in the postmodern era, it must engage with the 
economic and cultural structure of the new world system on a fundamental level; hence 
Jameson calls for “an aesthetic of cognitive mapping—a pedagogical political culture 
which seeks to endow the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place 
in the global system.”11  As Konstantinou points out, Jameson generally turned to 
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conspiracy texts for his examinations of cognitive mapping: David Cronenberg’s 
Videodrome (1983), Sydney Pollack’s Three Days of the Condor (1975), Alan J. Pakula’s 
conspiracy trilogy (Klute [1971], The Parallax View [1974], and All the President’s Men 
[1976]), Michelangelo Antonioni’s Blow-Up (1966), and Brian DePalma’s Blow Out 
(1981) all feature prominently in The Geopolitical Aesthetic, Jameson’s follow-up to 
Postmodernism that explores cinema’s capacity for cognitive mapping.12  Konstantinou 
argues that such texts fail to truly depict the place of the subject in the postmodern global 
worldscape because they focus solely on the power structure of control instead of on the 
postmodern system of capital that is predicated upon brand name recognition.  
Konstantinou provides profound insights into the depiction of trademarks in the novel 
and how these trademarks cognitively map the subject’s position as a consumer between 
the multinational corporations of first world countries and the exploited labor that 
produces these products in the third world.  But he never connects the novel’s depiction 
of the capitalist system of advertising together with its paranoid conspiracy elements that 
concern the society of control and the September 11th attacks.  To fully understand how 
Pattern Recognition provides a cognitive map of postmodern globalization, we must 
consider both the novel’s depiction of capital and its exploration of 9/11’s significance.   
In this sense, as I argue, Pattern Recognition operates in the present because it 
concerns itself with the absolute ascendancy of the postmodern, which implies both the 
rise of the late capitalist marketing machine and the power structure of control.  The term 
“postmodern” implicitly suggests a kind of oxymoron, a paradoxical state of history in 
which the future already exists in the present: it denotes a condition that literally defines 
us as existing “after the modern.”   Of course, the term “postmodern” has accrued a slew 
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of different connotations, but in this chapter I will be dealing with the epistemological, 
socio-historical, and aesthetic senses of postmodernism.  In Pattern Recognition, the 
World Trade Center attacks serve as the watershed moment when the postmodern 
episteme that had been gestating for decades was finally revealed to have achieved 
absolute ascendancy over the older, modern, socio-cultural paradigm.  No doubt, it has 
become a standard cliché to argue that 9/11 fundamentally altered the world, but 
Gibson’s point is much more subtle: Pattern Recognition and Spook Country depict 9/11 
as only one moment in the history of postmodernization, a socio-cultural force that has 
slowly been evolving since the end of World War II.  The novel’s action occurs in 
August 2002, only a scant eleven months after the attacks, and the text deals explicitly 
with the attacks by means of the backstory of its protagonist, Cayce Pollard.  Still fresh at 
the novel’s outset, “9/11” remains omnipresent throughout the text in a vague, hazy 
fashion like images seared on the retina that linger long after they have already faded 
from actual existence.  The oblique references13  in the text eventually give way to the 
discovery that Cayce’s father (Win Pollard, an employee of the CIA) inexplicably 
disappeared on the day of the attacks.14  This revelation appears in a chapter entitled 
“Singularity,” and the attacks function as not just a singularity in Cayce’s life but also as 
the singular moment of our historical age.  Gibson’s novel functions “as a self-reflexive 
account, reconstructed as mimetic realism, of a story he has written several times already 
as science fiction.  The story is about how we find ourselves permeated by futurity as a 
kind of defining feature of the perpetual transition that is now.”15  In effect, the novel 
operates after the end of the history,16 when, as Bigend claims, “we have no future” nor 
any connection to the past.  Pattern Recognition is like our own world insofar as 
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September 11, 2001 constitutes a historical rupture that is no less than the rupture of 
history itself:  
Pattern Recognition can be read as a kind of post-singularity fiction of the 
present […] Gibson’s singularity may be more symbolic, finally, than 
material; nevertheless, it functions in much the same way as the 
technological singularity, as an apocalyptic event that cuts us off from the 
historical past, leaving us stranded in difference.  And this is where 
Gibson’s treatment of futurity in Pattern Recognition continues the 
complex pattern of his writing since Neuromancer: that is, even as there is 
too little “now” to stand on and “we have no future,” at the same time we 
find ourselves on the other side of an event that has changed everything.  
From this perspective, time present—postmodern time—is supplemental 
time, time-after-the-end-of-time; the cautionary “post” in “postmodern” 
represents both our hesitation in letting go of the past and our anxiety that 
we are, in fact, on the other side of irrevocable change.17 
 
Thus, the 9/11 attacks take the place of the normally estranging elements of science 
fiction such as technological innovations that completely alter society or “apocalyptic 
event(s)” that shatter the traditional molds of civilization.  
Notably, Gibson had already envisioned Pattern Recognition’s plot before the 
events of 9/11, but the attacks caused him to reevaluate his story and to find the historical 
background that brought his plot and its themes into sharp focus.  Gibson claims to have 
already been well into his writing of the novel when the attacks occurred, and, as he has 
claimed in an interview, the events of September 11th fundamentally altered not just his 
view of the novel but also his outlook on history in general: 
When I came back to the manuscript, and went to my computer, and 
opened the file, about three weeks after September 11, and I saw that my 
protagonist’s back story, that I’d been sort of interrogating and looking for 
and starting to find, was taking place right then—her memories were of 
that autumn—It hadn’t occurred to me until I was looking at the screen 
that she was there.  I had a sense that the back-story world my character 
had been tentatively inhabiting for me, as I tried to figure out what the hell 
was wrong with her, had clicked off—it had forked and diverged like 
Borges’ “Garden of Forking Paths.”  It had become like nothing—what up 
to that point had been my best attempt at mimesis and embracing the uncut 
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world.  And there was this terrible irony in that.  But that was completely 
swept aside by my recognition at that point that my world no longer 
existed and that the meaning of everything—I felt that just as strongly as 
I’ve ever felt anything in my life—the meaning of everything, ever that 
had gone before had to be reconsidered in the light of something that had 
happened.18 
 
For Gibson, September 11th represents what he once called a “nodal point”—a singularity 
that forever cuts the world off from what came before and fundamentally alters 
everything that occurs afterward.19  But why do the September 11th attacks represent such 
an important moment in contemporary history?  
In this chapter, I want to argue that the World Trade Center attacks represent a 
point of rupture in which the face of the twin processes of postmodernization and 
globalization were laid bare to the world.  Pattern Recognition examines 9/11 as the 
crystallizing moment of postmodernization: it serves as the ultimate event in a series of 
events (heretofore, the most important of which was probably the fall of the Berlin Wall) 
that signifies the passage from the modern regime of sovereignty to the postmodern order 
of control.  In short, 9/11 corresponds with the end of Cold War ideologies.  In the 
postmodern world, the disciplinary power of military-industrial complexes like the 
United States and their enforcement agencies begins to wane in the face of the onslaught 
of globalization.  Because Cayce’s father was a CIA operative, 
he serves in the novel as one of number of figures of the old cold war 
world, defined as it was by its struggles between the massive state 
disciplinary, security, and military apparatuses of the United Sates, the 
Soviet Union, and their allies […] September 11, Gibson’s novel suggests, 
is the sign that order has finally and definitely come to an end, clearing the 
space for the emergence of something new.20  
 
 Like Cayce’s father, the Cold War apparatus of power vanished along with the twin 
towers on 9/11.  While the Cold War functioned according to the traditional, modern 
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paradigm in which nation states struggled for dominance, September 11th signals the 
culmination of the postmodern process of globalization.  The World Trade Center 
Attacks reveal the fully globalized body of the Earth by demonstrating how an attack on 
one location can strike at the heart of the entire global capitalist order.  Pattern 
Recognition acts as an index of this new topology of power, which has shifted from what 
Michel Foucault calls “disciplinary societies” to what Gilles Deleuze terms “controls 
societies.”   
 
II.  Patterns of the Postmodern: The Computerization of Society and the Subject 
 
Before examining how Pattern Recognition provides an index or cognitive map to 
this fully globalized and computerized society, we must first look at the trajectory of 
Gibson’s writings because the trajectory of his literary output parallels the growth of 
computerization in the past three decades.  Only by placing Pattern Recognition within 
the overall framework of his oeuvre can we fully grasp the significance of the text in 
relation to the postmodern society of control.  With the possible exception of The 
Difference Engine (1990), a steampunk novel that Gibson co-authored with Bruce 
Sterling, Gibson’s entire body of work consists of texts that examine the potential effects 
of computer networks, and even The Difference Engine concerns the creation of steam-
driven computers in the Victorian era.  Gibson initially envisioned the invention of 
cyberspace in a series of stories that originally appeared in Omni magazine during the 
early 1980s: “Johnny Mnemonic” (1981), “New Rose Hotel” (1981), and “Burning 
Chrome” (1982) first introduced readers to the world of “The Sprawl.”21  But he did not 
attain true notoriety until the publication of his first “Sprawl” novel Neuromancer (1984) 
and its two sequels: Count Zero (1986) and Mona Lisa Overdrive (1988).  This series 
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played a fundamental role in giving birth to the science fiction sub-genre of cyberpunk.  
As its name indicates, “The Sprawl Trilogy” depicted a seemingly bleak, noirish future in 
which cities have spread out and engulfed their surrounding environs and in which 
information is housed and transmitted through a global computer network known as the 
Matrix.   
Gibson’s “Sprawl” series spans the 1980s when the Internet was still in its 
gestation phase, but, once the Internet went public, Gibson’s fiction underwent a serious 
transformation in order to accommodate the new technological advances occurring 
around him.  Gibson’s next major series deals with a much less distant future, one in 
which the technology seems to be just around the corner.  Generally referred to as “The 
Bridge Trilogy,” this series began in 1993 with the publication of Virtual Light and was 
followed by two sequels: Idoru (1996) and All Tomorrow’s Parties (1999).22  The trilogy 
takes its name from the fact that a gigantic earthquake severed San Francisco’s Golden 
Gate Bridge, thus making it incapable of supporting automobile travel.  However, the 
bridge maintained enough structural integrity for a group of squatters to move in and 
construct a community that exists outside of traditional United States law and order.23  
While the Bridge novels featured such technological advancements as virtual reality 
helmets and a computer-generated, artificial intelligence pop music icon, they still 
operated in a future barely removed from the contemporary world in which they were 
written—for example, Virtual Light was set in the year 2005, only a scant twelve years 
from its publication date.  As he states in the above-cited interview, these works read 
almost like adventures in an alternative present, in a present that was reached along a 
different forking path (to follow Gibson’s Borgesian metaphor).  With his next novel, 
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Pattern Recognition, Gibson began to forego futurity and alterity altogether, and he 
continued this new narrative paradigm in his follow-up to Pattern Recognition: Spook 
Country (2005).24  For the bulk of this chapter, I will focus on Pattern Recognition 
because it provides a more sophisticated investigation of the computerization of the 
postmodern worldscape, but, in the conclusion, I will transition into a brief discussion of 
Spook Country in order to provide some final thoughts on the topic of control. 
Gibson’s novels have often dealt with the implications of rampant globalization.  
In the two decades since the publication of Neuromancer, Gibson’s interests have not 
altered, but his approach has changed.  Gibson still writes about globalization, the effects 
of information upon the psyche, the cyborgization of the human, and international 
intrigues surrounding information, but now he writes about such anxieties in a realistic 
present or recent past milieu instead of in futuristic worldscapes.  In this respect, Pattern 
Recognition represents the moment in Gibson’s own body of work at which the 
distinction between present and future vanishes.  From Neuromancer to Pattern 
Recognition, Gibson’s literary output charts the collapsing of the temporal event horizon 
that he discusses; that is, as linear time has progressed from past to present to future, 
Gibson’s works have inverted this paradigm by migrating steadily from the future to the 
present or even the past.  By means of this inversion, Gibson’s texts schematize the 
manner in which the objects of speculative fiction have become the real world 
technologies of today, or, in other words, how the future has become the present.  
Furthermore, because Gibson’s texts always deal with computer technology, they act as 
programmatic indexes of what Francois Lyotard terms “the hegemony of computers”; 
that is, each of his works acts as a response to the growth of computer and 
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communication technology by charting the effects of this computerization upon both the 
individual and socio-political levels.  In short, we might say, Gibson’s works concern 
nothing less than postmodernity.   
In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979), Jean-Francois 
Lyotard explicitly links the postmodern era with the rise of computer and cybernetic 
technology.  Of course, Lyotard remains most famous for his definition of the 
“postmodern as incredulity towards metanarratives,” that is as a skepticism towards any 
schematic attempt to explain human identity, reality, or historical forces.25  Any 
overarching narrative that attempts to provide the key to understanding all of or some 
facet of human experience becomes a dubious object: psychoanalysis, Darwinian 
evolution, Marxism, scientific empiricism, etc. all become suspect under the auspices of 
postmodern epistemology.  For Lyotard, the “modern […] designate[s] any science that 
legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal 
to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of the Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, 
the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth.”26  But 
knowledge undergoes a transformation “as societies enter what is known as the 
postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age.”27  In the era 
of postindustrialism and postmodernism, the legitimation of knowledge ceases to depend 
upon metanarratives; instead, it is increasingly grounded in its exchange value—it 
undergoes a process of “mercantilization.”28  With the advent of cybernetics, which 
concerns itself with flows of information and the ability of computers and robots to 
process and exhibit information,29 Lyotard argues that our definition of knowledge must 
undergo an alteration in order to accommodate the emergent concept of information:  
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The nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged within this context of 
general transformation.  It can fit into the new channels, and become 
operational, only if learning is translated into quantities of information.  
We can predict that anything in the constituted body of knowledge that is 
not translatable in this way will be abandoned and that the direction of 
new research will be dictated by the possibility of its eventual results 
being translatable into computer language.30  
 
Thus, the postmodern era gives rise to what Lyotard terms the “hegemony of computers,” 
a hegemony in which, to be legitimated, all knowledge must be translatable into 
information, into a language that can be read and processed by computers.  Because of 
this hegemony of computers, knowledge becomes exterior to the knower, and it “ceases 
to be an end in itself, it loses its ‘use value.’”31  There is no use apart from information, 
no value apart from capital: “knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is 
and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new production.”32  For Lyotard, 
information and its exchange value achieve a hegemony over knowledge—information 
becomes a commodity to be bought, sold, and housed by means of computers. 
 Pattern Recognition traces this transformation of knowledge.  The novel’s 
protagonist, Cayce Pollard, inhabits an almost mystical position in the world of 
postmodern marketing, advertising, and computerization.  She works as a “coolhunter,” 
someone gifted with the intuitive ability to recognize the next hot trend.33  She possesses 
this ability because she has internalized not just the commodity marketplace but also the 
hegemony of computers.  This hegemony is established in the book’s opening pages, 
which describe Cayce’s  profession by means of her Google search results: “Google 
Cayce and you will find ‘coolhunter,’ and if you look closely you may see it suggested 
that she is a ‘sensitive’ of some kind, a dowser in the world of global marketing.  Though 
the truth, Damien would say, is closer to allergy, a morbid and sometimes violent 
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reaction to the semiotics of the marketplace” (2).  In this passage, we can see how Google 
and other such search engines have become indexes of society—they provide a basic 
structuring principle for the flow of capital in the postmodern economy.34  As it title 
indicates, the novel explores the growing importance of pattern recognition in the newly 
computerized global market, and sites such as Google function by means of such pattern 
recognition.  Similarly, as Cayce explains, her employment depends upon her pattern 
recognition skills: “It’s about a group behavior pattern around a particular class of object.  
What I do is pattern recognition.  I try to recognize a pattern before anyone else does” 
(88).  Her ability relies on the fact that social images, particularly those of company 
trademarks, have become embedded in her psyche to such a degree that they elicit 
complex emotional responses.  She has even developed an allergy to some of them, “a 
sometimes violent reactivity to the semiotics of the marketplace” (2).  Her condition “is a 
side effect of too much exposure to the reactor cores of fashion.  This has resulted in a 
remorseless paring-down of what she can and will wear.  She is, literally, allergic to 
fashion” (8).  Hence, she only wears non-descript outfits with the trademarks removed, 
which allow her to avoid suffering violent reactions to the logos—in effect, she removes 
her body from the sphere of brand-named commodities.35  Her seemingly brandless 
outfits represent her attempt “to carve out an original identity in a world filled with 
‘simulacra of simulacra of simulacra.’”36  But her struggle to find her own “trademark” 
proves ultimately to be in vain because the novel proceeds to examine the manner in 
which postindustrial capitalism commodifies even the most aberrant lifestyle choices.37 
In “Fear and Loathing in Globalization,” Jameson terms Cayce’s condition 
“commodity bulimia” as if her consumption at the constant buffet of commodity 
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trademarks forces her psyche to purge them by wearing generic attire and developing an 
allergic response: 
Indeed, within the brand name the whole contradictory dialectic of 
universality and particularity is played out as a tug of war between visual 
recognition and what we call the work of consumption (as Freud spoke of 
the work of mourning).  And yet, to paraphrase Empson, the name 
remains, the name remains and kills; and the logo into which the brand 
name gradually hardens soaks up its toxicity and retains the poison.38 
 
Thus, postmodern capitalism administers a lethal injection of commodities into each 
consumer, causing them to internalize the commodity system.  In essence, Cayce acts as a 
sort of commodity mystic, “a very specialized piece of human litmus paper” who can 
merely look at company logos and determine, without any kind of rational thought, 
whether they will function as lucrative product symbols or not (13).39  Therefore, the 
novel demonstrates the manner in which the human becomes like a computer: by means 
of her internalization of the commodity system and its attendant system of advertising, 
Cayce becomes capable of processing trademarks, logos, and brand names—it is a 
“hermeneutic disposition” that allows her mind to intuitively perform the massive 
endeavors of real-world coolhunters who employ “focus groups, market research, 
consumer surveys, and statistical models as the basis for their predictions.”40  Her brain 
has internalized the semiotics of the marketplace so deeply that it can instantly recognize 
patterns; it is no accident that her friend Damien jokingly refers to her bland outfits as 
C.P.U.s (Cayce Pollard Units, but, of course, also Central Processing Units), which 
further highlights the fact that Cayce operates like a computer.  In effect, Cayce has 
internalized this postmodern hegemony of computers: the pattern recognition protocols of 
computer programs have embedded themselves in Cayce’s psyche.  Similar to the manner 
in which various companies offer product suggestions based on previous consumption 
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patterns without any need for additional details about a consumer’s life, Cayce becomes 
capable of identifying logos that will prove profitable among the largest possible 
demographic.  She achieves this without rational thought because she has internalized the 
commodity marketing system and the hegemony of computers to the point that they have 
become like deep psychic structures that operate akin to a reflex response.   
 
III.  The Digitized Aesthetic: The Façade of Freedom and the Web of Control 
 The effects of the postmodern hegemony of computers extends beyond 
epistemology and into the realm of aesthetics as well.  As we have already seen, each of 
Gibson’s texts functions as a response to computerization’s steady growth towards 
hegemonic power, and the aesthetics of his works mark this progress as well.  The 
“Sprawl” stories and novels feature a language that attempts to capture the 
epistemological processes of the texts’ futuristic characters, who are completely 
enmeshed in the virtual/digital world.  Filled with jargon that is often never fully 
explained and featuring word choice that stresses how computer technology has become 
vitally linked to the human psyche, the “Sprawl” novels prove to be a dense web of 
intrigues unfolding against an almost unimaginable techno-landscape.  One need only 
examine a sample passage from the opening pages of Neuromancer to see this digital 
aesthetic at work:  
A year here and he still dreamed of cyberspace, hope fading nightly.  All 
the speed he took, all the turns he’d taken and the corners he’d cut in 
Night City, and still he’d see the matrix in his sleep, bright lattices of logic 
unfolding across that colorless void […]The Sprawl was a long strange 
way home over the Pacific now, and he was no console man, no 
cyberspace cowboy.  Just another hustler, trying to make it through.  But 
the dreams came on in the Japanese night like livewire voodoo, and he’d 
cry for it, cry in his sleep, and wake alone in the dark, curled in his capsule 
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in some coffin hotel, his hands clawed into the bedslab, temperfoam 
bunched between his fingers, trying to reach the console that wasn’t 
there.41 
 
In this passage, every line bristles with the electricity of the computer world it is 
describing to the reader—fantastical phrases like “cyberspace,” “bright lattices of logic,” 
and “livewire voodoo” convey the manner in which computerization can infiltrate not 
only the psyche but also aesthetic production.  As Scott Bukatman explains, Gibson built 
the techno-language of the Sprawl universe from a variety of sources: “Gibson coalesced 
an eclectic range of generic protocols, contemporary idiolects, and a pervasive 
technological eroticism combined with a future-shocking ambivalence.  Aside from the 
old and new waves of science fiction, Gibson’s prose and perspective owes much to the 
streetwise weariness of Chandler and the neologistic prowess of William Burroughs.”42  
Bukatman’s observation explains the manner in which the prose style of Neuromancer 
represents a gestalt aesthetic that blends together the hard-boiled style of Raymond 
Chandler and Dashiell Hammett43 together with the fantastic and ambiguous science 
fiction language of William S. Burroughs.  But this style of writing gives way in 
Gibson’s later texts to a more quotidian, sparse style that plays well for audiences beyond 
the traditional science fiction fanbase.  The language of these early works acts as an 
aesthetic attempt to textually embody the cognitive effects of the development of such 
technology, but just as Gibson’s settings have moved from the future to the present so has 
the syntax of his novels migrated temporally as well: now his novels feature the 
vernacular of the contemporary moment, which is itself filled with its own cyber-
language.  While the hegemony of computers and the society of control still seemed like 
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objects of speculation in “The Sprawl Trilogy,” the form and content of Pattern 
Recognition display the manner in which both have become the norm of the day.   
On the formal level of the novel, the text is filled with emails that have taken the 
place of modernist epistolary communication.  In fact, the entire final chapter, “Mail,” 
consists almost entirely of emails to Cayce that provide the novel’s closure.  Thus, we 
can see how the shift in epistemology has infiltrated the literary realm on a basic, 
structural level.  Indeed, one could imagine a postmodern epistolary novel in which the 
entirety of the text was comprised of emails or text messages complete with headers, 
Internet acronyms, images, and emoticons.  In fact, David Foster Wallace’s non-SF short 
story “The Suffering Channel” (2004) proceeds one step further than Gibson in this 
regard by incorporating the entirety of an email, including its attendant HTML tags, into 
the text of the story.44  Pattern Recognition further deals with the computerization of 
aesthetics at the level of its narrative, which centers around  a work of art that seems to 
participate fully in the “hegemony of computers” while remaining free from capitalist 
control: the Footage, (a film or series of films) that could be taken to epitomize the 
possibilities of art in the postmodern, computerized era.  For Cayce Pollard, the Footage 
constitutes the one constant in her life—while she jetsets around the world meeting with 
corporate bigwigs, Cayce lives her real, passionate existence through the channels of the 
Internet.  Cayce herself represents a form of otaku, or fanboy, because her raison d’être 
resides in cultishly following “the Footage,” film clips of an unknown origin that appear 
sporadically on the net and which she and the other “Footageheads” debate ad infinitum 
by means of a web forum known as “FETISH:FOOTAGE:FORUM” or “F:F:F.”  Cayce’s 
main obsession in life only exists on the net: the “mystery of the Footage itself often feels 
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closer to the core of her life than Bigend, Blue Ant, Dorotea, even her career” (78).  The 
Footage represents the liberatory dream of the Internet, the dream that users across the 
world can be brought together in a virtual space to share knowledge free from the 
boundaries of nations and corporations.  And, indeed, the Footage forum is a fully 
globalized entity that brings together users of diverse economic, national, and cultural 
backgrounds.  For Cayce and the other footageheads, the footage represents art free from 
commodification (no small feat in the postmodern era when art comes to be recognized as 
a commodity). 
As Jameson states, “the Footage is an epoch of rest, an escape from the noisy 
commodities themselves, which turn out, as Marx always thought they would, to be 
living entities preying on the humans who have to coexist with them.”45  In a world in 
which everything has become “simulacra of simulacra of simulacra,” the Footage offers 
freedom for its viewers from the endless procession of commodities, trademarks, and 
advertising gimmicks—it is an escape from the “logo-maze” (18).  For Cayce, it 
functions as a form of “psychological prophylaxis,” a preventative measure against the 
further impregnation of her psyche by the virile and viral force of commodities (51).  The 
footage segments, which the Footage Forum labels with numbers based on the 
chronology of their dissemination, represent minimalist, non-narrative filmic images that 
always feature the same couple in a variety of indeterminate settings.  When Cayce 
receives an email with an attached Footage segment, the novel describes her watching it 
in almost ecstatically sublime terms: 
Damien’s Studio Display fills with darkness absolute.  It is as if she 
participates in the very birth of cinema, that Lumière moment, the steam 
locomotive about to emerge from the screen, sending the audience fleeing 
into the Parisian night.  Light and shadow.  Lovers’ cheekbones in the 
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prelude to embrace…So long now, and they have not been seen to 
touch…They are dressed as they have always been dressed, in clothing 
Cayce posted on extensively, fascinated by its timelessness, something she 
knows and understands.  The difficulty of that.  Hairstyles, too.  He might 
be a sailor, stepping onto a submarine in 1914, or a jazz musician entering 
a club in 1957.  There is a lack of evidence, an absence of stylistic cues, 
that Cayce understands to be utterly masterful.  His black coat is usually 
read as leather, thought it might be dull vinyl, or rubber.  He has a way of 
wearing its collar up.  The girl wears a longer coat, equally dark but 
seemingly of fabric, it’s shoulder-padding the subject of hundreds of posts.  
The architecture of padding a woman’s coat should yield possible periods, 
particular decades, but there has been no agreement, only controversy.  
She is hatless, which has been taken either as the clearest of signs that this 
is not a period piece, or simply as an indication that she is free spirit, 
untrammeled by even the most basic conventions of her day.  Her hair has 
been the subject of similar scrutiny, but nothing has ever been definitely 
agreed upon…And here in Damien’s flat, watching their lips meet, she 
knows that she knows nothing, but wants nothing more than to see the film 
of which this must be a part.  Must be. (23-4) 
 
The Footage represents a pure aesthetic object, one that gives no clues as to its genre or 
even if it is a narrative: it is merely a series of images open to endless interpretation.  In 
fact, the Footage segments hearken back to what Tom Gunning has termed the “cinema 
of attractions”: the early, silent films of Auguste and Louis Lumière and George Méliès 
that create effects more directly through images than overarching narratives.46  For the 
Footageheads, the forum provides a public space of free discourse surrounding an 
aesthetic object that remains free from the ubiquitous commodification present in all 
other spheres of society.  But does it really? 
Because it has been virally disseminated through various Internet locations, the 
origins of the Footage remain shrouded in mystery.  Throughout the majority of the 
novel, it remains unclear whether or not a narrative strand connects the individual 
segments, and hence the Footage appears to be a virginal artistic object, unsullied by the 
commodifying forces of the cinema industry.   In Pattern Recognition, the Footage forum 
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acts as a microcosm of literary or film theory because it features various factions who 
dogmatically debate theories of interpretation.  For example, whether the individual 
segments represent pieces of “a work in progress” or “something completed years ago” 
proves to be an unsolvable antinomy for the Footageheads, giving rise to two competing 
camps known as the Progressives and the Completists (22).  Cayce’s friend Parkaboy acts 
as the “de facto spokesperson” of the Progressives who believe “that the footage consists 
of fragments of a work in progress, something unfinished and still being generated by its 
maker” (49).  On the other side of the debate, the Completists “are convinced that the 
footage is comprised of snippets from a finished work, one whose maker chooses to 
expose it piecemeal and in non-sequential order” (49).  In addition to theories concerning 
the Footage’s narrative, the Footageheads also debate the number of people responsible 
for the Footage’s creation.  Parkaboy develops the theory of “the Garage Kubrick,” the 
auteur theory of the critical universe that orbits the footage: 
It is possible that this footage is generated single-handedly by some 
technologically empowered solo auteur, some guerilla creator out there 
alone in the night of the Internet.  That it might be being generated via 
some sort of CGI, actors, sets and all, and entirely at the virtual hand of 
some secretive and perhaps unknown genius, has become a widespread 
obsession with a large faction of Progressives, and with many Completists 
as well, though the Completists necessarily put that in past tense. (50) 
 
Hence, the Footage forum instantiates a true space of art: neither tied to commercial 
machinery nor even to the dominance of proper names, the Footage resides in anonymity 
as an object open to pure interpretation.  But the Footage also represents a certain sense 
of angst that comes with the Internet, a sense that the anonymity provided by the web 
harbors unknowable secrets in the black, semiotically unstable “night of the Internet.” 
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Despite the hermeneutical instability of the Footage, Cayce manages to track 
down its point of origin.  By working through these communication channels, which we 
shall see are the same channels that allow the society of control to function, Cayce finally 
receives a Russian email address of one Stella Volkova, who claims that her mentally 
disabled sister Nora is the creator of the footage.  Cayce hops a plane to Moscow and 
discovers that Nora suffers from brain damage that she incurred during a bomb attack that 
killed her parents.  Because of her mental impairment, Pattern Recognition reveals Nora 
to be an artist who is completely free from the influence of commodities because her 
damaged mind cannot even function as part of the capitalist regime: “their [the 
Footage’s] production is not seeking an instant capital gain but rather the expansion of 
their trade, which has been manufactured in order to be shared visually with other users 
online.”47  Ultimately, the Footage merely represents one disordered mind’s attempt to 
communicate.  When Cayce asks if the film represents a linear narrative, Stella responds, 
“I do not know.  One day, perhaps, she will start to edit as she edited her student film: to 
a single frame.  Or perhaps one day they speak, the characters.  Who knows?  Nora?  She 
does not say” (312).  Cayce watches as Nora creates a new segment, and she discovers 
that Nora crafts her film digitally from found footage, thus negating any of the 
Footagehead theories about the significance or potential narrative of the clips.  Cayce 
discovers that the Footage is “only the wound speaking wordlessly in the dark” (316).  
The Footage gives voice to the traumatized psyche of the world: “what matters here is the 
neutral and non-sequential make up of the footage that seems to be echoing the sudden 
and inexplicable (for the characters in the novel) collapse of the Twin Towers.”48   
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In effect, the Footage constitutes a mysterious space to which its viewers attempt 
to ascribe meaning just as American citizens were still trying to understand the nature of 
the September 11th attacks: “Rather, in the light of ‘events’ like the bursting of the dot-
com bubble and the attacks of September 11, we now desperately search for patterns in 
the fabric of history but find that ‘now’ changes too abruptly to map completely or 
meaningfully.  We try to recognize patterns or employ coolhunters as a means of coping 
with what we cannot understand.”49  Moreover, the Footageheads’ devotion to the film 
clips demonstrates another means of inscribing meaning upon reality.  If we think back to 
Chapter Two, the Footage represents a form of sublimation—it provides a substitute 
object that can fill the lack of being that has perhaps become even wider in the post-9/11 
era.  While the reality outside their windows may not longer make sense, the 
Footageheads find solace in attempting to sort out the meaning underlying the Footage.  
The Footage provides a worthy sanctuary from the post-9/11 geopolitical situation 
because it seems to exist in a space that has not yet been territorialized by capital and 
control.  But Cayce points out that Nora’s work has garnered too much attention to 
remain free from the strictures of capitalist control: “any creation that attracts the 
attention of the world, on an ongoing basis, becomes valuable, if only in terms of 
potential” (317).  And, as we shall see below, once Cayce has discovered the Footage’s 
origins, Bigend promptly moves in to territorialize this seemingly liberatory aesthetic 
space. 
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IV.  Virtual Identities: Self-Fashioning in the Web of Control 
While the Footage Forum functions as one example of the liberatory capacities of 
the Internet, the novel also examines the utopian potential of creating new identities 
whole cloth on the web.  Indeed, such an act of virtual self-fashioning provides Cayce 
with the first steps on her quest to discover the Footage’s author.  Initially, Cayce’s 
search for the origins of the Footage is conditioned by Parkaboy’s discovery of a digital 
watermark steganographically concealed within one of the older segments of film, thus 
proving that the Footage does not represent an entirely anonymous work of art.  As 
Parkaboy explains in an email to Cayce, steganography “is about concealing information 
by spreading it throughout other information” (78).  Thus, steganography represents a 
pattern distributed throughout a digital object that is beyond the capabilities of the normal 
human eye to recognize.  Cayce’s new Russian acquaintance Voytek serendipitously 
knows about steganography, and explains the steganographic process in his broken 
English dialect: “Can be code supplied to client by watermarking firm.  Firm sells client 
stego-encrypted watermark and means to conceal” (84).  Parkaboy and his friend Darryl 
discover references to the watermarking while reading Japanese sites concerning the 
footage.  In order to find out more about the watermark, Parkaboy and Darryl undertake 
an act of self-fashioning that becomes possible only within the virtual sphere of 
anonymity created by the Internet: they “began to lovingly generate a Japanese persona, 
namely one Keiko, who began to post, in Japanese, on that same Osaka site” (78).  They 
craft their faux-personality in order to attract Footage otaku, for as Parkaboy says, 
“there’s nothing like genderbait for the nerds” (78).  They sculpt her identity to resemble 
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something out of a fanboy’s wet dream, and they immediately catch someone with this 
“bait”: 
Very friendly.  Very pretty our Keiko…She posts from Musashi’s ISP but 
that’s because she’s in San Francisco learning English.  Very shortly, we 
had one Takayuchi eating out of our flowerlike palm.  Taki, as he prefers 
we call him, claims to orbit a certain otaku-coven in Tokyo, a group that 
knows itself as “Mystic,” though its members never refer to it that way in 
public, nor indeed refer to it at all.  It is these Mystic wonks, according to 
Taki, who have cracked the watermark on #78.  This segment, according 
to Taki, is marked with a number of some kind, which he claims to have 
seen, and know.  No doubt motivated by lonely fantasies of getting up our 
deliciously short little plaid skirt, which we have described to him in 
passing, he now holds out the promise of showing this to us, upon our 
return to Tokyo. (78-9) 
 
As Konstantinou points out, Keiko represents the manner in which sexual fetishes 
represent another form of pattern because they “are part of the mind’s ‘culture module,’ 
whose parameters get set in the particular cultural environment one happens to grow up 
in.”50  Hence, sexual fetishes, like brands, operate according to “cognitive maps.”51  By 
engaging the power of these cognitive maps, Parkaboy and Darryl use Keiko to dupe an 
unsuspecting Japanese programmer.  This incident simultaneously highlights the 
hermeneutic instability of human interactions in cyberspace, where self-fashioning 
becomes uniquely possible, but it also demonstrates how all manners of subject behavior 
can be read according the protocol of pattern recognition.52 
Keiko’s creation displays the manner in which subjects can create their dream 
existences, even if only virtually, in which they can be intelligent and sexy and in which 
they have fascinating life stories to narrate to whoever will listen.   As Deleuze would 
say, the Internet grants the user the ability to truly create his/her self as a work of art.  
Thus, “the past,” as Cayce explains, becomes “mutable too, as mutable as the future” 
(121). Subjects can even go so far as to create fake pictures of themselves—as Parkaboy 
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and Darryl do with Keiko—pictures that can represent themselves as they would like to 
be seen.  In an email to Cayce, Parkaboy describes the creation of Keiko’s photograph:  
Judy Tsuzuki, five-foot-eleven and about as Japanese as you are, aside 
from the DNA.  Texas.  Twenty-seven.  Bartender in this place down the 
street from Musashi’s.  What we did to up the wattage for Taki, aiming to 
maximize libidinal disturbance, we shot this long tall Judy then reduced 
her by at least a third, in Photoshop.  Cut’n’pasted her into Musashi’s 
kid’s sister’s dorm room at Cal.  Darryl did the costuming himself, and 
then we decided to try enlarging the eyes a few clicks.  That made all the 
difference.  Judy’s epicanthic folds are long gone, the way of the modest 
bust nature intended for her (actually we’ve got her wrapped in Ace 
bandage for the shot, but nothing too tight) and the resulting big round 
eyes are pure Anime Magic.  This is the girl Taki’s been looking for all his 
life, even though nature’s never made one, and he’ll know that as soon as 
he lays eyes on this image. (132) 
 
Thus, as we saw with the technology in Trouble on Triton, new types are opened up for 
the subject by means of technology: the subject can engage in forms of difference that are 
not available in normal reality.  The subject (whether male or female) can thus virtually 
live out a fantasy existence as a sleek, sexy anime girl within the various communities of 
the Internet.  The “otaku-coven” of which Taki is a part represents one of these sub-
communities within the overall community of the Internet, and by means of such sub-
communities the subject can find one that grants the recognition s/he desires either for 
their real identity and life history or for the identity they have constructed and the story 
they have narrated for themselves.  But do such practices truly contain liberatory 
potential?  Can the subject truly experience a realm of freedom and becoming by means 
of the Internet or does the Internet merely function as one more tool of control? 
To answer these questions, we must turn to the character of Hubertus Bigend who 
shatters Cayce’s view of the Footage as a pure aesthetic object while simultaneously 
revealing the nature of control societies.  In Cayce’s initial conversation with Bigend, he 
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problematizes all of the Footageheads’ analyses of the Footage when he offers Cayce 
another potential reading of it: he proposes that the Footage may not have been “uploaded 
randomly” but “very carefully, intending to provide the illusion of randomness” (66).  
Thus, Bigend views the Footage’s dissemination as “the single most effective piece of 
guerilla marketing ever”: by spying on the Forum, he “saw attention focused daily on a 
product that may not even exist” (67).  Whereas the Footageheads view the Footage as an 
artistic text worthy of endless criticism and debate, Bigend sees it as nothing more than 
one more object to be commodified and exploited to increase his profit margins.  But 
Bigend’s conversation goes further by also revealing the Internet’s utopian sheen to be 
nothing more than a mask that hides the underlying machinery of the control grid.  This 
conversation causes Cayce to undergo a cognitive shift from viewing the forum as a 
closed world to recognizing it, as Bigend points out, as “a matter of public record”: “The 
idea that Bigend, or his employees, have been lurking on F:F:F [fetish.footage.forum] 
will take some getting used to.  The site had come to feel like a second home, but she’d 
always known that it was also a fishbowl; it felt like a friend’s living room, but it was a 
sort of text-based broadcast, available in its entirety to anyone who cared to access it” 
(67).  Bigend desires the Footage so that he can be properly commodify it within the 
global system of information.  For something to be so stimulating to the masses, it cannot 
remain free.  Here one might think of examples of corporations buying sites like 
MySpace or YouTube in order to properly commodify them, to make them into 
productive sites instead of merely social ones.  Most importantly, Bigend’s words reveal 
that the Internet does not exist as a utopian space of free communication and that the 
anonymity offered by the Web represents nothing more than a façade.   
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Gibson’s cyberpunk output holds a privileged place in the history of postmodern 
science fiction because it traces the collapse of modernity in the face of full-blown 
postmodernization, but it also examines the innate connection between the hegemony of 
computers and the rise of the society of control.  While Gibson’s early novels depict how 
computerization will inevitably lead to a dystopian society of control, Pattern 
Recognition and Spook Country demonstrate the manner in which the hegemony of 
computers has already lead to the instantiation of the control society, albeit in a more 
subdued, quiet form than most science fiction authors had envisioned.  In his essay on 
control societies, Gilles Deleuze argues, “It’s easy to set up a correspondence between 
any society and some kind of machine, which isn’t to say that their machines determine 
different kinds of society but that they express the social forms capable of producing 
them and making use of them.”53  Deleuze contends that whereas “sovereign societies 
worked with simple machines, levers, pulleys, clocks,” disciplinary societies, which arose 
in the 18th century according to Michel Foucault, “were equipped with thermodynamic 
machines presenting the passive danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage.”54  
Based on Foucault’s description of disciplinary societies, Deleuze posits that we have 
recently moved into a new social organization of power, “control,”55 which “function 
with a third generation of machines, with information technology and computers, where 
the passive danger is noise and the active, piracy and contamination.”56  Whereas the 
disciplinary society “operat[es] by organizing major sites of confinement,”  control 
functions by establishing the illusion of freedom: “Control is not discipline.  You do not 
confine people with a highway.  But by making highways, you multiply the means of 
control.  I am not saying this is the only aim of highways, but people can travel infinitely 
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and ‘freely’ without being confined while being perfectly controlled.”57  In effect, control 
societies function by computerizing the individual, by spreading the hegemony of 
computers to include not just knowledge (which becomes information) but also the 
subject, who becomes a “dividual” instead of an individual, a code in a database:  
In control societies, on the other hand, the key thing is no longer a 
signature or a number but a code: codes are passwords, whereas 
disciplinary societies are ruled (when it comes to integration or resistance) 
by precepts.  The digital language of control is made up of codes 
indicating whether access to some information should be allowed or 
denied.  We’re no longer dealing with a duality of mass and individual.  
Individuals becomes “dividuals,” and masses become samples, data, 
markets, or “banks.”58 
 
Individuals become little more than the sum of their data; hence, the paradigmatic image 
of the control society “is no longer a man confined but a man in debt.”59  The control 
society is not equivalent to the hegemony of computers, but, since computers serve as the 
paradigm for control, the rise in computerization entails a consequent rise in the power of 
control.  In the age of control, power becomes decentralized—it moves out of the prisons, 
hospitals, and other institutions of confinement and spreads across the entire terrain of the 
socius.  Control represents a radical territorialization of all the various strata of everyday 
life: biopower stretches itself out globally to form and control every aspect of our 
existence.  Thus, because it is a social order founded upon the advent of the computer, the 
society of control functions by means of pattern recognition, and Gibson’s novel 
cognitively maps this new geopolitical terrain.   
Bigend’s quest to appropriate the Footage as a profitable commodity represents 
the manner in which the forces of control (whether they be governmental institutions or 
corporations) always watch and keep records of even the most seemingly marginal 
events.  To this end, Bigend’s company Blue Ant has been keeping tabs on the Footage 
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Forum.  To learn about the Footage, Bigend’s employee Dorotea Benedetti engages in 
her own form of self-fashioning when she creates an online persona named Mama 
Anarchia, a Footage fan drenched in critical theory.  To do so, she employs a graduate 
student to translate her posts into theory-speak, always being careful to use words such as 
“hegemonic” and to namedrop French theorists like Baudrillard.  Moreover, the faux-
character of Mama Anarchia demonstrates the manner in which presumably liberatory 
acts of virtual self-fashioning can also be appropriated by the system of control in order 
to better exercise its power over individuals.   
For the society of control, no aspect of life remains outside its sphere of interest 
and influence—it extends the disciplinary society’s panoptic gaze across the entire terrain 
of the socius, but it does so in a supple manner that remains almost invisible to the 
masses.  As Hubertus Bigend states in Spook Country, the pseudo-sequel to Pattern 
Recognition, “I’ve learned to value anomalous phenomena.  Very peculiar things that 
people do, often secretly, interest me in a certain way.  I spend a lot of money, often, 
trying to understand those things.  From them, sometimes, emerge Blue Ant’s most 
successful efforts.  Trope Slope, for instance, our viral pitchman platform, was based on 
pieces of anonymous Footage being posted on the Net.”60  Here, Bigend reveals the 
subsequent fate of the Footage after Pattern Recognition’s conclusion: it becomes Trope 
Slope, a viral advertising campaign that inserts ads into old films, thus turning people’s 
love for historic cinema into an opportunity to, as Bigend says, “sell shoes.”61  Bigend 
reveals how corporations seek to appropriate the desires of the multitude and to transform 
them into moneymaking venues, and he also signifies the manner in which individuals 
cannot remain free from the strictures of control—he is the representative of both capital 
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and control in the novel.  By means of Bigend’s endeavors, the Footage and Nora become 
trapped within the intertwined webs of capitalist production and the society of control.  
By turning their attention to even the most mundane and seemingly inconsequential 
activities of users’ daily lives, the forces of control open up an endless array of sites in 
which behavior can be monitored, catalogued, and consequently controlled. 
Thus, the computer represents the image of control because it grants or restricts 
access based on information it maintains on its users with no need to refer to a higher 
power—the society of control becomes purely rhizomatic as every point in the network 
becomes a potential space for exercising control.  Of course, the disciplinary society does 
not simply vanish overnight; instead, the transformation from a modern diagram to a 
postmodern one represents an ongoing process.  For Gibson, September 11th marks a 
point of rupture in which it became apparent that the underlying diagram of society had 
shifted, that the postmodern era and its society of control now firmly held sway over the 
diminishing, modern, disciplinary regime of power.  The attacks highlighted the fully 
globalized nature of power, the fact that power no longer operated according to striated 
spaces but now functioned as a smooth space that extended across the entire expanse of 
the globe.  Insofar as power had become a global force, a calculated strike on one 
location (or two if we count the Pentagon attack as well) represents an assault upon the 
entire, global terrain of power.  In essence, then, Pattern Recognition views September 
11th as just such an event: an event that reveals the paradigm shift that has been going on 
somewhat silently for decades from the disciplinary society with its various sites of 
confinement to the society of control in which the world is linked together by computer 
networks in a vast array that creates the circuits of power in a limitless number of 
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locations.  Against this background, Pattern Recognition demonstrates that the creation 
of these postmodern circuits of power has not been random or haphazard; instead, these 
circuits have coalesced into a system that functions as the backbone of the society of 
control.  
 
V.  Conclusion: Annotating the Global:  
      The Eversion of Cyberspace in William Gibson's Spook Country 
 
While Pattern Recognition depicts the manner in which the forces of control 
invest themselves in the digital realm and examines the intricate linkage between the 
hegemony of computers and the society of control, Gibson's most recent novel, Spook 
Country (2007), takes this train of inquiry one step further by depicting the manner in 
which the hegemony of computers moves beyond the confines of the virtual and spreads 
itself across the physical realm.  Spook Country continues Gibson’s foray into writing 
science fictions of the present and again features Blue Ant CEO Hubertus Bigend.  Also 
set in our present world, Spook Country features technological advancements that do not 
exist just yet but that are only barely extrapolated from current technological capabilities.  
In the novel, the major new technology relies upon the recent strides in perfecting GPS 
(Global Positioning System) technology, which first began being developed by the 
United States military in the 1970s and was approved for civilian use by Ronald Reagan 
in 1983.  The GPS system became fully operational in 1995 and steadily began to 
infiltrate the consumer marketplace, but Gibson’s novel imagines a new usage for GPS 
coordinates as well as for virtual reality (VR) helmets.  Like Pattern Recognition, the 
novel focuses on a newly emergent realm of aesthetics by way of its depiction of 
“locative art,” artworks or videos that can only be seen with VR helmets at particular 
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GPS coordinate points.  The novel revolves around Hollis Henry, who Bigend hires to 
write a piece on locative art for his start-up tech magazine named Node.  She begins her 
research for the article by interviewing Alberto Corrales (the creator behind the pieces of 
locative art), who explains the implications of this new usage of GPS technology to 
Hollis: “bare-espace…it is everting”; that is, GPS technology has caused the 
epistemology of cyberspace to leak out into the physical world: the informational patterns 
that once governed virtual experiences have now migrated out of the computer and 
spread themselves across the physical globe—they have undergone a process of 
“eversion.”62  The virtual has been turned inside out, hence blurring its distinction from 
the actual. 
At first, the locative art technology seems to harbor nothing more than 
insignificant entertainment value: the novel introduces the technology when River 
Phoenix stumbles up and dies in front of Hollis on the spot of his actual death in 
Hollywood.  The true benefits of this new technology become apparent when Hollis 
Henry visits a room that has been annotated using the locative system. As Hollis’s friend 
Odile explains in her broken English, “Cartographic attributes of the invisible…Spatially 
tagged hypermedia…The artist annotating every centimeter of a place, of every physical 
thing.”63  By means of locative art, the structure of the network begins to influence real 
space to an unprecedented degree: no longer purely virtual, networks become actualized 
in the physical realm.  Thus, objects can become synonymous with hyperlinks that lead 
the user to a vast wealth of information pertaining to their history, use, symbolism, etc.  
By means of GPS, the globe undergoes computerization in an astoundingly literal way, a 
process epitomized in the worldview of Bobby Chombo, the hacker who performs the 
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technological grunt work that allows Alberto to create his locative artworks.  Alberto 
explains that the locative system and GPS technology have altered Bobby’s view of the 
world: “Bobby divides his place up into smaller squares, within the grid.  He sees 
everything in terms of GPS gridlines, the world divided up that way…He won’t sleep in 
the same square twice.  He crosses them off, never goes back to one where he’s slept 
before.”64  Just as Cayce’s psyche has computerized itself until it is capable of processing 
trademark logos, Bobby has internalized the GPS computer system while simultaneously 
developing an attendant paranoia about it.  Although Bobby never explains the 
motivations for his compulsory behavior towards the gridlines, one can assume that he 
fears being found in the same place twice.  By constantly moving from square to square, 
Bobby appears to behave unpredictably. 
In effect, Spook Country depicts the full-blown consolidation of the hegemony of 
computers.  In the novel (and in our real world), GPS coordinates effectively render the 
globe into data readable by a computer.  The spread of the hegemony of computers to a 
fully spatialized dimension represents the triumph of control over discipline, the virtual 
over the actual, and the postmodern over the  modern—the illusion of freedom is 
maintained while every space on the globe becomes accessible as a potential site for the 
exercise of control.   Indeed, Deleuze’s vision from the end of “Postscript on Control 
Societies” becomes a viable reality in a world mapped by GPS systems:  
We don’t have to stray into science fiction to find a control mechanism 
that can fix the position of any element at any given moment—an animal 
in a game reserve, a man in a business (electronic tagging).  Félix Guattari 
has imagined a town where anyone can leave their flat, their street, their 
neighborhood, using their (dividual) electronic card that opens this or that 
barrier; but the card may also be rejected on a particular day, or between 
certain times of day; it doesn’t depend on the barrier but on the computer 
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that is making sure everyone is in a permissible place, and effecting a 
universal modulation.65   
 
At this point, it becomes easy to see how communication technologies do not necessarily 
represent liberatory experiences for the subject, or, if they do, then these liberties merely 
mask a deeper structure of control.    Since the channels of communication remain 
controlled by corporations and regulated by the government, then an individual’s right to 
use them can easily be denied.  Once one is plugged into the system, which includes not 
just the Internet but also cell phones and other devices, then one becomes a subject of 
control: “every connection has its price; the one thing you can be sure of is that, sooner or 
later, you will have to pay.”66  As Steven Shaviro argues in his discussion of K.W. Jeter’s 
Noir (1998), “In short, if you’re connected, you’re fucked.”67   
But is it possible that the system of control can be turned against itself?  In his 
1990 interview with Gilles Deleuze, Antonio Negri poses precisely this question to 
Deleuze concerning his theory of control societies:  
You suggest we should look in more detail at three kinds of power: 
sovereign power, disciplinary power, and above all the control of 
“communication” that’s on the way to becoming hegemonic.  On the one 
hand this third scenario relates to the most perfect form of domination, 
extending even to speech and imagination, but on the other hand any man, 
any minority, any singularity, is more than ever before potentially able to 
speak out and thereby recover a greater degree of freedom.  In the Marxist 
utopia of the Grundrisse, communism takes precisely the form of a 
transversal organization of free individuals built on a technology that 
makes it possible.  Is communism still a viable option?  Maybe in a 
communication society it’s less utopian than it used to be?68 
 
In this question, no doubt, Negri anticipates the evocation of the global revolution of 
Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004),69 but Deleuze promptly disavows any such positive 
reading of the society of control in his response:  
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The quest for “universals of communication” ought to make us shudder 
[…] You ask whether control or communication societies will lead to 
forms of resistance that might reopen the way for a communism 
understood as the “transversal organization of free individuals.”  Maybe, I 
don’t know.  But it would be nothing to do with minorities speaking out.  
Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted.  They’re 
thoroughly permeated by money—and not by accident but by their very 
nature.70 
 
As Deleuze makes clear, the utopian potential of communication will constantly be 
undercut by the fact that communication devices and services remain commodities in 
themselves, that they remain trapped in the systems of capitalism and control that will 
constantly negate their revolutionary potential.  And, by using various communication 
services, users further insert themselves into the grid of control.  Pattern Recognition 
makes this clear in the object of the Footage and the character of Nora, both of which 
seem to remain free from the strictures of capitalist society, but both of which ultimately 
end up as just so many more sites upon which control and capital can exercise their 
power.  Furthermore, Spook Country demonstrates the manner in which the society of 
control is “everting”; that is, the society of control which had operated virtually by means 
of computers and other digital technologies is crafting itself a physical body that stretches 
across the entire length and breadth of the globe.  In the control society, the concept of an 
outside vanishes as every specific point on the map becomes subject to the hegemony of 
computers and consequently subject to the influence of power, whether such power be 
that of nation states or of corporations.  Thus, the eversion of cyberspace designates a 
singular moment in the march of globalization, a moment in which no site (no matter how 
remote) remains free from the long arms of capitalism and control. 
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Brother’s Matrix trilogy, which also stars Keanu Reeves, are almost endless: the Matrix Trilogy consists of 
The Matrix (1999), The Matrix Reloaded (2003), and The Matrix Revolutions (2003).   In 1998, Abel 
Ferrara, who remains most famous for his films The Driller Killer (1979), King of New York (1990), and 
Bad Lieutenant (1992), adapted “New Rose Hotel” into a film starring Willem Dafoe, Christopher Walken, 
and Asia Argento, the daughter of horror auteur Dario Argento.  Ferrara also delved into the realm of 
science fiction with his remake of Invasion of the Body Snatchers that appeared under the abbreviated title 
Body Snatchers (1993). 
 
22 All Tomorrow’s Parties, of course, takes its name from The Velvet Underground song of the same title 
which first appeared on the group’s Warhol-produced, iconic debut album The Velvet Underground and 
Nico (1967).  Incidentally, the song was one of the handful on the album that were sung by Andy Warhol 
protégé Nico. 
 
23 Indeed, the community on the Bridge represents a sort of utopian, lawless space akin to the Unlicensed 
Sector in Samuel Delany’s Trouble on Triton, which I discussed in Chapter One. 
 
 166 
 
                                                                                                                                            
24 Gibson has recently announced that Pattern Recognition and Spook Country represent the first two parts 
in yet another trilogy.  The series will conclude with a novel entitled Zero History.  At this time, a 
publication date for Zero History has not yet been announced. 
 
25 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington 
and Brian Massumi (1979; Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984): xxiv.  Italics are Lyotard’s. 
 
26 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition xxiii.  Again the italics are Lyotard’s. 
 
27 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition 3. 
 
28 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition 5. 
 
29 For an informative history of the various waves of cybernetic theory and their effects upon epistemology 
and philosophy, see N. Katherine Hayles’s How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1999). 
 
30 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition 4.   
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Konstantinou’s “The Brand as Cognitive Map in William Gibson’s Pattern Recognition.” 
 
34The internet has only taken over this role as the predominate index or cognitive map of our globalized 
society in recent times.  This role was previously held by television.  Park Chan Wook’s recent film Oldboy 
(2003) explores this capacity of television.  Oldboy is actually the second film in Chan Wook’s trilogy of 
thematically related films, all of which deal with the theme of revenge.  The other two films are Sympathy 
for Mr. Vengeance (2002) and Lady Vengeance (2005). In Oldboy, the main character Oh Dae-Su is locked 
for fifteen years in a hotel room that functions as a space in which rich clients can pay to have people 
imprisoned for prescribed lengths of time.  Despite his absence from the outside world, Oh Dae-Su 
continues to learn and follow the history of civilization by means of the television in the room.  Oh Dae-
Su’s narration during his fifteen-year imprisonment in Oldboy provides an insightful reading of both the 
television and the Internet: “If you stand outside a phone booth on a rainy day and meet a man whose face 
is hidden by a violet umbrella, my advice is that you make friends with television.  The television is both 
clock and calendar.  It is your school, home, church, friend, and lover.  But my lover’s song is too 
short”(Scene 2).34  Oh Dae-Su makes this last statement as he is masturbating and watching a female pop 
singer, whose song climaxes prematurely before he manages to achieve a similar feat.  Oh Dae-Su’s 
complaint about his “lover’s song” being overly brief depicts the one flaw of television that the Internet 
does not share: temporal constraint.  While television programs can be recorded ever more effortlessly, this 
still requires planning based on the clock and duration.  All aspects of the Internet, on the other hand, 
remain available to the user at anytime.  There are always friends to be had (MySpace, chatrooms, etc.), 
knowledge to be learned (Wikipedia), and lovers to be had (the infinite realm of Internet pornography and 
virtual sex).  It is always there for the user, no matter what his/her needs or desires may be; it is space 
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physical manifestation, would swallow the Earth whole in its seeming infiniteness.  His situation is similar 
to the one Paul Virilio discusses in The Vision Machine [trans Julie Rose (1988; Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1994)] involving inmates and watching television in prison during his discussion 
of the private space’s loss of autonomy: “the private sphere thus continues to lose its relative autonomy.  
The recent installation of TV sets in prisoners’ cells rather than just in recreation rooms out to have alerted 
us…From now on, the inmates can monitor actuality, can observe television events—unless we turn around 
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and point out that, as soon as viewers switch on their sets, it is they, prisoners or otherwise, who are in the 
field of television, a field in which they are obviously powerless to intervene” (64-5).  Virilio here 
recognizes the power of the image and its ability to control the subject, for Virilio quotes the prisoner who 
states that watching television makes prison more difficult because the prisoners are allowed to witness all 
the aspects of the world in which they are not allowed to take part.  Virilio’s concept of “imprisonment in 
the cathode-ray tube” almost directly invokes David Cronenberg’s Videodrome (1983), and indeed the 
television controls our perceptions of reality through its portrayal of everything from politics to sexuality to 
its definition of “fun.”  As Pattern Recognition explains, the Internet operates in the same sphere as 
television because certain places, such as Brazil in the novel, make no real distinction between TV and Net 
culture (90).  The Internet is thus the logical successor of the television, a fact that an example from Oldboy 
displays clearly. 
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Moltke’s ability to excrete works of art: part of the text centers around the debate over whether his feces 
represents true art (found art, moreover, for he does not craft them in any way) or if they are in actuality 
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the Avant-Garde,” in Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, eds.  Thomas Elsaesser and Adam Barker 
(London: BFI Publishing, 1990.  56-62).  Alternately, see my discussion of Gunning and the cinema of 
attractions in Chapter Four. 
 
47 Tatiani G. Rapatzikou, “Authorial Identity in the Era of Electronic Technologies,” in Authorship in 
Context: From the Theoretical to the Material, eds. Kyriaki Hadjiafxendi and Polina Mackay (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 160.   
 
48 Rapatzikou, “Authorial Identity” 159. 
 
49 Konstantinou, “Brand as Cognitive Map” 80. 
 
50 Konstantinou, “Brand as Cognitive Map” 77. 
 
51 See Konstantinou’s argument in the “Brand as Cognitive Map.” 
 
52 In Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT P, 2004), 
Alexander R. Galloway argues that it is “protocol” that provides structure and implements control in the 
decentered, distributed network of the internet and global society.  Galloway argues that the seemingly 
rhizomatic nature of the Internet does submit to a form of control hierarchy.  Galloway calls the means of 
such control “Protocol” because he bases his reading of it on the various computer protocols that allows the 
Internet to function: TCP/IP (Transfer Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) and DNS (Dynamic Name 
Server) being the most important ones.  In his book, Galloway examines how control exists after 
decentralization, “after it [centralization] is dead and gone” and has been “replaced as the social 
management style by the diagram of distribution” (8).  As Galloway explains, TCP/IP gives the Internet a 
seemingly horizontal, non-hieracharical structure: “TCP and IP work together to establish connections 
between computers and move data packets effectively through those connections.  Because of the way 
TCP/IP was designed, any computer on the network can talk to any other computer, resulting in a 
nonhierarchical, peer-to-peer relationship” (8).  While this protocol opens up the utopian possibility of 
sharing information and data free from the strictures of control, DNS forces a hierarchy upon the Net.  
Basically, DNS performs the function of translating web addresses, such as “www.google.com,” into IP 
addresses, which consist of a series of four, three digit numbers (for example, “121.543.345.567”).  
Galloway explains that “all DNS information is controlled in a hierarchical, inverted tree structure.  
Ironically, then, nearly all Web traffic must submit to a hierarchical structure (DNS) to gain access to the 
anarchic and radically horizontal structure of the Internet” (9). Of course, DNS servers remain controlled 
by the various ISPs (Internet Service Providers), who increasingly control all forms of communication 
including television, Internet, and telephone connections.  Although these companies generally allow free 
reign to their users as to the activities in which they engage on the Internet, they are capable of blocking 
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certain domain names, inhibiting certain types of peer-to-peer communications (file-sharing, for example), 
and even monitoring the type of information that users are accessing.  While DNS servers also remain 
decentralized, they still function as a means of controlling traffic on the web, and they begin to 
problematize the utopia of free communication and information sharing that the Internet promises to its 
users.   
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time, how increased speed of transportation altered the way in which distance was perceived, etc.  
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66 Steven Shaviro, Conntected, or, What it Means to Live in the Network Society (Minneapolis and London: 
U of Minnesota P, 2003) 3.   
 
67 Shaviro, Connected 3. 
 
68 Deleuze, “Control and Becoming,” Negotiations 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin (1990; New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995) 174. 
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69 In Empire and Multitude, Hardt and Negri contend that global communication simultaneously leads to the 
instantiation of the control society and the inscription of a space in which a utopian democratic revolution 
can be enacted by means of the multitude created by such circuits of communication. At the core of Hardt 
and Negri’s theories of revolution lies Marx’s own dialectical materialism which structures his conception 
of history, class struggle, and revolution.  Of course, Marx inherits the dialectic from the philosophy of 
Hegel, for whom the dialectic structured all processes from chemical reactions to the flow of history to the 
creation of the subject’s consciousness of itself.  As Sean Sayers and Richard Norman explain in Hegel, 
Marx, and Dialectic: A Debate (Sussex: Harvester Press and New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), at its 
basis, dialectical logic functions as an “an attempt to portray things as concrete,” and hence it operates as a 
refutation of metaphysics, which “is abstract in that it considers things merely in themselves, merely as 
what they are, as self-subsistent, as isolated and abstracted from their context” (3).  Contrary to this, Sayers 
and Norman explain that “according to dialectical thought, real, concrete things are not abstract in this way, 
but embedded in the world: essentially related to other objects and in interaction with them” (3).  At the 
heart of this view of things lies contradiction, for “all concrete things are contradictory.  There are tensions 
and conflicts within all things and in the relations between things…Concrete reality is not a mere diversity 
of indifferent and externally related things—it is not a mere ‘totality of facts.’  For as well as recognizing 
the positive existence of things, we must also see in things the forces opposing and negating them which 
lead to development and change.  Concrete things are not just related to each other, they are in a constant 
process of conflict and interaction” (Norman and Sayers 3).  Marx builds upon Hegelian dialectics to create 
dialectical materialism, “a philosophy of struggle and conflict,” in which “nothing comes into being except 
through struggle; struggle is involved in the development of all things; and it is through struggle that things 
are negated and pass away” (Norman and Sayers 23).  By means of its own internal contradictions, 
capitalism thus creates the means of its own destruction: “to say that capitalism is contradictory does not 
mean that it is impossible and unreal, but rather that is an essentially dynamic social form, and that it is 
ultimately destined to perish and be negated in a new social form, socialism, which will emerge from its 
result” (Norman and Sayers 13). Or, as Marx and Engels succinctly state in “Manifesto of the Communist 
Party” (The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed., ed. Robert C. Tucker [1848; New York and London: Norton, 
1978]), “What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers.  Its fall and the 
victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable” (483).  Marx and Engels believed that only when 
Capitalism achieved true hegemony, to use a Gramscian term not yet in the lexicon of Marx and Engels, 
over the entire globe, could the proletariat become capable of staging a global revolution.  Hardt and Negri 
believe that we have now reached the stage when Capital has reached its ultimate power in its 
transformation into what they term “Empire.”  This transition to the age of Empire provides the 
groundwork for Hardt and Negri's vision of a global, democratic revolution of the multitude.  Hardt and 
Negri furnish this new global society with the rather ambiguous name of “Empire.”  For them, Empire does 
not mean the imperialistic nation states of the 19th and early 20th century but rather the society of 
biopower and control, abstract labor, total globalization, and the multitude.  It is a society without margins 
from which to enact subversive practices, yet it also represents a society that, for Hardt and Negri, 
nonetheless contains the gestating potential for worldwide, utopian revolution via its creation of the 
multitude.  In Empire (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP, 2000), Hardt and Negri argue that the 
nation state has slid into a decline in its powers during the postmodern era,” yet they also contend that this 
“decline…does not mean that sovereignty as such has declined” (xi).  On the contrary, sovereignty has 
merely undergone a metamorphosis, shedding its old skin for a new shinier epidermis that masks its 
inherent nature:  “The passage to Empire emerges from the twilight of modern sovereignty.  In contrast to 
imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or 
barriers.  It is a decentered and deterretorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire 
global realm within its open, expanding frontiers.  Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, 
and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command.  The distinct national colors of the 
imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow” (Empire xii-xiii).  
Hardt and Negri view the advent of this world order as the natural progression in the expansion of 
capitalism’s march towards becoming an all-encompassing global economic order, that is, as one more 
transformation in the economic modes of production.  Empire is a “smooth space” that erases national 
boundaries (“striated spaces”) in favor of creating a decentered, global society of control.  But Hardt and 
Negri’s seemingly dystopian concept of Empire contains some seemingly utopian facets, such as its attitude 
of integration, in itself, yet their vision of Empire’s creation of the multitude pushes their theories into 
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profoundly utopian territory, for it is the multitude that provides the potential for a new radically 
subversive, democratic movement on global scale that has hitherto remained impossible.  Throughout 
Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004), Hardt and Negi 
characterize the multitude as a Deleuzian body without organs, as a massive flesh that refuses the 
hierarchical ordering of organs.  The twin forces of “commonality and singularity defines what we called 
the flesh of the multitude.  These, in other words, are the conditions of possibility for the formation of the 
multitude” (212).  The multitude exists beyond such exclusive distinctions as national identities, racial 
identities, etc., for it preserves such singularities within its matrix while simultaneously establishing a 
common ground upon which such disparate bodies of individuals can find a sense of unity.  Hardt and 
Negri pose the multitude as a kind of project, a project that could finally bring about global democracy in a 
radically new fashion.   At present the multitude cannot truly arise because it remains trapped within the 
society of control that Empire represents, for there exist a variety of “forces that constantly constrain this 
multitudinous flesh to form a political body, transforming its singularities into divisions and hierarchies, 
reducing the common to a means of global control, and expropriating the common as private wealth.  One 
fact that should be obvious in all this is that multitude does not arise as a political figure spontaneously and 
that the flesh of the multitude consists of a series of conditions that are ambivalent: they could lead toward 
liberation or be caught in a new regime of exploitation and control” (212).  To achieve a new state of 
liberation, Hardt and Negri argue that the multitude must harness the powers of the common in order to 
enact a political project based on love that will topple sovereignty’s power in all its forms and replace it 
with a radically democratic global order.  The multitude must seek “the destruction of sovereignty in favor 
of democracy […] the multitude today needs to abolish sovereignty at a global level” (351).  In the 
contemporary world, sovereignty proves “unnecessary” because “the conditions are emerging that give the 
multitude the capacity of democratic decision-making” (352).  Hardt and Negri have recently expanded 
their collaboration into a trilogy with the publication of Commonwealth (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
2009), which begins trying to theorize how the global democratic revolution of the multitude would take 
place band what a government by the multitude would look like. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
DOCUMENTARY SCIENCE FICTION: REALISM AND MEMORY 
IN THE TIME TRAVEL FILMS OF CHRIS MARKER AND SHANE CARRUTH 
 
No one has lived in the past, and no one will live in 
the   future.  The present is the form of all life. 
   -Jean Luc Goddard’s Alphaville1 
  
Science fiction has always been a genre obsessed with time: it imagines potential 
futures and often uses these as a means of commenting upon the present moment,2 it 
considers the implications of introducing radically new technologies into our 
contemporary world,3 it features alien visitors or futuristic societies in order to comment 
upon the current social-cultural state of a particular nation or of the entire globe,4 or it 
imagines alternative presents.5  Beyond these basic plotlines of temporal estrangement, 
science fiction also developed a self-conscious plot trope that allows it to more fully 
reflect upon the nature of time—the time travel narrative.  Of course, stories of time 
travel are not a recent occurrence—such narratives became one of the major strands of 
science fiction as early as the 19th Century, and these tales have proliferated far beyond 
the bounds of science fiction proper.6  And time travel could be explicitly connected to 
the cinema because film seems to provide a means for capturing time.  Paul Coates 
argues that time travel stories actually arose because of cinema: “the emergence of time 
travel as a literary theme at the end of the 19th century is a phenomenon one may suspect 
to be linked to the simultaneous emergence of cinema, with its capacity to manipulate the 
illusion of time.”7  In many ways, “cinema itself has the properties of a time machine” 
because it can transport us to the past, whisk us away to unimaginable futures, or simply 
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preserve slices of time.8  If time travel narratives have always harbored this connection to 
cinema, then it makes sense to ask what insights time travel films can offer about the 
filmic medium.  Hence, in this final chapter, we shall explore how science fiction can 
allow us to rethink our conceptualizations of cinema in radically novel ways. 
In Theory of Film, Siegfried Kracauer argues that cinema has always divided 
itself into two distinct tendencies: the realistic tendency and the formative tendency, or, 
to put it in other terms, films either follow in the lineage of the Lumière brothers or 
Georges Méliès.9  As Kracauer explains, the realistic tendency expands upon the realism 
of photography through its incorporation of movement and its use of staging.  Initially, 
films of the realistic tendency only featured narratives if they occurred naturally, and they 
incorporated movement only if the objects within the frame moved.  Of course, it became 
immensely popular to shoot films from moving trains, but this form of movement still 
originated in nature.  This kind of “objective movement” differs from “subjective” 
movement in which the director uses camera movement (pans, tilts, tracking shots, etc.) 
as well as editing techniques to move the audience through “vast expanses of time and/or 
space.”10  By incorporating these various kinds of movement, the cinema became a more 
perfect recreation of reality than mere photography, but Kracauer maintains that it further 
built upon this realism by means of staging, which includes not just the choosing of 
locations but also the creation of artificial settings.  Of course, staging should “convey the 
impression of actuality, so that the spectator feels he is watching events which might 
have occurred in real life and have been photographed on the spot.”11  The realistic 
tradition of filmmaking seeks to recreate reality, to give the impression that these events 
have actually occurred.  Certain directors, such as Werner Herzog, still adamantly adhere 
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to this doctrine and insist on always filming on location.  Herzog even went so far as to 
physically drag a boat over an Amazonian mountain to instill authenticity into 
Fitzcarraldo (1982).  While the Lumière tradition strives to create the illusion of reality, 
the formative tendency, which derives from Méliès, seeks “to penetrate the realms of 
history and fantasy” by harnessing the various formative powers that cinema opens up for 
the director.12  For Méliès, who was a magician by trade, the cinema created new spaces 
for him to experiment with his illusions, and these new forms of illusion allowed him to 
create narrative films, such as his science fiction classic, Le Voyage dans le lune (1902) 
or “A Trip to the Moon” as well as his Le Manoir du diable (1896) or “The House of the 
Devil,” which is often considered to be the first horror film.  Méliès inaugurated the 
filmic tradition of science fiction and horror, and he did so by means of illusions and 
special effects—his films were built around their spectacles. 
While Méliès began to instill narratives into his films, Tom Gunning argues that 
both the realistic films of Lumières and the fantastic films of Méliès function according 
to the same underlying aesthetic, an aesthetic he labels as “the cinema of attractions.”  He 
defines the cinema of attractions in opposition to narrative cinema, which began to exert 
a hegemonic force over cinema between 1907 and 1913 with the rise of directors like 
D.W. Griffith.  In contrast to narrative cinema, Gunning explains that the cinema of 
attractions “envisioned cinema as a series of visual shocks” and that even the realistic 
filmmaking “was valued largely for its uncanny effects.”13  Initially, cinema remained 
inextricably linked to spectacle, either the spectacle of the cinematograph itself or the 
spectacles that filmmakers could create through the medium of film: “The cinema of 
attractions directly solicits spectator attention, inciting visual curiosity, and supplying 
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pleasure through an exciting spectacle—a unique event, whether fictional or 
documentary, that is of interest in itself.”14  Even the fantastic cinema of attractions films, 
such as those of Méliès, featured narrative only as a pretense: “the story simply provides 
a frame upon which to string a demonstration of the magical possibilities of the 
cinema.”15  For Méliès, narrative merely provided a structure to connect multiple “tricks” 
together into a unified whole.  Of course, cinema’s recreation of reality no longer stuns us 
as it did the audiences who attended the Lumière brothers’ screenings—we do not 
generally flee into the night believing the images to be real, a story many, such as 
Gunning, consider to be apocryphal.  But filmmakers still often strive to shock audiences 
in a variety of ways: comedies include increasingly raunchy subject matter; horror films 
incorporate gorier and more gruesome death scenes; blockbuster films strive for ever 
more impressive special effects; and directors such as Lars von Trier, Nagisa Oshima, 
and Michael Haneke create shock effects through the use of frank, fetishistic, and even 
pornographic sex scenes.16  In general, science fiction films operate according to the 
aesthetic of the cinema of attractions through their inclusion of estranging elements and 
storylines and their use of ever more complex forms of special effects.  But is it possible 
to still create the other kind of shock that Gunning suggests?  Is it still possible to use 
cinema to render reality “uncanny” in the same fashion that the Lumières did?  In this 
chapter, we will explore two films that function as what I will term “documentary science 
fiction,” that present reality to us in just such an uncanny fashion. 
Whereas the majority of science fiction films participate in the tradition of Méliès, 
this chapter explores two films that feature traditional science fiction plots but that 
deviate from conventional sci-fi by adhering to the realistic tendency.17  Because cinema 
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itself has often been compared to a time machine, it seems fitting that time travel films 
would provide the ideal method for exploring this concept.  This chapter examines two 
time travel films that eschew spectacle in favor of creating films that not only 
problematize the genre of science fiction but that comment upon the nature of cinematic 
expression.  Chris Marker’s La Jetée (1962) and Shane Carruth’s Primer (2004) both 
exhibit a counter-spectacle aesthetic that allows them to explore the relation between time 
and memory in a way that will allow us to reconsider the struggle between the modalities 
of spectacle and narrative in cinema.  Documentary science fictions represent the 
cinematic equivalent of science fictions of the present.  While they may feature 
estranging elements, they use a realistic aesthetic to comment upon our present world or 
to interrogate the manners in which we perceive reality.  As we shall see, these two films 
participate in the Lumière tradition because they concern the cinema’s ability to 
seemingly preserve time and depict reality, and hence the films simultaneously explore 
our desires to relive the past or to reorder it, a desire that cinema offers to us in its 
recreations of reality. 
 
I.   Still-Lifes of the Future: La Jetée and Science Fictions of Realism  
 
The rudiments of documentary science-fiction can be found in a variety of films, 
such as Jean-Luc Goddard's Alphaville (1965) and Andrei Tarkovsky’s Solaris (1972) 
and Stalker (1979).  Alphaville features none of the normal science fiction visuals—it 
appears to be set directly in the present; only its storyline clues the reader into it as a 
science fiction film.  Goddard forgoes special effects and elaborate futuristic settings 
partly due to his extremely limited budget but also to evoke a feeling in the audience that 
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the future has already arrived.  Godard utilizes a counter-spectacle aesthetic in his 
apocalyptic film Weekend (1967), which depicts the disintegration of bourgeois society.  
Similarly, in Solaris, Tarkovsky’s camera spends an inordinate amount of time dwelling 
upon wholly unfuturistic elements: the film’s opening provides images of nature on 
which Tarkovsky poignantly lingers during his trademark long takes.  Despite the film’s 
futuristic setting, Tarkovsky refuses to incorporate futuristic cars and opts instead for the 
common conveyances of his day, thus driving home the film’s message that humankind 
has become so alienated from its natural environment that the present has become 
equivalent to the future.  Tarkovsky continues his experiments with documentary science 
fiction in the perplexing and beautiful Stalker (1979), a film that (like Thomas Pynchon’s 
Gravity’s Rainbow [1974]) explores a liminal space known simply as “The Zone,” a 
space that was supposedly the site of an alien landing or some other disastrous or 
paranormal occurrence.  Even more so than Solaris, Stalker features nothing outside of its 
narrative that would demarcate it as science fiction.  The film sculpts its otherworldly 
atmosphere from natural locations and fully urbanized spaces, which again are posed 
against one another in a dichotomy.  Indeed, whether the paranormal or extraterrestrial 
exists in Stalker or whether it is merely a hoax or hallucination remains an issue of debate 
long after its credits role.  More recently, Darren Aronofsky’s π (1998) and Wong Kar 
Wai’s 2046 (2004) both, to one degree or another, continue to experiment with this 
aesthetic approach to the genre.  But La Jetée and Primer provide a special example of 
this sub-genre of science fiction because their stories of time travel reflect upon cinema 
as a means of capturing time and upon the medium’s ability to render reality uncanny.  
Because time travel narratives inevitably play with and frustrate our general narrative 
 178 
 
expectations, these two documentary science fictions provide the perfect venue for 
exploring the gulf between the realistic tendency and formative tendencies and between 
the cinema of pure spectacle and narrative cinema. 
In the history of time travel narratives, there exists none quite as unique as Chris 
Marker’s La Jetée.  Now perhaps best known as the basis for Terry Gilliam’s 12 Monkeys 
(1995), Marker’s film represents a critical text in the history of cinematic 
experimentation because it consists almost entirely of still images—it, in essence, 
devolves the filmic image back to its photographic forebears.  La Jetée (in English, “The 
Jetty” or “The Pier”) takes place in a dystopian future after global nuclear war has 
annihilated the majority of the Earth’s population.  In an attempt to improve their present 
situation, a group of scientists begin conducting experiments in time travel.  The main 
character, who is known simply as “the Man,” repeatedly travels back in time and 
eventually even into the future, where he learns that humanity will rise from the ashes 
into a brighter tomorrow.  Although the plot of Marker’s film contains estranging 
elements, its use of still photography instead of moving images distinctly marks it as 
documentary science fiction.  Because it forgoes the basic technology of film, Marker’s 
La Jetée provides the ideal space for examining cinema as spectacle.  Furthermore, it will 
allow us to consider film as a medium for capturing the human and to reflect upon the 
relation between identity, memory, and time. 
La Jetée opens with a shot of Orly Airport, just south of Paris, the setting that 
inaugurates and closes this brief circuit of a film.  Sounds of planes and choral singing 
swell as the credits roll across the still image of the airport.  Abruptly, Marker cuts to a 
black screen with white text that states, “Ceci est l’histoire d’un home marque par une 
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image d’enfance” (“this is the history of a man marked by an image from his 
childhood”).18  An unseen narrator reads these words to the viewer, and the film never 
reveals the narrator’s identity or purpose—he simply exists alongside the series of images 
to deliver the story to the audience, a job he undertakes in a monotonous and clinical tone 
of voice, almost as if he is reporting lab results.  The film features no direct dialogue—
the narrator renders all the characters’ words in indirect discourse and only refers to 
himself (for it is a masculine voice) as “we.”  Moreover, the narrator only uses the past 
tense to describe the events, which makes the film feel like a series of snapshots that the 
narrator is displaying while recalling the story.  This aesthetic further heightens the 
realism of the film because it gives the impression that the film’s events have actually 
occurred and are being presented in this document for our inspection.   
At the film’s beginning, the Man’s parents have brought him to the airport as a 
child to watch the planes arrive and depart.  Thus, the film starts by examining the human 
fascination with motion, which is almost entirely absent from La Jetée since Marker’s 
film denies the very technology that provides the basis of the cinematic medium—the 
illusion of movement created by the rapid succession of still images.  La Jetée “reduc[es] 
film to its origin in a series of stills in black and white,” and this “use of still photographs 
creates a sense that all that remains after the disaster of World War III are the fragments 
of a narrative.”19  Film has been reduced back even further than the Lumière shorts which 
feature little more narrative than a photograph: a train arriving at a station, people going 
swimming, people exiting a factory—the narrative of all of these could almost be 
conveyed in simple snapshots.  But the narrative of La Jetée could not be so simply 
deduced from the procession of images without the narrative voice to connect them.  
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Only narrative can piece together the fragmented images that compose the film, for as 
D.N. Rodowick argues with regards to the film, “movement, drained from the image and 
divorced from representation and action, has relinquished its role as the measure of 
time.”20  If movement no longer serves as a measure of time, then we are plunged back 
into time as it exists in the Eleatic paradoxes of Zeno.  Zeno of Elea remains famous (or 
infamous) for his paradoxes of motion, all of which involve subjects attempting to pass 
through an infinite number of points in a finite space of time, thus rendering Achilles 
incapable of ever catching the Tortoise.21  From the film’s outset, Marker’s use of still 
images creates a cinematic space that deterritorializes the filmic medium in a similar 
fashion, hence enabling the critic to perform a complete reevaluation of the relationship 
between the filmic spectacle of movement and its narrative content.22  Because Marker’s 
film eschews the cinematic illusion of movement, it also denies an inherent narrative to 
the images because movement generally implies at least a basic narrative action.  But 
without the narrative voice, the film’s narrative would remain incomprehensible, for its 
images in isolation from the narrative would persist in their ambiguity to the point of 
being aporetic.  Furthermore, since the film also foregoes any attempt to create spectacle 
through the use of special effects and instead features images that could just as easily be 
from our reality, then the narrative voice provides the only evidence of this being science 
fiction cinema.   
This particular visit to Orly proves auspicious for the young child because he 
witnesses a man being shot on the pier, a memory that will haunt him for the remainder 
of his life.  Just before the murder occurs, he witnesses something entirely different: the 
peaceful countenance of a woman’s face.  As the narrator explains,  
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Nothing tells memories from ordinary moments.  Only afterwards do they 
claim remembrance on account of their scars.  That face which was to be a 
unique image of peace time to carry with him through the whole wartime.  
He often wondered if he had ever seen it or if he had dreamed a lovely 
moment to catch up with the crazy moment that came next. (1) 
 
From the beginning, La Jetée interrogates the relation between the subject’s identity, 
memory, and narrative as well as how particular instants in time are inscribed in the 
subject’s mind as memories, much in the same way that cinema carves out slices of time.  
The image of the woman’s face only becomes a memory when it is tied together in the 
Man’s subsequent life narrative, that is, when a narrative bridge has been erected between 
the still images.  But, as the narrative voice makes clear, these narrative bridges always 
harbor the potential of being mere fictions that the individual has generated in order to 
make sense of their chaotic existence.  Indeed, as Elena del Rio points out, the still 
images recall Roland Barthes’s argument about the relation of photography to the past: 
“the Photograph does not necessarily say what is no longer, but only and for certain what 
has been.” 23  It points towards “the inherent poignancy of the photograph, that sign of an 
absent presence.24  The photograph represents our tortured relationship with the past, a 
relationship that time travel narratives interrogate at a fundamental level.  Perhaps even 
more than the future, the past beckons to us to solve its riddles and mysteries or to 
remember those foggy moments that may hold keys to our identity while also 
instantiating the desire in us that altering the past could lead to a metamorphosis of the 
present.  
Such is the case with the Man in La Jetée who still wonders about that pre-war 
day at Orly when the image of a woman’s face was etched forever in his memory—his 
mind focuses on this image as one worthy of remembrance, much in the way that cinema 
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chooses discrete images from the chaotic manifold of space-time.  As the narrator makes 
clear, in his later life, he ponders whether he actually witnessed the woman’s face or 
whether it was merely a fiction that his psyche created to grapple with the image that 
followed it: the horrifying picture of a man being gunned down.  As Frank Kermode 
argues, we use, whether consciously or unconsciously, fictions to “satisfy our needs,” for 
they provide “models of the world [which] make tolerable one’s moment between 
beginning and end.”25  Or as Constance Penley argues, “time travel stories are fantasies 
of origins,” and “they are also fantasies of endings.”26  Even from the beginning of the 
film, Marker forces the viewer to consider how we create notions of beginnings and 
endings, how we parse out certain slices of time as worthy of remembrance.  Hence, all 
memories harbor the potential of remaining purely fictional, of having been sculpted into 
significance by our subsequent rewriting of them.  As the narrator from Marker’s pseudo-
documentary Sans Soleil (1983) states, “I’ll have spent my life trying to understand the 
function of remembering, which is not the opposite of forgetting, but rather its inner 
lining.  We do not remember.  We rewrite memory much as history is rewritten.”27  In 
one sense, La Jetée compels us to wonder whether all memory contains less of what was 
perceived and more of the narrative that the subject has generated to explain these 
remembered perceptions.  But, as Kracauer suggests with regards to film, “it is entirely 
possible that a staged real-life event evokes a stronger illusion of reality on the screen 
than would the original event if it had been captured directly by the camera.”28  And La 
Jetée suggests that we perhaps stage reality in our minds—that our memories are like 
cinematic stagings of real-life events. 
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After this initial setup of the film regarding the woman’s face, La Jetée proceeds 
to tell the story of the Man’s subsequent life.  Shortly after the Man’s visit to Orly Airport 
as a young child, World War III erupts and decimates the surface of the earth, leaving 
Paris in ruins, a state evoked by photographs of Paris intercut with shots of ruins.  The 
narrative voice explains, “Many died.  Some fancied themselves to be victors.  Others 
were made prisoners.  The survivors settled beneath Chaillot.  Above ground everything 
was rotten with radioactivity.  The survivors stood guard over a kingdom of rats” (3).  
While they “guard” the radioactive surface of the Earth, the entirety of their existence 
takes place within a series of catacombs under the Palais de Challoit, catacombs that 
both protect them from the fallout on the surface and that represent the past from which 
they have been forever sundered.  Amongst the religious statuary that litters the 
catacombs, there is a small plaque that reads “tête apôtre,” literally “mind apostle.”  And, 
in effect, the Man must learn to become a mind apostle in order to save the human race 
from extinction.  To stave off the annihilation of their species, the survivors devise a 
series of time travel experiments with the hope of finding the needed assistance:   
The human race was doomed.  Space was off limits.  The only link with 
survival passed through time.  A loophole through time and then maybe it 
would be possible to reach food, medicine, energy.  This was the purpose 
of the experiments: to throw emissaries into time to call past and future to 
the rescue of the present.  But the human mind balked.  To wake up in 
another time meant to be born again as an adult.  The shock would be too 
much. (4) 
 
For the traveler, then, the journey to a different time represents a form of rebirth, a 
journey back through a psychic birth canal and an arrival in a completely new set of 
narrative parameters.  Like the Lumières’ films, reality becomes uncanny for these 
pathetic travelers through time, for they have witnessed spatio-temporal transformations 
 184 
 
that cannot possibly be real.  Insofar as time shapes human identity and perception, the 
possibility of awaking in a new time proves to be fundamentally shattering for the 
psyche: it means the recreation of one’s identity, a complete rewriting of one’s personal 
narrative.   
 To circumvent this fault in the human mind, the experimenters seek out prisoners 
who maintain strong mental connections with their pasts—individuals who harbor 
distinct memories of the past and of their selves within that time frame.  They 
surreptitiously stumble upon the ideal test subject in the Man because of his continued 
obsession with that particular day on the pier at Orly.  As the narrator explains, “the camp 
police spied even on dreams,” and they are fully cognizant of the fact that the Man “was 
glued to an image of the past,” an image that has developed so much significance for him 
that it will enable the Man to travel back in time without losing his sense of identity (4).  
Indeed, the entirety of his identity remains inextricably linked to this image—the image 
has been “overemplotted,” to use Hayden White’s term, in his life narrative: “We might 
say that…the patient has overemplotted these events, has charged them with a meaning 
so intense that, whether real or merely imagined, they continue to shape both his 
perceptions and his responses to the world long after they should have become ‘past 
history.’”29  The Man has overemplotted his memory of that day at Orly—and, for this 
reason, the camp scientists believe that he harbors a better chance of successfully 
returning to the past.30  The image of the Woman’s face remains frozen in his memory, 
and he desires to recapture it and to set it back into motion.  It remains crystallized like 
the images that comprise La Jetée, but, as we shall see, the Man desires to set time 
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running again on that day at the pier, to reinsert motion and hence to salvage his 
meaningless, fragmented existence. 
 Like a research report, the narrator’s statements record the results of these 
temporal experiments into the past: “at first nothing else but a stripping out of the 
present,” a stripping out that leaves the Man awash in a sea of blackness and pain (4).  
But, then, on the tenth day, a change occurs, a procession of images appears each of 
which the narrator’s voice describes in turn:  
Images begin to ooze like confessions.  A peace time morning.  A peace 
time bedroom.  A real bedroom.  Real children.  Real birds.  Real cats.  
Real graves.  On the sixteenth day, he is on the pier at Orly.  Empty.  
Sometimes he reaches a day of happiness.  But another one.  A face of 
happiness, but another one.  Ruins.  A girl who could be the one he is 
yearning for.  He crosses her path on the pier.  He sees her face in a car 
smiling.  More images pour out and mix.  Museum.  Perhaps the museum 
of his memory. (5) 
 
The images that flow over the Man have no narrative connection—the images “ooze” in a 
non-narrative, non-temporal sequence like a dream.  This procession of images highlight 
the imagistic quality of memory.  The images the Man perceives are obviously from 
before the war because they depict landscapes not yet scarred by nuclear blasts, but this 
provides the only connective theme between them.  Yet this basic thread throughout the 
images coupled with the narrator’s repeated use of the terms “peace time” and “real” 
implies that they are brief, static glimpses of the past.  Indeed, the repetition of the word 
“real” suggests that the film’s present world proves to be, in some sense, “false,” that it 
has somehow had reality stripped out of it.  And, in effect, the diegetic present of the film 
functions as an island in time because it has ceased to be a part of a serial narrative—its 
connection with the past has been severed, and the survivors currently lack the ability to 
move forwards into a future.  Also, “the insistence on the reality of these things 
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paradoxically draws attention to their status as images.”31  Like the still images of which 
the film is comprised, the Man’s present is one that contains no linkage to a larger 
narrative.  Furthermore, the repetition of the word “real” recalls the constructed nature of 
memory, the potentially fictional nature of our remembered images:  
The repeated use of the word ‘real’ in this sequence gives credence to the 
traveler’s fantasies/memories, while deconstructing the metaphysical 
binarism reality/fantasy in at least two important ways.  The first one, of 
course, concerns the reality of psychic contents themselves.  No less 
significantly, the unequivocal sense of reality conferred on these 
photographic images seems to challenge the Platonic indictment of 
representation as copy or forgery of an original truth.  Photography and 
film are to be taken not as simple illusions in relation to a reality ‘out 
there,’ but as realities in their own right, with their own specific ontologies 
and epistemologies. (387)    
 
Hence, in the images that appear to the Man, the film begins to blur the line between 
reality and fiction, between original and duplicated image.  The “real” nature of the 
images highlights the potentially false nature of this dystopian future version of Paris, and 
this future proves false precisely because the survivors are no longer connected to the 
narrative thread of history.  Thus, to reinsert themselves into narrative and, consequently, 
into history, the survivors must turn their attention toward time itself—they must force 
themselves back into the narrative schema from which they have been expelled and left 
floating in a timeless sea.   
Finally, on the thirtieth day of the experiments, the Man perceives more than mere 
glimpses of the past: he travels back himself and meets the Woman from the earlier 
images: “Now he is sure she is the one.  As a matter of fact, it is the one thing he may be 
sure of.  In the middle of this dateless world, which first stuns him by its splendor” (6).  
Unable to focus because of the various shiny baubles that present themselves to him in a 
department store, the Man loses sight of the Woman and she disappears.  But the 
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experimenters immediately return him to the past: “time rolls back again.  The moment 
happens once more.  They have no memories, no plans.  Time builds itself painlessly 
around them.  As landmarks, they have the very taste of this moment they live as 
scribblings on the walls” (6).  Finally, in this second permutation, the Man actually meets 
the Woman (she also never receives a name), and they seem to genuinely enjoy one 
another’s company. 32  Here, we see the film imposing a spatial language upon 
temporality with the term “landmarks”—they are islands in time around which the 
normal river of linear temporality flows, but, as the film demonstrates, linear or serial 
conceptions of time provide only one narrative model of organizing human experience.  
The narrative voice emphasizes that the couple “have the very taste of this moment” 
almost as if their infatuation causes them to exist in an extratemporal space in which the 
past and the future have no bearing: only the present exists—they are devoid of 
“memories” (no past), and “they have no plans” (no future) (6).  Towards the end of their 
first meeting, the Man and Woman stroll through a park, and “he remembers there were 
gardens” (6).  In the park, Marker pays homage to Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) 
when the Man leads the Woman to an exhibit that features a cross-section of a Sequoia 
tree with significant dates in history posted on its various rings.33  He points beyond the 
edge of the tree and explains to the Woman that he comes from there.  Interestingly, the 
tree represents a true spatialization of time—it is time crystallized into an image.  Here, 
whether one conceives of time as a circle or a line, the visual metaphor still proves 
valid.34  In essence, the tree signifies the manner in which time can be distilled or 
transmuted into an image.  Cinema normally creates just such images of time through its 
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depiction of movement, but Marker refuses this spectacle even as he creates a film about 
time and memory. 
Suddenly, the experimenters recall the Man to his own time because it is the end 
of their first round of experiments.  In the second round of experiments, the technicians 
attempt to create a perfect moment between the Man and the Woman.  They send the 
Man back repeatedly, and he meets the Woman in different places each time: “she always 
welcomes him in a simple way.  She calls him her ghost” (7).  Then, on one particular 
day, she acts frightened when he meets her, and when she leans over him: “As for him, he 
never knows whether he moves towards her, whether he is driven, whether he has made it 
up, or whether he is only dreaming” (7).  The film then cuts to images of the Woman 
lying in bed, thus giving the impression that the two have slept together and that perhaps 
her fright stemmed from her inexplicable desire for this strange man who appears and 
vanishes like a phantom.  The series of still images depicting the Woman lying in bed are 
finally interrupted by one image that lingers and then reveals itself to be an actual moving 
image, the only one in the film.  The motion in the scene is so subtle that it could be 
easily missed: the Woman simply opens her eyes.  But it is a truly powerful second of 
cinema, for, as Coates comments, “it is like the mysterious birth of time itself.”35  Only in 
such moments can the two lovers feel that they are truly living in the present, that the 
present is not already past.  Generally, once one has the chance to name a moment “the 
present,” then it has already become the past.  The movement in this image implies this to 
be the present because the movement in the three spatial dimensions signifies a 
consequent movement in time.  Because the rest of the film consists entirely of still 
images, it highlights how these images already exist in the past, for how else could these 
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snapshots exist?  This scene breaks the illusion of the film as a series of snapshots, and it 
highlights this scene as perhaps the only occurrence in the narrative worthy of future 
remembrance—it represents the only experience precious enough to be ensconced as a 
filmic memory in the mind’s eye.  The Man has recaptured the woman who had haunted 
him, and he has transformed her frozen visage from the pier into a sensuously mobile 
look of love.  The film implies that it is only the power of love that allows the individual 
to exist in a state of pure duration, a state that allows them to be fully in tune with the 
present with no cares about the past or the future.  The Man and the Woman seem to step 
outside the normal constraints of the present as their love begins to blossom, for their 
relationship is built upon narrative incongruities since the Man disappears and reappears 
at random.  As Coates further comments, “the girl’s eyes are, as it were, animated by 
love, her love for the man/child, the love that has transported him into the past.  For it is 
this sense of the possibility of renewed movement, of the flame of life being rekindled 
out of universal ashes, that draws the protagonist backwards.”36 Thus, without the 
constraints of the past (since the two never exchange personal histories) nor concerns for 
the future (since the Man could disappear at any moment), the couple believe that they 
can exist in a perpetual present, in a state in which the strictures of time no longer matter.  
Shortly after they make love, the pair meet in a natural history museum filled with 
the preserved remains of animals ranging from small birds to giraffes and giant whales.  
The natural history museum proves profoundly significant, for it is a space built upon the 
all too human belief that the passage of time can be arrested and that the present can be 
preserved in perpetuity, a belief also exemplified by cinematic technology.  As Bob 
Dylan says of museums, they are the places in which “infinity goes up on trial.”37  In 
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other words, the museum represents a space in which humankind believes it can carve out 
blocks of immortality.  With the museum, the experimenters achieve their goal: “now 
they have hit the bull’s-eye.  Thrown in the right moment, he may stay there and move 
without trouble” (8).  In effect, the scientists have engineered the perfect situation, one in 
which the two are infinitely compatible with one another.  Perhaps the museum setting 
taps into past time in a way more exact than any other, for it is a three-dimensional space 
demarcated for the sole purpose of preserving spatial objects against the onslaught of 
temporal progression—it is a space created to keep time from getting lost, to recreate and 
preserve reality.  In the context of the museum, “the girl seems also to have been tamed,” 
as the narrator says, as if she is one of the wild animals that have been “tamed” through 
the art of taxidermy (8).  The narrator further explains that she has come to accept the 
Man’s strange appearances and disappearances as naturally occurring phenomena, and 
thus the engineers have achieved their goal of successfully inserting the Man into past 
time.  Hence, when he returns to the future, the Man realizes that this was his last meeting 
with the Woman, for now the question becomes whether or not the scientists can send 
him into the future. 
The journey into the future proves more difficult, but the Man manages to 
complete the mission: he travels into a future world in which Paris had been rebuilt with 
“ten thousand incomprehensible streets” (9).  As Coates points out, the film depicts these 
ten thousand streets by using “a close-up of the grain of piece of wood,” thus recalling 
the earlier scene with the sequoia and demonstrating how images from reality can be used 
in estranging ways.38  A panel of leaders from the future greets him, and he pleads with 
them to send aid to the survivors in the past: “Since humanity had survived, they could 
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not refuse to its own past the means of its own survival.  That sophism was taken for Fate 
in disguise” (9).  The Man makes the circular argument that since the human race had 
survived, then this futuristic welcome committee must have been the cause of it; 
therefore, to deny help to the past would be to destroy themselves in the present.  Of 
course, the argument proves questionable, and it recalls one of the basic paradoxes of 
time travel narratives—the grandfather paradox, “which warns of the possibility of a 
wayward traveler mistakenly killing his own grandfather, thus erasing himself from 
existence.”39  A variation of the grandfather paradox also exists in which the traveler’s 
journeys into past time actually cause the gestation of certain aspects of his/her present: 
this is the case in works such as Heinlein’s “By His Bootstraps” and Cameron’s The 
Terminator as well as in La Jetée and 12 Monkeys to a lesser degree.   
Despite the sophistic nature of his plea, the Man convinces the panel from the 
future, and they give him plans for a power plant capable of generating enough energy to 
restart industry across the planet.  Equipped with this knowledge, the Man returns to the 
past, but no triumph awaits him there.  Instead, the scientists take the information from 
the Man, and then the prison guards prepare to execute him since he has outlived his 
usefulness.  But one hope presents itself to him—the panel from the future travels back in 
time to offer him the chance to escape into the future and avoid his fate: 
Now he only waited to be executed with somewhere inside him the 
memory of a twice lived fragment of time.  And deep in these limbos, he 
got the message from the men of the world to come.  They too traveled 
through time and more easily.  Now they were there ready to accept him 
as one of their own.  But he had a different request.  Rather than this 
pacified future, he wanted the world of his childhood and this woman who 
perhaps was waiting for him. (10) 
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So the Man travels to the past one last time to that childhood moment on the pier at Orly, 
thus literalizing Nietzsche’s eternal return of the same and Freud’s return of the 
repressed—he races back towards his fate—but not the fate he expects.  As he enters the 
pier, he realizes that his childhood self will be there as well, but he ignores this thought 
and instead focuses on rushing towards the Woman whose face he had carried with him 
in his memory all these years.  But, sadly, they are not meant to be together, for he has 
been followed by one of the camp guards: “And when he recognized the man that had 
trailed him since the camp, he knew that there was no way out of time.  And he knew that 
this haunted moment he had been granted to see as a child was the moment of his own 
death” (10).   Hence, La Jetée ends with a frozen image of the Man falling backwards 
with his arm reaching up towards the sun.  Finally, he understands that the only way out 
of time lies in death (the final ending to our personal narrative), but La Jetée 
problematizes this very notion by making the ending equivalent with the beginning.   
The Man believes he can escape from the strictures of time, that he can rewrite his 
personal narrative and generate a utopian existence for himself, that he can create his own 
happy ending.  But he has repressed one aspect of that day at Orly: his memory focuses 
upon the woman’s face and neglects the person being gunned down next to his childhood 
self.  While the Man overemplotted the woman’s face, he underemplotted or even 
overwrote the murder.  La Jetée’s ending proves especially significant because the end 
and beginning of the film are revealed to be same; thus, the film illustrates the manner in 
which every moment is essentially an insignificant point in the procession of linear time.  
Marker’s film demonstrates the manner in which film makes moments special even 
without recourse to spectacle.  By way of its counter-spectacle aesthetic, La Jetée 
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illustrates how cinema can translate the quotidian into the spectacular, how it can render 
plain reality into an estranging experience.  While it lacks the spectacle generally 
associated with the genre, La Jetée effectively highlights how cinema makes even the 
most mundane events into sites of potential marvel: a group of men photographed in 
catacombs can become a cadre of post-apocalyptic survivors capable of sending people 
back in time.  La Jetée foregoes the conventional spectacles that attend science fiction 
and demonstrates the manner in which all narrative remains science fiction, but to fully 
understand film’s inherent science fictional nature, we must turn to another example of 
documentary science fiction: Shane Carruth’s Primer.   
 
II.  The Forking Paths of Time:  
      The Multiplicity of the Self in Shane Carruth’s Primer 
 
As Tom Gunning points out, “the system of attraction remains an essential part of 
popular filmmaking,” and most films achieve “a synthesis of attractions and narrative.”40  
But films like La Jetée structure themselves in a manner that divorces narrative from 
image in a manner that allows the critic to speculate upon the relation between the two 
cinematic tendencies.  To more directly problematize the concepts of spectacle and 
narrative, we must now turn towards another documentary science fiction that also 
follows in the realistic tradition of the Lumières, one that similarly deals with time travel 
but in a realistically depicted, contemporary setting—Shane Carruth’s Primer.  Primer’s 
story concerns two entrepeneuring engineers with the distinctly Biblical names of Abe 
and Aaron who inadvertently create possibly the greatest invention in the history of the 
world: a time machine or temporal stasis chamber (the film never gives the device a 
name) that allows them to travel back to the recent past.  Primer’s austere 
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cinematography and lack of special effects create a startlingly realistic mise-en-scène, 
almost as if we are watching a documentary about entrepreneurs instead of a science 
fiction film.  Primer heightens its cinéma vérité feel by constantly shooting the characters 
in static long shots that make it seem as if they are being watched by a secret camera 
peaking in at the characters through their garage windows.  For example, when they have 
built their first version of the machine, the pair sprinkle paper circles over it to test 
whether it is indeed emitting some sort of field.  As they do so, the camera tracks left and 
begins shooting the machine through the video camera the two have set up to document 
the experiment.  When the paper scraps stop in mid-air without succumbing to gravity, 
the audience feels as if they are actually watching a video lab report of the experiment.   
In addition to such cinematographic and directorial choices, Primer also creates a 
realistic aesthetic by foregoing elaborate props or special effects.  The machines (or 
boxes, as the characters often call them) are composed entirely of materials available at 
any hardware store.  The film even depicts the characters scouring various everyday 
items from their environment, such as the palladium they harvest from the catalytic 
converter in Abe’s car.  As the film’s narrative voice says, “They took from their 
surroundings what was needed and made of it something more”—this phrase becomes a 
sort of refrain throughout the film (1).  Following along with this statement, the film even 
stages a dichotomy between two types of engineering: the high-powered and hyper-
funded engineer who has endless materials and resources versus the ingenious, garage-
based inventors who must be creative with what is available, the inventors who, we might 
say, engage in their profession through the practice of bricolage.  The film highlights this 
difference during Abe and Aaron’s discussion of how NASA’s solution to writing in zero 
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gravity differed from the Soviet one.  Because of the lack of gravity, traditional pens 
would not function in space, so NASA spent inordinate amounts of money creating a new 
pen that would work in the absence of gravity.  The Soviets solved the problem in a much 
simpler fashion: they used pencils instead of pens.   
The narrative describes the quartet of engineers in a way that again explains 
Primer’s aesthetic approach to the genre of science fiction:  
Meticulous, yes.  Methodical.  Educated.  They were these things.  
Nothing extreme.  Like anyone, they varied.  There were days of mistakes 
and laziness and infighting.  And then there days, good days, when by 
anyone’s judgment, they would have to be considered clever.  No one 
would say that what they were doing was complicated.  It wouldn’t even 
be considered new.  Except maybe in the geological sense.41 
 
While this passage describes the characters, it also evokes Primer’s relation to the genre 
of science fiction.  The film’s story is nothing new: time travel narratives have remained 
a science fiction mainstay for over a century, and narratives about the creation of 
alternate timelines and selves have also become common plot archetypes.  But Primer 
takes these plotlines and creates something new.  Like this statement, the film follows its 
events in a meticulous fashion, almost as if it is attempting to put the audience in the role 
of a scientist judging the evidence from a series of experiments.  In addition, Primer 
eschews elaborate sets, famous actors and actresses, and dazzling special effects and 
chooses instead to appropriate what it needs from its surroundings and to make of it 
something more.  Because the characters view their surroundings with an eye that sees 
the manner in which they can be deconstructed and rebuilt, the film from its very 
beginning forces the audience to consider the possibility that their normally stable 
definitions of reality do not represent the only readings of their environment.  As the film 
peals away the layers of reality, it simultaneously deconstructs science fiction in a 
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manner that gestures towards the realization that all film (and perhaps even all narrative) 
proves to be science fiction.  Like La Jetée, Primer reveals the estranging and spectacular 
nature of the objects that exist around us—it takes reality and reflects in back to us in a 
way that reveals its innate uncanniness. 
Primer opens with blackness, which is quickly illuminated by lights coming on in 
a typical suburban American garage, a motif that runs throughout the film.  From the 
camera’s vantage point inside the garage, the shot depicts the door begin rising and four 
men entering the garage.  Then, the scene features the non-diegetic sound of a phone 
ringing.  Someone answers the phone and a voice speaks, “Here’s what going to happen.  
I’m going to read this and you’re going to listen, and you’re going to stay on the line.  
You’re not going to interrupt.  You’re not going to speak for any reason.  Now, some of 
this you know.  I’m going to start at the top of the page” (1).  From its outset, like La 
Jetée, Primer splinters itself between the narrative voice on the phone and the images 
projected for the viewer, the two of which do not always explain one another entirely.  
Because the interlocutor who is listening to the narrative voice never speaks, the film 
never offers clarification about the disjunctions that appear between the narrative 
produced by the flow of images and the one read by the voice on the phone.  
Furthermore, the massive gaps in the narrator’s story never receive satisfactory 
explication.  The film, like the statement that the voice reads, acts as a primer on the 
events that follow, but a primer that remains fundamentally incomplete.  It functions like 
a beginner’s handbook that is missing crucial sentences and paragraphs if not entire 
pages.  For the majority of the film, the identities of the narrating voice and his listener 
remain unclear to the audience, but later the voice reveals that he is an alternate version 
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of Aaron created by the pair’s travels through time, and the interlocutor (who is never 
identified) is presumably some version of Abe.  In a sense, the narrator represents a voice 
from the future because Aaron has already experienced the present, thus highlighting the 
fact that the future already exists in the present or that the concept of the present is 
virtually meaningless.  It is important here to note that Primer’s title functions as a 
double entendre that contains two meanings, both of which have meaningful relations to 
the film.  The film itself acts as a primer, an introductory text for the viewer and for the 
interlocutor on the phone.  At the same time, the word “primer” also evokes the notion of 
priming a machine.  We might also say that the film deals with the priming (in both 
senses of the word) of the individual for a new kind of existence in which one’s life 
narrative can be revised on a constant basis, thus opening the subject up to a radical 
experience of becoming. 
Along with two other inventors/engineers, Abe and Aaron operate a garage-based 
mail-order company that supplies computer parts to hackers.  But Abe and Aaron grow 
tired of fashioning these low-grade inventions and decide to pursue other avenues of 
experimentation in hopes of attracting corporate attention.  Although the film never 
explains it precisely, Aaron and Abe begin by attempting to build a low-cost form of 
superconductor.  In fact, the film never explains itself at all, an important facet of its plot 
that I will trace throughout the remainder of this chapter.  But their experiments 
ultimately produce something entirely new, something that can only be described as a 
time machine or temporal stasis chamber (again, the film never gives the device a name).  
Early on, the film’s coherence begins to fragment through techniques such as blackouts, 
the first of which occurs after Aaron and Abe have turned on the machine for the first 
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time.  As they lift up the machine’s cover to see the results of the experiment, the film 
abruptly cuts to black and then to an image of Abe waking up on a floor beside a phone, 
leaving the viewer to question whether or not the machine caused some sort of blackout 
or whether it is merely a jump cut.  Like the beginning of the film, the blackness is 
broken by a phone ringing, and the sequence features multiple, jarring shots of Abe 
awakening to add to the confused feeling of the image.  When Abe answers the phone, 
Aaron asks if he is hungry and then to alleviate Abe’s sense of confusion, Aaron 
explains, “Abe, it’s 7:00.  Abe, it’s 7:00 at night” (5).  It is almost as if Abe needs to be 
reacquainted with time and to have his place in the narrative structure of reality explained 
for him.  The film never explains such instances, thus leaving the viewer to supply his/her 
own narrative fillers.  As we shall see, these absences of information highlight the 
manner in which the film interrogates the nature of cinema itself. 
A large portion of the film consists of repeated versions of the same day, almost 
as if it is a cerebralized version of Harold Ramis’s comedy Groundhog Day (1993).42  
The viewer’s first experience of this day again opens with blackness, which is illuminated 
by a blinding light as Abe opens a rooftop door.  As before, the relation between this 
scene and the previous one remains shadowy.  On the first iteration of the day, which is 
already at least its second permutation, Abe promises to show Aaron “the most important 
thing any living organism has ever seen” (7).  They constructed the device in their garage 
predominantly from common items such as copper tubing; again, “They took from their 
surroundings what was needed and made of it something more.”  The machine has two 
ends (an A end and a B end), which should be thought of as two points on opposite poles 
of an elongated oval.  Whatever object enters the box at one end falls into a feedback 
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loop and curves parabolically around to the other end, but it consequently becomes 
untethered from normal physics; it only pops out on the other end after a significant 
number of cycles.  In effect, the object in the device experiences a longer period of time 
than objects outside the machine.  For instance, every five days, Abe wipes an amount of 
protein buildup out of the box that would require five to six years to produce. Primer 
never delves into the minds of its characters, and neither Abe nor Aaron ever offer their 
hypotheses in a straightforward fashion.  After explaining the protein build-up to Aaron, 
Abe invites him to put his watch inside the machine.  Initially, the two believe the 
machine degrades gravity or blocks information, but they discover that they are blocking 
something much more fundamental—time.  As Abe explains,   
Everything we’re putting in that box becomes ungrounded.  And I don’t 
mean grounded to the earth, I mean not tethered.  We’re blocking 
whatever keeps it moving forward, so they flip-flop…But Aaron, the 
Weeble’s stupid.  It can’t move.  Even if we were to put the Weeble in at 
point B, it’s still just going to bounce back and forth until it’s kicked out at 
the B end.  But if it were smart, it could enter at B end and exit at the A 
end before it flips back. (8) 
   
At this point, the significance of the device still remains unclear, but nonetheless Abe 
surprises Aaron by revealing that he has already built a device large enough to 
accommodate a person.   
He drives Aaron to a climate controlled storage facility, where Aaron witnesses a 
double of Abe entering one of the storage units.  Abe has already used the device to travel 
back in time once, thus revealing this to be the second permutation of the day.  Before 
continuing, I should briefly explain how the larger machines function.  To set the 
machine, the user powers it up at the point in time to which s/he wants to return.  Then, 
after a certain length of time has passed, the person enters the box, remains in it for that 
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determined period of time, and then exits the box at the moment when s/he switched on 
the box’s power.43  A delay timer keeps the person from meeting another version of their 
self.  The boxes are basically constructed from collapsible metal frames with plastic tarps 
strung between the beams—they are flooded with argon and then must be tightened up to 
secure any leaks, for, as Abe explains, “There’s always leaks” (10).  And, as the film will 
display, there are always leaks in narrative, particularly film narrative which must 
condense stories down to a reasonable sitting length—Primer achieves this feat 
beautifully with its lean seventy-seven-minute running time.  Instead of creating a 
hermetically sealed representation of reality, film acts like a sieve through which certain 
moments of time drip away.  Film cannot depict every moment of time, so it must choose 
which pieces of time to include.  In general, films condenses stories in a manner that will 
allow the audience to easily piece together the missing moments of time.  But Primer 
refuses this convention of narrative cinema: it offers enough of the pieces to create a 
skeletal structure of its story, but then it purposefully leaves massive gaps in a manner 
that demonstrates how all film represents a science fictional experience because cinema 
in itself proposes the belief that reality can be captured and made sensible.  Yet, as 
Primer demonstrates, the gaps in narrative perhaps harbor information that would 
fundamentally alter the meaning of the whole.  The tension between narrative and 
spectacle in Primer is palpable throughout the film as the images and narrative voice 
conflict with one another, and ultimately the film depicts how our belief in stable visions 
will always ultimately prove as illusory as the film we are watching. 
In their first attempts, Abe and Aaron travel trough time in order to make modest 
sums of money by playing the stock market, a radical new version of “insider trading.”  
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After the two power up the machines, they isolate themselves in a hotel room away from 
all contact with the world because, as Abe explains, “If we’re dealing with causality, and 
I don’t even know for sure…I just took myself out of the equation” (10).  The two gather 
stock information and pick up two tanks of oxygen to allow them to breathe while inside 
the boxes.  When the film depicts them entering the boxes for the first time, it cuts to 
black, which is again illuminated by a light coming on in the box.  Then, Abe describes a 
particular moment he experiences inside the box, “I don’t know, maybe it was the 
Dramamine kicking in, but I remember this moment in there, in the dark with the 
reverberation of the machine.  It was maybe the most content I’ve ever been” (10).  Here, 
it is almost as if absenting one’s self from the flow of history and creating an existence 
for one’s self outside of time provides a profoundly blissful experience, almost as if it is 
time that causes us to suffer.  When Aaron exits, he gets sick because he leaves the box 
too soon, for the return to time proves traumatic.  They have returned to six hours earlier 
in the day, and they later revisit the storage facility and witness a duplicate version of 
themselves entering it.  Thus, Abe and Aaron seem to have achieved their goal: they have 
created a marketable device, one of the greatest inventions humankind has ever 
witnessed, a page directly out of science fiction that has been transmitted into the real 
world. 
Of course, human nature kicks in and Abe and Aaron’s curiosity drives them to 
further contemplate the implications of the machine.  During a conversation, they discuss 
what action they would perform if they had absolute impunity, and Aaron expresses his 
desire to punch his boss in the face, but as he says, “I’d only do it though if I knew that 
no one would find out or get hurt.  Like I wish there was a way that I could do it and then 
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go back and tell myself not to.  Because I just want to know what it feels like.  That’s all, 
really” (12).  The two discuss the infeasibility of the idea and attempt to play it off, but as 
the narrative voice states, “But the idea had been spoken and the words wouldn’t go back 
after they had been uttered aloud…And with no need for it, no possible real-world 
application, no advantage at all to be gained from it, the idea stayed” (12).  During their 
subsequent discussions of the absurdity of the idea, the two begin to consider the relation 
between time and identity; as Aaron says,  
I’m not going to pretend like I know anything about paradoxes or what 
follows them, and honestly, I really don’t believe in that crap.  I mean kill 
your mom before you were born, whatever.  It has to work itself out 
somehow…Look this is what I know for sure.  About the worst thing in 
the world is to know that the moment you are experiencing has already 
been defined…and do you ever feel like… maybe things aren’t right, like 
maybe your life is in disarray or just not what you would like and you start 
to wonder what caused this.  But what if it wasn’t something you had to 
wonder about?  What if you knew for sure this is not the way things are 
supposed to be? 
 
Thus, Primer questions the nature of the present, of the present as an illusion based on the 
human capacity to narrate and string one event together with the next, but even more 
fundamentally the film begins to explore the connection between memory and the self, 
between time and identity.  Aaron finds himself discontented with the eternal return of 
the same—he desires to insert difference into his past, to not only create his life as a work 
of art in the present but to reshape his personal history and consequently to revise his 
identity.  In effect, by splintering its narrative, Primer argues that our identities are never 
actually unified because they constantly fluctuate with the continually floating signifier 
of the present.  Since the present can never be pinned down because it is always already 
past, identity remains fundamentally non-unifiable as well.  But what if this was not the 
case?  This is the question that Aaron decides to pursue. 
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Soon enough, the two begin traveling back more frequently to trade stocks and 
also for other, less clear purposes.  Whether Aaron travels back to punch his boss in the 
face or not is never depicted, but the film suggests that he performed the deed, for, as the 
viewer discovers, Aaron has been taking trips back in time without Abe’s knowledge.  
Soon, after one of their trips back to trade on stocks, Abe notices that Aaron has blood 
pouring out of his ear, but the significance of this occurrence is never explained.  Instead, 
the viewer is left to presume that the machine has caused some sort of physical damage.  
At this point, what happens and does not happen becomes murky as the film increasingly 
splinters into a mosaic of different timelines.  The film jump cuts across different places 
and times with few clear narrative connections, thus creating a disorienting effect that 
makes it impossible to distinguish which are the original versions of Abe and Aaron and 
which are the doppelgängers created by their travels.  But whether the distinction 
between copy and original even matters becomes a question with no real answer in the 
film.   Again, the film invites us to impose our own narrative upon the storyline in order 
to make sense of the fragments that have been presented to us.   
This intensification of the film’s narrative confusion begins when Abe and Aaron 
experience a strange incident: they see their friend Rachel’s father, Mr. Granger, sitting in 
a car outside Aaron’s house in the wee hours of the morning.  They call him at his house 
only to discover that he is at home as well.  They instantly realize that Granger has used 
the device and created a duplicate version of himself.  The pair accost Granger, who flees 
and inexplicably falls into a vegetative state, and they remain incapable of determining 
when or how Granger entered one of the boxes because as the voice on the phone 
explains, “the permutations were endless” (16).  How Granger even discovered the 
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machine, much less ascertained how to use it, remains a mystery that the film never 
resolves.  The two travel back in a desperate attempt to reset the situation before Granger 
entered the box, yet Granger’s double still exists and cannot get near Abe without falling 
into a vegetative state.  But, as the narrative voice explains (although explains might be 
too strong a word), “From this they deduced that the problem was recursive, but beyond 
that, found themselves admitting, against their own nature, and once again, that the 
answer was unknowable” (15).  While this statement applies to the situation with Mr. 
Granger, the narrator’s statement could just as easily apply to the film itself: the film 
seems to repeatedly offer new realizations that will resolve its enigma but these 
realizations inevitably slip away into the chaotic vacuum of time that unfolds onscreen. 
After the debacle with Granger, Abe decides that they have carried the 
experiments too far and that he must reset the situation.  At this point, the film reveals the 
existence of the failsafe machine, a secret machine Abe had built and left running since 
day one in case the consequences began to spin out of their control, in case causality 
slapped them in the face.  He enters the failsafe machine, returns to the first day, and 
approaches Aaron in a manner that duplicates the earlier scene.  However, this iteration 
plays out differently when Aaron shockingly reveals that his earpiece actually contains a 
recording of the events of that day which play in his ear, giving him a three-second lead 
on the events that occur around him—the earpiece appears in the first permutation of the 
day, but initially the audience believes that Aaron is simply listening to basketball.   Abe 
cannot fathom how this is possible, so Aaron reveals that he had already discovered the 
failsafe machine and used it to return to the first day. Aaron describes how the modular 
design of the boxes allows them to be folded up and taken back in time.  After taking one 
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of the machines back with him, Aaron drugged that day’s version of himself so that he 
could keep living the same day over and over again: “Aaron would describe how simple 
things become when you know precisely what someone will have for breakfast even in a 
world of tamper-proof lids” (16).  On most iterations of the day, Aaron stashes his 
double’s body in the attic; however, on one particular version of the day, his double 
struggles with him.  At this point, the narrative voice reveals himself to be this double of 
Aaron who refused to be imprisoned in the attic: “And that’s where I would have entered 
the story.  Or exited, depending upon your reference” (16).  When the double realizes that 
Aaron has recorded the day’s conversations, he leaves—he takes himself out of the 
equation as Abe says in an earlier scene.  Therefore, Aaron achieves a state in which he 
already knows the narrative of not only his own life but of those lives around him.  He 
becomes capable of experiencing the present because it is known in advance and hence it 
can be fully lived before it slips away into the past.  The present exists before him like an 
actuality film, such as those of Lumière, that allows him to control time and determine 
the shape of reality in a way that had previously only existed for filmmakers.  He frames 
himself and directs the characters using his foreknowledge of the events that will unfold 
around him. 
But why has Aaron chosen to relive this particular day?  At the end of that fateful 
day, the two attended a birthday party only to witness their friend Rachel’s ex-boyfriend 
enter the party with a shotgun.  Deciding to use the device for ostensibly noble purposes, 
Aaron attempts to program the birthday party in such a way that he could act as the hero 
and stop Rachel’s ex-boyfriend from threatening or even harming the other partygoers.  
While Abe offers a variety of other viable alternatives to prevent the encounter, Aaron 
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persists in his conviction that he must confront the irate ex-boyfriend: “This way, we 
know exactly what happens.  We have complete control over it” (17).  During this 
conversation, Abe interrupts Aaron and reveals that the machine has had other adverse 
side effects: “What’s wrong with our hands?...Why can’t we write like normal people?”  
Aaron responds, “I don’t know.  I can see the letters.  I know what they should look like.  
I just can’t get my hand to make them easily” (17).  Because the two have created an 
existence for themselves outside of time, they begin to lose their ability to communicate 
through written language.  Again, the film never explains this strange side effect, but we 
can speculate as to its implications.  Like film, language unfolds according to a linear 
temporal scheme, and the pair of time travelers have violated such neat and tidy concepts 
of time and history to the point where they have become incapable of using language, 
incapable of interacting with the normal flow of time.  Instead of the time being a line or 
even a circle as it becomes in La Jetée, Primer shatters such coherent and unified visions 
of time and replaces them with a dizzyingly, chaotic shape.  Instead of a simple shape 
like the line or the loop, Primer creates a chaotic pattern that can only be compared to 
Borges’s “The Garden of Forking Paths” (1941).  As Borges’s character Stephen Albert 
explains about his translation of Ts’ui Pên’s The Garden of Forking Paths (a fictional 
work in Borges’s story),  
The Garden of Forking Paths is an incomplete, but not false, image of the 
universe as Ts’ui Pên conceived it.  In contrast to Newton or 
Schopenhauer, your ancestor did not believe in a uniform, absolute time.  
He believed in an infinite series of times, in a growing, dizzying net of 
divergent, convergent, and parallel times.  This network of times which 
approached one another, forked, broke off, or were unaware of one 
another for centuries, embraces all possibilities of time.44 
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Borges’s (or Ts’ui Pên’s, we might say) vision of the universe is one in which all possible 
scenarios are played out, in which ever action we take has the potential to splinter time 
and create alternate timelines.  We cannot know whether the universe functioned that way 
before Abe and Aaron took their first trip back to the past, but once they have, then time 
begins to splinter: each path or timeline creates infinite new paths.  The hedge maze of 
time becomes ever larger, more chaotic, and impossible to navigate. 
It becomes impossible to tell how many alternate timelines and doubles of himself 
Aaron has created in his attempt to perfectly engineer that evening at Rachel’s party.  As 
the voiceover Aaron explains, the presumably original version of Aaron has replayed the 
scene numerous times before the audience actually sees it:  
I can tell you with certainty what I did that night when it was my turn.  But 
I think it would do little good because what the world remembers, the 
actuality, the last revision is what counts, apparently.  So how many times 
did it take Aaron as he cycled through the same conversations lip-
synching trivia over and over?  How many times would it take before he 
got it right?  Three?  Four?  Twenty?  I’ve decided to believe that only one 
more would have done it.  I can almost sleep at night if there is only one 
more.  Slowly and methodically, he reverse-engineered a perfect moment.  
He took from his surroundings what was needed and made of it something 
more.  And once the details had been successfully navigated, there would 
be nothing left to do but wait for the conflict.  Maybe the obligatory last-
minute moral debate until the noise of the room escalates into panic and 
background screams as the gunman walks in.  And eventually he must 
have got it perfect and it must have been beautiful with all the praise and 
adoration he had coming.  He had probably saved lives, after all.  Who 
knows what would have happened if he hadn’t been there?  (17) 
 
Not surprisingly, the film does not depict the interaction between Aaron and the shotgun-
wielding partygoer, for the shot ends with Aaron walking over to accost him.  Again, the 
audience is left to their own devices to supply the narrative that ensued.  All we know is 
that Aaron was able to program a perfect moment by replaying the narrative numerous 
times.  As it does so often, Primer denies us the spectacle that we expect.  Whereas such 
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a violent confrontation would normally be included in the scene, Primer cuts the scene 
short without giving us the payoff.  Examples such as this abound throughout the film, 
and they gesture towards the counter-spectacle aesthetic of the film.  Primer forecloses 
meaning by never depicting the most crucial elements of the story and by never fully 
explaining the incidents it does choose to depict. 
The penultimate scene of the film depicts Abe and Aaron conversing in an airport 
terminal.  During their conversation, the film splices in images of the drugged versions of 
Abe and Aaron waking up and breaking out of the rooms in which they have been locked.  
Abe plans to stay and sabotage their development of the machines, but Aaron implies that 
he is only staying because he is in love with Kara, Aaron’s wife: “Let’s see, why would 
Abe stay?  What possible reason could there be to be here?  I guess that it just won’t go 
back far enough, will it?  Tell you what, why don’t you take Kara and Lauren [Aaron’s 
daughter] and put them in the box and then you and Aaron can each keep a set and you 
can stop feeding off it” (18).  Aaron makes this comment in bitterness, but his words 
gesture towards the machine’s capacity to duplicate reality.  Like cinema, the machines 
have the power to copy people and project them back to themselves.  Cinema makes us 
uncanny to ourselves and enables us to exist in new narratives—we can recast ourselves 
as new characters.  By using a purely realistic aesthetic, cinema allows us to reorder 
reality in a manner that highlights the fundamental illusory nature of our concepts of 
existence. 
The film’s final shot reveals Aaron in an obviously foreign country with a group 
of French-speaking workmen who he is instructing on building a room-sized version of 
the box.  Over this final shot, the voice ends its primer with these comments:  
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Now I have repaid any debt I may have owed you.  You know all that I 
know.  My voice is the only proof that you will have of the truth of any of 
this.  I might have written a letter with my signature, but my handwriting 
is not what it used to be.  Maybe you’ve had the presence of mind to 
record this.  That’s your prerogative.  You will not be contacted by me 
again.  And if you look you will not find me. (19)   
 
The film abruptly cuts to black again before the credits begin to roll across a gray screen.  
Aaron has wholeheartedly accepted the new powers that the machine has granted him: he 
is now capable of revising the narrative of history; of inserting, subtracting, or changing 
his role in stories; and of restarting narratives from their beginning almost like one would 
push the reset button on a videogame console.  Aaron becomes like a director of what 
William S. Burroughs would term the “reality film”—he can stage scenes, replay scenes, 
alter the script, or even take himself out of the scene altogether. 
In the final analysis, then, Primer highlights how the medium of film itself 
represents a science fiction because film uses technology to force unity upon the 
experience of reality, it creates the illusion of worlds in which life falls into neat narrative 
storylines. By foregoing traditional sci-fi spectacle and generating a documentary-style 
aesthetic of realism, Primer demonstrates how the reality projected by cinema always 
represents a science fiction—it is always reality distilled into a framed image, lives 
reduced to fragments of a story, the universe slowed down to twenty-four frames per 
second.  Primer brings the science fictional nature of cinema into sharp relief through its 
use of realism, jump cuts, plot holes, and other alienating effects, which turn Primer into 
a puzzle that may or may not have a solution.  Like Granger’s trip back in time, the 
permutations for the answer to the logical problem that is Primer remain endless.  Primer 
fractures itself in order to reveal to the viewer that existence is fundamentally chaotic, 
that if there is unity then it has been forced upon existence by the human capacity to 
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narrate events into coherence.  Ultimately, Primer highlights how science fiction serves 
as a form of critical theory by deconstructing our most fundamental notions not just of 
narrative and cinema but also of order, coherence, and unity.   
 
III.  Conclusion: The World as Spectacle 
 
From the spectacle of the cinematograph itself to the trick cinema of Méliès to the 
modern-day blockbuster, cinema has increasingly strived to create ever more elaborate 
spectacles in an attempt to capture the attention of ever-larger audiences.  In fact, the 
blockbusters of today could be said to be regressing back to the cinema of attractions 
because they increasingly privilege spectacle and visual shocks over plot and 
characterization.  Today, films are no longer even required to have connections to the real 
world—they can fashion their mise-en-scène entirely through the use of computer 
graphics.  Films like James Cameron’s Avatar (2009) break all connections to our reality 
and partake fully in the formative tradition—they even eschew staging, in its traditional 
sense at least, by digitally sculpting the environment in which their characters interact.  
Indeed, Avatar epitomizes the aesthetic aspirations of most science fiction cinema: it 
takes us on breath-taking rides through completely alien worlds and introduces us to 
estranging forms of subjectivity.  But La Jetée and Primer participate in a different 
science fiction tradition, a counter-spectacle tradition that blurs the line between realistic 
and fantastic cinema, between Lumières and Méliès.  Increasingly, we can find other 
examples of documentary science fiction as the reality around us becomes ever more 
estranging, almost as if we already live in the future.  For the most part, Alfonso 
Cuarón’s Children of Men (2006) participates in a similar documentary-style aesthetic: its 
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images of a world in which women can no longer get pregnant never differs drastically 
from our own world.  Indeed, the footage of urban warfare could just as easily have come 
from a news report on Iraq or any other war-torn nation.  Furthermore, Cuarón’s long 
takes using handheld cameras give the impression that the film is actually being shot by a 
battlefield correspondent or documentary filmmaker.  Even more recently, Neill 
Blomkamp’s District 9 (2009) staged itself as a documentary following the arrival, 
segregation, and attempted removal of a group of aliens who lands in South Africa.  
Despite the computer-generated alien creatures, the slums of District 9 (the section of 
Johannesburg reserved for these interplanetary refugees) could just as easily have existed 
in any number of countries across the globe where people have been displaced by 
genocide or other geopolitical forces.  While films like Avatar may push the boundaries 
of cinematic technology and gesture towards the future of the filmic medium, films like 
La Jetée, Primer, Children of Men, and District 9 provide a much more profound insight: 
they show us that our world is already science fiction, that the dystopianism of these 
futuristic worldscapes are the problems of our own global civilization, and that the 
fractured realities that wind off the reels and onto the screen are nothing less than the 
lives we lead everyday. 
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NOTES
                                               
1 This line is spoken by Alpha 60, the computer that runs the city Jean-Luc Goddard’s Alphaville, DVD,  
(1965; U.S.A: Janus Films/Home Vision Cinema/The Criterion Collection, 1998). 
 
2 Of course, there are many classic examples of this use of the genre, particularly among dystopian 
literature: George Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945) and Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) both comment upon 
totalitarian regimes such as Stalin’s; Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451(1953), George Lucas’s THX-1138 
(1971), and Terry Gilliam’s Brazil (1985) criticize fascism, to boil them down into the most simplistic 
terms possible; Anthony Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange (1962) investigates the disintegration of youth 
culture as well as the horrifying prospect of programming human beings; Burgess’s The Wanting Seed 
(1962), Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), and William F. Nolan and George Clayton Johnson’s 
Logan’s Run (1967) or Michael Anderson’s eponymous film all explore population growth problems and 
governmental attempts to control them; and Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale (1985) uses a 
society oppressive to women to criticize current gender roles. 
 
3 For a recent example of this, see William Gibson’s Spook Country (2007) and its depiction of new uses 
for GPS technology.  Other examples exist throughout the history of science fiction: Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein (1831) and H.G. Wells’s The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896) both imagine new uses of 
vivisection to create new forms of life; Roger Corman’s film X: The Man With the X-Ray Eyes (1963) 
depicts the introduction of X-Ray vision so powerful that one can see into the heart of God at the center of 
universe; Darren Aronofsky’s π (1998) tells the story of a mathematician in the present who develops a 
computer system capable of predicting fluctuations in the stock market (or in any other number system for 
that matter); and, as we shall in the second half of this chapter, Shane Carruth’s Primer imagines the 
creation of a temporal stasis chamber. 
 
4 For an example of science fiction’s reflections on the present, one need only consider the slew of 
American science fiction films in the 1950s (and somewhat in the early 1960s) that dealt with lingering 
fears from World War II and the ensuing Cold War: communist infiltration, nuclear annihilation, global 
warfare, and mutations from nuclear testing to name only a few. For example, Robert Wise’s The Day the 
Earth Stood Still (1951), Don Siegel’s The Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), Gordon Douglas’s 
Them! (1954), Ishirō Honda’s Gojira (1954, more commonly known in the United States as Godzilla), 
William Cameron Menzies’s Invaders from Mars (1953), Ray Milland’s Panic in Year Zero! (1962), and 
Harry Horner’s Red Planet Mars (1952) all use alien invaders, mutated creatures, or apocalyptic scenarios 
to imagine the potentially disastrous effects of WWII and Cold War technology.  But there are also 
numerous works that depict alien civilizations that are comprised of humans who may or may not retain ties 
to Earth.  Among such works, two of the most classic examples are Isaac Asimov’s Foundation (1951) and 
its numerous sequels and Frank Herbert’s Dune  (1965), which led to a franchise that is still being 
continued by his son.  Both Asimov and Herbert use their novels to explore the nature of political systems 
and rebellions. 
 
5 The most classic example of the alternative present is no doubt Philip K. Dick’s The Man in the High 
Castle (1962), which depicts an alternate Earth in which the Axis defeated the Allies in WWII and in which 
North America was consequently partitioned into Japanese and German zones.  Such alternative histories 
have also increasingly proliferates in the works of non-SF authors.  For example, Vladimir Nabokov’s Ada 
or Ardor: A Family Chronicle (1969) takes place in an alternate version of North America in which most of 
the continent is controlled by Tsarist Russia and in which our version of Earth exists as a mystical other 
world (although perhaps only in the mind of the protagonist Van Veen).  More recently, Philip Roth’s The 
Plot Against America (2004) imagines another alternate World War II scenario by depicting the birth of a 
grassroots Nazism movement in the United States due to the election of Charles Lindberg as president of 
the United States.   
 
6 In fact, the history of literature over the last two centuries is replete with fantastic tales of individuals 
experiencing temporal displacement.  From more strictly literary works such as Washington Irving’s “Rip 
Van Winkle” (1819), Mark Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court (1889), and Charles 
 213 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Dickens’ A Christmas Carol (1843) to more conventionally science fictional genre pieces like Edward 
Bellamy’s Looking Backward: 2000-1887 (1888) and H.G. Wells’s The Time Machine, the 19th century 
was filled with meditations upon the possibilities of temporal displacement whether through supernatural, 
technological, or more ambiguous means.  In the twentieth century, the time travel narrative continued to 
flourish in classics such as Robert Heinlein’s “By His Bootstraps” (1941), Ray Bradbury’s “A Sound of 
Thunder” (1952), Isaac Assimov’s The End of Eternity (1955), Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five 
(1969), and Octavia Butler’s Kindred (1979) to name only a few in the world of literature.  Elsewhere, in 
the cinematic world, directors have produced a variety of time travel films: Don Taylor’s The Final 
Countdown (1980), James Cameron’s The Terminator (1984), Michael Anderson’s Millennium (1989), and 
Eric Bress and J. Mackye Gruber’s The Butterfly Effect (2004).  Time travel has remained such a persistent 
theme in science fiction novels, stories, and films that it has even spawned numerous farcical texts: Woody 
Allen’s Sleeper (1973), Terry Gilliam’s Time Bandits (1981), Robert Zemekis’s Back to the Future (1985), 
Harold Ramis’s Groundhog Day (1993), and Matt Groening’s Futurama animated series (1999-2003, 
2008-present).  Even earlier than these science fiction texts, modernist literature harbored an obsession with 
time and human consciousness’s ability to exist in different times simultaneously through the power of 
memory.  Indeed, Marcel Proust’s monumental À le recherché du temps perdue (In Search of Lost Time or 
Remembrance of Things Past, as it is often translated [1913-1927]) could be read as an examination of how 
sensory perceptions allow an individual to travel back in time to an early period in one’s life.  We can even 
see how time and its relation to human society and identity have affected non-SF works as well.  For 
example, Martin Amis’s Time’s Arrow (1991) functions almost like a time travel narrative because its plot 
moves backwards to reveal its main character’s history as a Nazi.  Similarly, Christopher Nolan’s film 
Memento (2000) proceeds backwards in time to interrogate the relation between memory and identity.  And 
Gaspar Noe’s Irréversible (2002), probably the most avant-garde rape-revenge film ever created, starts with 
the brutal murder of a man in a gay S&M club, and then proceeds backwards to reveal the rape that 
precipitated this act of revenge.  For a full study of the various scientific theories and literary depictions of 
time travel, see Paul J. Nahin’s Time Machines: Time Travel in Physics, Metaphysics, and Science Fiction 
(New York: American Institute of Physics, 1993).  Worlds Enough and Time: Explorations of Time in 
Science Fiction and Fantasy, eds. Gary Westfahl, George Slusser, and David Leiby (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 2002) is also a useful anthology of articles on different depictions of time travel. 
 
7 Paul Coates, “Chris Marker and the Cinema as Time Machine,” Science Fiction Studies 14.3 (Nov. 1987): 
307. 
 
8 Constance Penley, “Time Travel, Primal Scene, and the Critical Dystopia,” in Close Encounters : Film, 
Feminism, and Science Fiction, ed. Constance Penley (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1991.  63-80), rpt.  
in Liquid Metal: The Science Fiction Film Reader, ed. Sean Redmond (London and New York: Wallflower 
P, 2004) 128.   
 
9 For a fairly complete retrospective of Méliès’s career, see the DVD collection of his films entitled 
Georges Méliès: The First Wizard of Cinema (1896-1913) (U.S.A: Flicker Alley, 2008).  For the Lumière 
brothers’ films, see the collection entitled Landmarks of Early Cinema, Vol. 1 (U.S.A.: Image 
Entertainment, 1997). 
 
10 Sigfried Kracauer, Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
1960) 34. 
 
11 Kracauer, Theory of Film 34. 
 
12 Kracauer, Theory of Film 35. 
 
13 Tom Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)Credulous Spectator,”   Viewing 
Positions: Ways of Seeing Film, ed. Linda Williams (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1997) 116. 
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14 Tom Gunning, “The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, its Spectator, and the Avant-Garde,” Early 
Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, eds.  Thomas Elsaesser and Adam Barker (London: BFI Publishing, 
1990) 58. 
 
15 Gunning, “Cinema of Attractions” 58. 
 
16 At least since his relationship with the Dogme-95 group, Lars von Trier’s films have always reveled in 
scandal and shock.  The graphic sex of Breaking the Waves (1996), which concerns a woman who decides 
that prostituting herself will bring her paraplegic husband help from God, the lack of sets and the disturbing 
rape scenes of Dogville (2003); and the recent shock surrounding Antichrist (2009), which features explicit 
sex and graphic torture, attest to a filmmaker who strives to push boundaries and promote visceral 
reactions. In fact, von Trier’s Antichrist allegedly induced Lumière-style reactions in the audience: the 
genital mutilation scene supposedly not only caused people to leave the theatre but also caused fainting and 
epileptic fits in its audience members.  Since the beginning of his career, Von Trier has created films that 
operated on the boundaries between science fiction, horror, and traditional realistic cinema: The Element of 
Crime (1984), Epidemic (1987), Europa (1991), and Antichrist all blur genre boundaries to create Von 
Trier’s uniquely disturbing brand of cinema.  Similarly, Nagisa Oshima has produced films like Empire of 
Passion (1978) and In the Realm of the Senses (1976) that have pushed the boundaries between artistic 
portrayals of sexual intercourse and pornography.  And Michael Haneke pushes the boundaries of violence 
and sexuality in numerous films.  Most notably, The Piano Teacher (2001) features the inclusion of 
pornographic scenes as well as disturbing sexual fetishes in its main characters.  Haneke also commonly 
includes scenes of violence more aberrant than mainstream cinema, partly because he films them in a cold, 
clinical, and emotionally detached style: The Seventh Continent (1989), Benny’s Video (1992), 71 
Fragments of a Chronology of Chance (1994), and Funny Games (1997) all feature disturbing accounts of 
extreme violence that become even more disquieting because Haneke’s detached camera never seems to 
condone or condemn them but merely to record them as natural occurrences in the postmodern landscape. 
 
17 In Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (1911; Mineola, NY: Dover, 1998) Bergson actually argued 
that the cinema could serve as a metaphor for the “mechanism of our ordinary knowledge” because “we 
take snapshots […] of the passing reality” that “our perception, intellection, [and] language” then “string” 
together (306).  Thus, for Bergson, cinema mirrors our natural perceptual schema, but in Cinema 1: The 
Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (1983; Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1986) Deleuze argues that Bergson’s vision of cinema is flawed because he was writing during the earliest 
stage of cinema (the days of the Lumières and their peers), and “the essence of a thing never appears at the 
outset, but in the middle, in the course of its development, when its strength is assured […] Is not cinema at 
the outset forced to imitate natural perception?” (3). For Deleuze, cinema violates the laws of natural 
perception through the specific linkages that exist between individual shots or photograms (frames): film 
can call upon a variety of transitional film editing techniques (wipes, dissolves, fade-ins and fade-outs, 
match cuts, and jump cuts) that allow for instantaneous spatial displacement; the film’s plot can use an 
array of techniques (flashbacks, flashforwards, and memories) to violate the normal linear logic of time; 
and films can even employ an assortment of optical effects (filters, gels, canted angels, and the entire world 
of special effects) to create a skewed view of reality or an alternate state of consciousness.  I am indebted to 
Gregory Flaxman’s article “Cinema Year Zero” from The Brain and the Screen: Deleuze and the 
Philosophy of Cinema, ed. Gregory Flaxman (Minneapolis and London: U of Minnesota P, 2000. 87-108.) 
for help with explicating the connection between Deleuze and Bergson. 
 
18 Chris Marker, dir., La Jetée, in La Jetée and Sans Soleil: Two Films by Chris Marker, DVD, (1962; 
U.S.A: Janus Films/The Criterion Collection, 2007) Scene 1.  Unless otherwise noted, the quotes from La 
Jetée are derived from the English dub of the film.  Hereafter, parenthetical references in section one of this 
chapter will refer to the scene numbers on the Criterion DVD version of La Jetée. 
 
19 Coates, “Cinema as Time Machine” 312. 
 
20 D.N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine (Durham and London: Duke UP, 1997) 4. 
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21 Zeno’s paradoxes rest upon a fundamental illusion about infinity, for, as set theory teaches us, there are 
many levels of infinity, some of which can be traversed by Achilles and others that cannot be.  As Aristotle 
responds to Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise in his Physics, “So when someone asks the 
question whether it is possible to traverse infinite things—either in time or in distance—we must reply that 
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divisible into instants because motion is indivisible, and “this indivisibility of motion implies, then, the 
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and the Philosophy of Cinema, ed. Gregory Flaxman (Minneapolis and London: U of Minnesota P, 2000),  
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Criticism (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1978) 86-7.     
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30 When White discusses overemplotment, he is using the term to discuss the manner in which analysands 
overemplot certain moments from their past.  While White is, of course, discussing narrative in general, 
Penley actually discusses time travel in terms of fixation and regression.  In fact, her essay compares 
Marker’s La Jetée with James Cameron’s The Terminator (1984) by staging the time travel in both films as 
an exploration of the primal scene since The Terminator actually involves revolutionary leader John 
Connor sending his father to the past to conceive himself in the future.  Penley points out that La Jetée 
similarly features a man traveling through time for the love of a woman, a love that is spawned by an image 
from his childhood.  Elena del Rio also couches the film in psychoanalytic terms when she claims that it 
“conceives of human desire as a rigid fixation whose reality is anchored in the past (the temporal mode of 
loss) more firmly than in the future (the temporal mode of fulfillment)” (383). Indeed, the analysand’s 
experience of dream analysis during psychoanalysis provides a useful corollary here that will help to 
demonstrate the manner in which narrative functions as a synthesis of the chaotic manifold of sensory 
perceptions.  In The Interpretation of Dreams [trans.  James Strachey (1900; New York: Avon Books, 
1965), Freud explains that “to complete a dream-analysis” requires the act of a “dream-synthesis” (345)  In 
other words, as Freud proceeds to explain,  “When the whole mass of dream-thoughts is brought under the 
pressure of the dream-work, and its elements are turned about, broken into fragments and jammed 
together—almost like pack-ice—the question arises of what happens to the logical connections which have 
hitherto formed its framework.  What representations do dreams provide for ‘if,’ ‘because,’ ‘just as,’ 
‘although,’ ‘either—or,’ and all the other conjunctions without which we cannot understand sentences and 
speeches? In the first resort our answer must be that dreams have no means at their disposal for 
representing these logical relations between dream-thoughts.  For the most part dreams disregard all these 
conjunctions, and it is only the substantive content of the dream-thoughts that they take over and 
manipulate.  The restoration of the connections which the dream-work has destroyed is a task which has to 
be performed by the interpretive process” (Freud, Dreams 347).  Thus, only through the interpretative 
process can a patient’s dream achieve a state of narrative coherence.  Of course, it would be a fallacy to 
directly equate the illogical nature of the dream experience to perceptions of everyday life, but a similar 
narrative act must constantly attend an individual’s sensory impressions—only through the cohesive 
capacity of narrative can a person force unity upon the chaotic manifold. 
 
31 Coates, “Cinema as Time Machine” 310. 
 
32 Marker’s refusal to give the characters proper names further strengthens the feeling that the film serves 
as a kind of lab report in which the couple are nothing more than subjects, guinea pigs whose names do not 
bear remembering.  In addition, their lack of proper nouns to designate themselves generates the potential 
for their writing their own personal narratives.  Generally, one’s personal narrative (or array of narratives) 
accrues around the proper name, the signifier used to designate the subject.  But, in La Jetée, subjects 
become disconnected from their narratives—they reveal that there really is no signified underlying the 
signifier.  Identity cannot be predicated so easily, for the subject’s identity is truly formed by relation to the 
nebulous cloud of narrative fragments that surround the subject.  Furthermore, as Paul Coates points out, 
“The nameless subject—his namelessness a metaphor for the damage consciousness has suffered, but also a 
means of easing our identification with him, since we too are viewers of images—may see “a happy face” 
from the past, but it is always ‘different’: no longer reality, only an image; no longer present, but framed as 
‘past’” (310). 
 
33 The scene from Vertigo takes place in a sequoia forest, and it features similar dialogue to the interaction 
between the Man and the Woman in La Jetee.  In Vertigo, DVD (1958; Universal City, CA: Universal 
1999), the scene is a meditation upon time, death, and history as Madeline and Scottie stand among “the 
oldest living things” and think “of all the people who’ve been born and died while the trees kept on living” 
(Scene 15).  Like Marker’s couple, Hitchcock’s pair also stand before a cross-section of sequoia, and 
Madeline, pretending that she believes herself to be her ancestor, points to where she was born and died.  
Vertigo provides the perfect film for Marker to allude to in La Jetée because it also concerns individuals 
who are “glued” to images from the past.  First, Madeleine Elster (played by Kim Novak) is obsessed with 
her great grandmother, Carlotta Valdes, who committed suicide.  In fact, she is so obsessed with her that 
she patterns her appearance after a portrait of Carlotta that hangs in San Francisco’s Legion of Honor 
Museum: she adopts the same spiral hairstyle and carries a replica of Carlotta’s pink bouquet.  Of course, 
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the Madeleine with whom Scottie (James Stewart) and the audience become acquainted ends up being Judy 
Barton, a woman who Gavin Elster hired to impersonate his wife and aid in making her murder look like a 
suicide.  Scottie meets Judy and becomes enamored of her because of her resemblance to Madeleine, so he 
reshapes her appearance until she exactly matches his memory of Madeleine including the same color and 
style of hair, the same bouquet, and the same gray suit.  Thus, like La Jetée, Vertigo concerns the power 
that images from the past can continue to hold over an individual’s life.   
 
34 The connections between Vertigo and La Jetée do not end with just these two films, for this scene in the 
Sequoia forest recurs in two subsequent films: Marker’s own Sans Soleil and Terry Gilliam’s 12 Monkeys, 
which was inspired by La Jetée.  In Sans Soleil, on La Jetée and Sans Soleil: Two Films by Chris Marker, 
DVD (1983; U.S.A: Janus Films/The Criterion Collection, 2007), the cameraman’s letters reflect upon the 
depiction of time in Hitchcock’s Vertigo: “He wrote me that only one film has been capable of portraying 
impossible memory, insane memory: Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo.  In the spiral of the opening titles, he saw 
time covering a field growing ever wider as it moved away, a cyclone whose present moment contains the 
motionless eye” (Scene 18).  The cameraman is obsessed with the spiral nature of time, and indeed 
Hitchcock’s film is a text filled with spirals, so the cameraman reproduces Scottie’s journey in order to 
delve into the mysterious force of Hitchcock’s film: “In San Francisco, he’d gone on a pilgrimage to all the 
film’s locations.  The florist Podesta Baldocchi, where James Stewart spies on Kim Novak, he the hunter 
and she the prey—or was it the other way around?  The tile floor hadn’t changed.  He’d driven up and 
down the hills of San Francisco where Jimmy Stewart—Scottie—follows Kim Novak—Madeleine.  It 
seems to be about pursuit, mystery, and murder, but in truth it’s about power and freedom, melancholy and 
dazzlement, so carefully coded within the spiral that you could miss it and not immediately notice that this 
vertigo of space in reality stands for the vertigo of time.  He’d followed every trail even to the cemetery at 
Mission Dolores where Madeleine prayed at the grave of a woman long dead whom she should not have 
known.  He’d followed Madeleine—as Scottie had done—to the museum of the Legion of Honor, before 
the portrait of a dead woman she shouldn’t have known.  And on the portrait, as in Madeleine’s hair, the 
spiral of time.  The Victorian hotel where Madeleine disappeared had itself disappeared.  Concrete had 
replaced it at the corner of Eddie and Gough.  But the cross-section of redwood trunk was still in Muir 
Woods.  On it, Madeleine traced the short distance between two of those concentric lines that measure the 
age of the tree and said, ‘Here I was born and there I died.’  He remembered another film in which this 
passage was quoted: the redwood was in the Jardin des Plantes in Paris, and the hand pointed to a place 
beyond the tree—outside of time.  The painted horse at San Juan Bautista, with an eye that looked like 
Madeleine’s—Hitchcock had invented nothing.  It was all there.  He’d run under the arches in the mission 
as Madeleine had run towards her death—but was it really hers?  From this fake tower—the only thing 
Hitchcock added—he imagined Scottie as ‘Time’s Fool of Love,’ unable to live with memory without 
falsifying it, inventing a double of Madeleine in another dimension of time, a Zone that would belong only 
to him, from which he could decipher the undecipherable story begun under the Golden Gate when he 
pulled Madeleine out of San Francisco Bay, when he’d saved her from death before casting her back to 
death—or was it the other way around?”  (Scene 18).  Thus, Marker even makes reference to his own 
earlier film (La Jetée) when the cameraman remembers having seen another film with a similar scene 
involving a sequoia.  But this is not the end of the Veritgo/La Jetée connection, for Terry Gilliam resurrects 
Marker’s Hitchcock allusion in his remake/reimagining of La Jetée, 12 Monkeys, DVD: Special Edition 
(1995; United States: Universal, 2005).  In 12 Monkeys, James Cole (Bruce Willis in the role of the Man) 
and Dr. Kathryn Railly (Madeleine Stowe as the Woman) hide out in movie theatre that is running a 
twenty-four hour Hitchcock marathon.  As Kathryn is putting a disguise on James, the sequoia scene from 
Vertigo is playing in a front of them, a scene that puts James into a trance similar to Madeleine’s in Vertigo 
and causes him to reflect upon the nature of time: “I think I’ve seen this movie before.  When I was a kid, I 
saw it on TV.  I did see it before.  I don’t recognize this part.  It’s just like what’s happening with us.  Like 
the past, the movie never changes.  It can’t change, but every time you see it, it seems different because you 
were different.  You see different things” (Scene 35).   
 
35 Coates, “Cinema as Time Machine” 312. 
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36 Coates, “Cinema as Time Machine” 312.  In this passage, Coates refers to him as the man/child, which 
leads one to ponder one fundamental aspect of the film that critics have yet to discuss.  It is clear that when 
the Man visits the Woman she is of about the same age as she was during the child’s glimpse of her on the 
pier at Orly, but it is never clear whether his visits to her from the future occur before or after that day at 
Orly.   
 
37 Bob Dylan, “Visions of Johanna,” Lyrics 1962-2001 (1966; New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).  The 
line stems from Dylan’s song “Visions of Johanna,” which first appeared on the album Blonde on Blonde 
(1966)  Dylan’s song is about the force of memory and the power it can continue to exert over us 
throughout our lives.  In the museum verse, Dylan not only illustrates the illusory nature of the museum’s 
version of infinity, but he also comments that “this is what salvation must be like after a while,” implying 
that immortality might signify nothing more than a freezing into stasis.  And, as we shall see, stasis proves 
to be important in both La Jetée and Primer.   
 
38 Coates, “Cinema as Time Machine” 311. 
 
39 George Slusser and Daniele Chatelain, “Spacetime Geometries: Time Travel and the Modern 
Geometrical Narrative,” Science Fiction Studies 22.2 (July 1995): 168. 
 
40 Gunning, “Cinema of Attractions” 60. 
 
41 Carruth, Shane, dir., Primer, DVD, (2004; United States: New Line Home Entertainment, 2005) Scene 1.  
For the remainder of the chapter, parenthetical references will refer to the scene numbers on the DVD 
version of Primer. 
 
42 Indeed, Primer recalls Nietzsche’s thought experiment from The Gay Science involving the eternal return 
of the same in which the reader is asked to imagine a demon appearing and offering the prospect of him/her 
reliving the same moment over and over again for eternity: “The greatest stress.  How, if some day or night, 
a demon were to sneak after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you, “this life as you now live it 
and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing 
new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything immeasurably small or 
great in your life must return to you—all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and this 
moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself.  The eternal hourglass of existence is 
turned over and over, and you with it, dust grain of dust.”  Would you not throw yourself down and gnash 
your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus?  Or did you once experience a tremendous moment when 
you would have answered him, “You are a god, and never have I heard anything more godly.”  If this 
thought were to gain possession of you, it would change you, as you are, or perhaps crush you.  The 
question in each and every thing, “Do you want this one more and innumerable times more?” would weigh 
upon your actions as the greatest stress.  Or how well disposed would you have become to yourself and to 
life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? (§341)  For the Man in 
La Jetée, he once experienced such a moment on the pier at Orly, and hence he craves the return of this one 
perfect moment in time.  Similarly, as we shall see, Primer concerns the replication of one particular 
moment by means of the power of time travel.  Nietzsche’s eternal return represents a meditation both upon 
the nature of memory and identity and the relation of both to time and repetition.   
 
43 To fully understand the depiction of time in the film, one must understand the nature of personal versus 
absolute time, a division that is established alongside Einstein’s theory of relativity.  For Aristotle, whose 
discussion of time in his Physics remains one of the earliest attempts to define the concept, time is related 
purely to perceptions of movement—it cannot be said to exist in itself.  As he states, “when, therefore, we 
perceive the ‘now’ as one, and neither as before or after in a motion nor as the same element but in relation 
to a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, no time is thought to have elapsed, because there has been no motion either.  
On the other hand, when we do perceive a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, then we say that there is time.  For time 
is just this—number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’.  Hence time is not movement, but only 
movement in so far as it admits of enumeration.  An indication of this: we discriminate the more or less by 
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number, but more or less movement by time.  Time then is a kind of number.  (Number, we must note, is 
used in two ways—both of what is counted or countable and also, of that with which we count.  Time, then, 
is what is counted, not that with which we count: these are different kinds of things.)  Just as motion is a 
perpetual succession, so also is time.  But every simultaneous time is the same; for the ‘now’ is the same in 
substratum—though its being is different—and the ‘now’ determines time, in so far as time involves the 
before and after (219a30-219b13).  I quote Aristotle at such length because this passage raises a variety of 
problems surrounding time, and he continues to argue for the dependence of time upon movement.  
Furthermore, time, like Aristotle notes with number, has numerous, subtly different meanings.  Time and 
movement are codependent upon one another because movement requires a duration while similarly the 
passage of time denotes at least a minimal form of movement.  In order to note the passage of time, then 
objects must move through space, the hands of the clock must be seen spinning, and the sun must continue 
its trek through the sky.  But, importantly, for Aristotle, time is not distinct from human perception: it is 
merely a categorical measure that can be counted. One of the fundamental divisions in philosophies of time 
is absolute versus relative.  In his Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1686), Sir Isaac Newton 
claims that “absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature, flows equitably without 
relation to anything external” (qtd. in The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed., general ed. 
Robert Audi [New York: Cambridge UP, 1999]  922).  In A Brief History Time: The Updated and 
Expanded Tenth Anniversary Edition (1988; New York: Bantam Books, 1996), Stephen Hawking explains 
the correlation between these two concepts of time: “Both Newton and Aristotle believed in absolute time.  
That is, they believed that one could unambiguously measure the interval of time between two events, and 
that this time would be the same whoever measured it, provided they use a good clock.  Time was 
completely separate from and independent of space” (18).  Thus, for Newton, time remained the same for 
all subjects provided they counted the same and used equally reliable clocks. In the 20th Century, time 
increasingly has come to be seen as an objective component of reality, not as a purely perceptual 
phenomenon.  In particular, the theories of Albert Einstein and Kurt Gödel argue for time as an empirical 
dimension of reality, and Gödel even argues that time travel proves to be a mathematical possibility.  
Einstein developed the theory of relativity that has as its “fundamental postulate” the theory “that the laws 
of science should be the same for all freely moving observers, no matter what their speed.  This was true 
for Newton’s laws of motion, but now the idea was extended to include Maxwell’s theory and the speed of 
light: all observers should measure the same speed of light, no matter how fast they are moving” (Hawking 
History 20-1).  As Stephen Hawking explains, this theorem has numerous revolutionary consequences.  
First, based on this theory, mass and energy become equivalent (E=mc2 or Energy = mass times the speed 
of light squared).  According to this equation, the energy that an object generates in order to produce its 
motion will cause its mass to increase.  Thus, an object can never reach the speed of light because its mass 
will increase so exponentially that it would be incapable of generating enough energy to propel itself.  But 
it is the second major consequence of relativity that concerns us here, and this is the fact that “has 
revolutionized our ideas of space and time” (Hawking History 21).  As Hawking explains, “in relativity, all 
observers must agree on how fast light travels.  They still, however, do not agree on the distance the light 
has traveled, so they must therefore now also disagree on the time it has taken.  (The time taken is the 
distance the light has traveled—which the observers do not agree on—divided by the light’s speed—which 
they do agree on.)  In other words, the theory of relativity put an end to the idea of absolute time!  It 
appeared that each observer must have his own measure of time, as recorded by a clock carried with him, 
and that different clocks carried by different observers would not necessarily agree” (Hawking History 21-
2). Furthermore, “the theory of relativity…force[s] us to change fundamentally our ideas of space and time.  
We must accept that time is not completely separate from space, but is combined with it to form an object 
called space-time” (Hawking History 23).  In 1949, Kurt Godel further revolutionized our conception of 
space-time by taking Einstein’s theory of relativity to new heights.  He imagines a new form of space-time 
that would legitimately grant the possibility of time travel, a prospect for which Einstein did not believe 
relativity allowed.  As Hawking again explains, Godel’s version of space-time “had the curious property 
that the whole universe was rotating” (Hawking History 160).  If the universe is rotating, then an individual 
could theoretical leave a planet in a spaceship and return to it at an earlier point in time.  Hawking explains 
that Gödel’s image of the universe proves illusory because we can now provide evidence that the universe 
does not rotate.  But, Hawking also explains, that scientists continue to pursue the question of time travel 
because the possibility still exists. 
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44 Jorge Luis Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths,” in Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings 
(1941; New York: New Directions, 1962) 28. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: THE HUMAN EQUATION: COMPUTERIZED AND 
TRANSCENDENT SUBJECTIVITY IN KUBRICK AND CLARKE’S  
2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY 
 
And thus spoke Zarathustra to the people: “The time 
has come for man to set himself a goal.  The time 
has come for man to plant the seed of his highest 
hope.  His soil is rich enough.  But one day this soil 
will be poor and domesticated, and no tall tree will 
be able to grow in it.  Alas, the time is coming when 
man will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing 
beyond man, and the string of his bow will have 
forgotten how to whir!  I say unto you: one must 
still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to 
a dancing star.  I say unto you: you still have chaos 
in yourselves.  Alas, the time is coming when man 
will no longer give birth to a star.  Alas, the time of 
the most despicable man is coming, he that is no 
longer able to despise himself.  Behold, I show you 
the last man.” 
-  Friedrich Nietzsche1 
 
As we have seen science fiction and critical theory both represent inquiries into 
the human, and, in essence, I contend that it is partly these explorations that link the two 
discursive spaces.  So far, we have explored several distinct variables of the human: 
gender and identity, desire and lack, the postmodern subject and the society of control, 
and science fiction’s use of a counter-spectacle aesthetic to explore the relation between 
time, memory, and identity.  In this final section, I will bring all of these elements 
together to demonstrate how both critical theory and science fiction harbor the same 
implicit desire: to conceptualize the human and/or to determine ways of advancing, 
perfecting, or even transcending the human experience.  However, while critical theory 
maintains the utopian hope that such conceptualizations remain possible, science fiction 
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uses its heterotopian form to deconstruct such theorizations.  To explore this topic, I will 
be turning to a more classic science fiction text than those I have hitherto examined: 
Arthur C. Clarke and Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968).  Kubrick’s film 
provides the ideal space for bringing these seemingly disparate topics into convergence 
with one another because it concerns the ontogenesis and evolution of the human itself.  
Evolution serves as the underlying, connective theme of the movie’s four segments (or 
movements we might say, since the film’s structure operates like a symphony): “These 
image patterns and visual metaphors document the true meaning of the word ‘Odyssey’ 
in the title—an evolutionary journey from beast, to technology, to a stage of evolution 
transcending the physical realm—and also underscore a central theme of the film: the 
limits of technology and the nature of humanity.”2  2001 explores the evolutionary 
progress of humanity from the pre-human stage through the birth and growth of 
technology and into the posthuman era when the self becomes capable of evolving 
beyond its present social and physical constraints.  2001 represents a filmic odyssey that 
takes the viewer through the evolution of consciousness—Kubrick crafts images that 
visualize and dramatize the place of the evolutionary subject, of the animal becoming 
human and the human metamorphosing into an almost divine posthuman existence.  By 
the end of this conclusion, we will see how the human remains tied to technology and 
how the growth of technology leads inevitably to the society of control and 
simultaneously to the posthuman.  In essence, 2001 concerns the dichotomy between 
being and becoming—the fundamental human choice—and it asks whether the human 
can exist in the absence of technology and spatio-temporal order but also whether 
technology ultimately ends up robbing the human of its innate potential. 
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I.  The Pre-Human: The Birth of Technology and the Will to Power 
 The origins of the film 2001: A Space Odyssey lay twenty years before its release 
with Arthur C. Clarke’s short story entitled “The Sentinel” (1948),3 and “the general 
critical stance regarding 2001 is a somewhat linear one—from ‘The Sentinel’ to 
Kubrick’s film to the novelization of the film by Clarke.”4  Of course, to call Clarke’s 
novel a “novelization” proves somewhat reductive since he and Kubrick developed the 
story together over the course of several years.5  But, as Suparno Banerjee explains, many 
critics to this day view “Clarke’s novel as an explanation of the film,” yet as he 
maintains, “a close comparative examination of the novel and the film clearly shows that 
Clarke’s novel is neither an explanation nor a novelization of the film but a work existing 
independently.  While Clarke’s novel is rooted in the tradition of hardcore science fiction, 
Kubrick’s film subverts all the norms of tradition films to create something unique.”6  In 
his study of Kubrick’s films, Randy Rasmussen also comments upon the relation between 
the film and the novel:  
2001: A Space Odyssey developed concurrently as a film and a novel, 
with Stanley Kubrick and Arthur C. Clarke exchanging ideas for a story 
about man’s evolution, exploration of outer space, and possible encounters 
with extraterrestrial intelligence […] But their separate results, film and 
novel, are very different from one another in narrative style and in the 
depiction of man, technology, and extraterrestrial life.7   
 
Although I will make references to Clarke’s novel over the course of my argument, I will 
focus predominately upon Kubrick’s film because it depicts the events in a more 
ambiguous manner that creates a more profoundly experimental narrative space than the 
novel.  Since the novel explores the same or similar themes as the film, it acts as a useful 
companion piece due to its more discursive nature, but Bannerjee correctly draws a sharp 
distinction between the two because Kubrick’s film ultimately revels in discontinuity, 
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ambiguity, and perhaps even aporia while Clarke’s novel remains tied to linear narrative 
and explicit exposition in a way that squashes some of the power and critical potential 
inherent in the cinematic version. 
Kubrick’s 2001 bathes the viewer in estranging images of radical otherness, and, 
like Primer, it forces the viewer to inscribe their own meaning upon the series of images.  
The film opens with an overture and blackness after which it cuts to a shot of space as the 
opening of Richard Strauss’s Also sprach Zarathustra (1896) immediately baptizes the 
viewer into the universe according to 2001.  Simultaneously, the music inaugurates the 
Nietzschean themes of the film: “Strauss’s musical interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
philosophical poem begins with a glorious evocation of sunrise, which Kubrick visually 
reworks into Earthrise.”8  The opening shot of the film initiates from behind the Moon 
and slowly tilts up to reveal the Earth and Sun in alignment with it.  Shots of such 
alignments and the “Dawn” section of Strauss’s Zarathustra function as refrains 
throughout the film which tie together its seemingly disconnected sections.  After this 
initial introduction, the film consists of four major sections: “The Dawn of Man,” an 
unnamed second section, “The Jupiter Mission,” and “Jupiter and Beyond the Infinite.”9  
The opening section follows a group of apelike creatures, which Clarke refers to as “man-
apes,” who have yet to develop the use of tools and hence exist in a purely animalistic 
state.  Clarke’s novel remains tied to traditional characterization scheme, for it “focuses 
on a main character in every part: Moon-Watcher in ‘Primeval Night,’ Heywood Floyd in 
‘TMA-1,’ and Dave Bowman in the rest of the sections.”10  While Clarke focalizes his 
story of the man-apes around the character of Moon-Watcher, the film provides no such 
center of focalization during “The Dawn of Man” segment and instead functions more 
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like wildlife documentary footage that follows the quotidian existence of these pre-
Neolithic creatures. 
The man-apes live in a desert-like terrain that offers little in the way of 
sustenance.11  Because they have not developed the capacity to hunt, they pick through 
the slim selection of vegetation available, and their access to water remains limited 
because another group of similar hominids also claims the same small, muddy water hole.  
Clarke opens his novel with a rather provocative description of the man-apes’ precarious 
evolutionary situation: 
The drought had lasted now for ten million years, and the reign of the 
giant lizards had long since ended.  Here on the Equator, in the continent 
which would one day be known as Africa, the battle for existence had 
reached a new climax of ferocity, and the victor was not yet in sight.  In 
this barren and desiccated land, only the small or the swift could flourish, 
or even hope to survive.  The man-apes of the veldt were none of these 
things, and they were not flourishing; indeed, they were already far down 
the road to racial extinction.12 
 
So the man-apes stand poised on the precipice of extinction because they remain poorly 
adapted to the environment around them.  They remain trapped in a state of being that 
will lead to their annihilation—for them, stasis equates to death.  They must learn to 
move from a state of being to one of becoming if they are to survive amidst their 
inhospitable surroundings.  Whereas Deleuze talks about the state of becoming-animal, 
the man-apes must learn to enter a stage of becoming-human. 
Initially, the film depicts a day in the life of the man-apes, a day filled with 
struggle: the frustrating search for food, an attack by a leopard, and the rival gang of 
man-apes at the water hole who scare them away with their taunts and growls. The film 
depicts this typical day as juxtaposition to the transformation the man-apes will soon 
undergo.  Then, on one auspicious morning, the man-apes awake to discover a giant, 
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black, rectangular object, known as the monolith, has appeared in the middle of the rocky 
alcove where they sleep.13  The scene that follows remains one of the most iconic 
moments in cinematic history.  Choral voices, which may or may not be diegetic, imbue 
the scene with a creepy, otherworldly aura and instantiate the monolith’s ambiguous 
symbolic status.14  As Bannerjee notes, “the monolith acts as the central symbol of the 
movie—the symbol of a higher intelligence and perhaps a higher order of existence.  This 
symbolism is always reinforced by musical accompaniment.”15  The monolith’s 
symbolism (or its refusal of symbolism perhaps) will not become apparent until later in 
the film, but Kubrick already uses it in these early scenes of the film to suggest a higher 
intelligence, whether it be divine or extraterrestrial.  As the monolith calls out to them, 
the man-apes devolve into a frenzy of anxiety and curiosity, taking turns approaching it 
before retreating again in fear.  Eventually, one of them dares to touch it and soon others 
follow suit: they sniff, caress, and inspect the monolith’s black surface.  As the choral 
voices swell to a crescendo, Kubrick cuts to a low-angle shot of the monolith in which it 
seemingly towers upwards into the heavens.  Its inky blackness engulfs the bottom two-
thirds of the frame as the rising sun converges with the crescent moon above it against a 
background of blood-red clouds.  This shot hearkens back to the opening shot of the 
Earthrise and gives the impression that the scene coincides with a cosmic alignment. 
In the subsequent scene, Kubrick depicts the man-apes foraging among rocks and 
discarded bones before focusing on one particular man-ape who begins to cock his head 
in a mannerism that implies rational thought.  This man-ape, who would be Moon-
Watcher in Clarke’s novel, picks up a piece of this biological detritus and begins 
considering it as the first notes of Richard Strauss’s Also sprach Zarathustra (1896) 
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begin to gently waft into the scene.  As the music builds with its blaring drums and 
trumpets, we watch as the man-ape picks up a bone and begins to smash the remains of 
an animal skull.  When we next see the man-apes encountering the rival clan at the water 
hole, their adversaries crouch and jump like apes, but Moon-Watcher’s clan stands 
upright in a more humanoid posture.  When one of the rival man-apes crosses the water, 
he is promptly beaten to death by the tribe while his cohorts escape back into the desert.   
The rousing introduction of Strauss’s tone poem Also sprach Zarathustra already 
gestures towards a Nietzschean reading of the film, and by turning towards Nietzsche’s 
concept of becoming, we will bring the various aspects of the human we have discussed 
so far together into one final discussion about the relation between science fiction and 
critical theory.  In essence, as we shall see, 2001 allows us to conceive of science fiction 
and critical theory as two different discursive forms for discussing the human both in its 
current state of being and its potential for becoming.  In his book on philosophy in 
Stanley Kubrick’s films, Jerold Abrams devotes an entire chapter to the representation of 
Nietzsche’s concept of the Overman (Übermensch) in 2001, and he claims that  
In moving images—and almost no dialogue—Kubrick captures the entire 
evolutionary epic of Friedrich Nietzsche’s magnum opus Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra.  From worms to apes to humans, Nietzsche tracks the 
movement of life as will-to-power—ultimately claiming that it is not yet 
finished.  We have only one stage left, the overman, a being who will look 
upon humanity as humanity now looks upon the apes.  It is well known 
that Nietzsche tells us little about what the overman will look like, except 
that he or she will emerge as a new kind of “child.”16 
 
The Overman represents the same kind of evolutionary leap as Akira—the human 
becomes like the ape or even the amoeba from the viewpoint of the Overman.  But the 
coming of the Overman, which Zarathustra preaches, does not necessarily entail an 
evolution of the physical form.  Instead, it is evolution of ethics and identity, an evolution 
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that moves the individual from a state of being to becoming, from a state of slavish 
morality to an ethos predicated upon freedom and self-definition.  As Philip Kuberski 
notes in his essay on Kubrick’s film, “there is an evolutionary drama implicit” in 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra which  
can be concisely sketched with reference to the parable of “the three 
metamorphoses” from Nietzsche’s introduction.  The camel, like 
traditional human cultures, bends down to take on the load of transmitted 
values and demands.  The lion, like enlightened technologists, confronts 
the dragon of tradition whose scales each bear the instruction: Thou Shalt.  
The final metamorphosis is that of the child acting out of its own impulse, 
free of tradition and free of resentment.17 
 
While the opening segment of 2001 can and has been read as a depiction of Darwinian 
evolution in action, Abrams and Kuberski correctly note that the film actually concerns a 
Nietzschean form of evolution.   
At first glance, the film may seem like it reads according to the most banal 
interpretation of Nietzsche as a sort of Darwinian philosopher who preaches a doctrine of 
overcoming the weak with one’s strength of mind and purpose.  This is Nietzsche boiled 
down to “that which does not kill him makes him stronger.”18  But, as Deleuze points out, 
while Nietzsche and Darwin both shook the foundations of traditional, Western, Christian 
thought in the 19th century, Nietzsche actually had little use for Darwin: “Nietzsche 
criticizes Darwin for interpreting evolution and chance within evolution in an entirely 
reactive way.”19  Nietzsche himself explains how the instinct towards self-preservation 
can never in itself lead towards becoming, for its purpose lies in maintaining a stasis of 
being:  
To wish to preserve oneself is a sign of distress, of a limitation of the truly 
basic life instinct, which aims at the expansion of power and in so doing 
often  enough risks and sacrifices self-preservation […] English 
Darwinism exudes something like the stuffy air of English overpopulation, 
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like the small people’s smell of indigence and overcrowding.  As a natural 
scientist, however, one should get out of one’s human corner, and in 
nature, it is not distress which rules, but rather abundance, squandering—
even to the point of absurdity.  The struggle for survival is only an 
exception, a temporary restriction of the will to life; the great and small 
struggle revolves everywhere around preponderance, around growth and 
expansion, around power and in accordance the will to power, which is 
simply the will to life.20 
 
Hence, Darwinian evolution represents the preservation of the status quo, which for 
Nietzsche is the biological equivalent of slavish moral systems like Christianity: instead, 
“he admires Lamarck because Lamarck foretold the existence of a truly active plastic 
force, primary in relations of adaptations: a force of metamorphosis […] The power of 
transformation, the Dionysian power, is the primary definition of activity.”21  Nietzsche’s 
vision of becoming—or evolution—remains tied to an innate potential within the human: 
the human has the ability to rise above its desire to simply defend a safe form of 
existence and to embrace the path of drastic metamorphosis, a metamorphosis that 2001 
traces across its four segments.  To truly grasp how the film ties together the various 
strands of this project, we must first examine precisely what Nietzsche means by 
becoming and the will to power.   
To understand the concept of becoming, one must first banish the Platonic and 
Cartesian ideas of the unified self, of the doer who pre-exists the deed.  In his highly 
influential study entitled Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, Pierre Klossowski explains 
that for Nietzsche “the body is the Self…the Self resides in the midst of the body and 
expresses itself through the body.”22  As Nietzsche proposes in On the Genealogy of 
Morals, the idea of the subject or agent represents a grammatical illusion: “there is no 
‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the 
deed—the deed is everything…our entire science still lies under the misleading influence 
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of language and has not disposed of that little changeling, the ‘subject.’”23  By banishing 
Cartesian dualism, Nietzsche sought instead to “establish a new cohesion, beyond the 
agent, between the body and chaos—a state of tension between the fortuitous cohesion of 
the agent and the incoherence of Chaos.”24  And, as we shall see when we discuss the 
final moments of the film, 2001 is a film about embracing chaos, about putting oneself in 
contact with multiplicities and endless lines of flight, about rolling the dice of chance on 
a plane of pure immanence.  But if the self equals nothing more than the body, then what 
precisely does Nietzsche mean by “the body”? 
In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze explains, “There are nothing but quantities 
of force in mutual ‘relations of tension’ […]  Every force is related to other forces and it 
either obeys or commands.  What defines a body is this relation between dominant and 
dominated forces.”25  Because the body is nothing more than a relation between 
conflicting forces, one can never speak of a unified self: “Being composed of a plurality 
of irreducible forces the body is a multiple phenomenon, its unity is that of a multiple 
phenomenon, ‘a unity of domination.’  In a body, the superior or dominant forces are 
known as active and the inferior or dominated forces are known as reactive.”26  We must, 
therefore, view the body, like society, as an interplay of forces, forces that either 
command or obey, for “every relationship of forces constitutes a body—whether it is 
chemical, biological, social, or political.”27  Thus, according to Nietzsche, all of reality 
consists of bodies that emerge out chaos because of forces struggling with one another. 
 At the heart of Nietzsche’s concept of force relations resides his theory of the will 
to power, for it is the will to power that drives the conflict between forces.  Deleuze 
explains that the will to power is “the principle of the synthesis of forces.”28  The will to 
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power is what drives one force to dominate another; it is the principle that determines the 
relation between active and reactive forces.  As Nietzsche states,  
The victorious concept of “force,” by means of which physicists have 
created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must 
be ascribed to it, which I designate as ‘will to power,’ i.e., as an insatiable 
desire to manifest power; or as the employment and exercise of power, as 
a creative drive, etc.  Physicists cannot eradicate “action at a distance” 
from their principles; nor can they eradicate a repellent force (or an 
attracting one).  There is nothing for it: one is obliged to understand all 
motions, all “appearances,” all “laws,” only as symptoms of an inner event 
and to employ man as an analogy to this end.  In the case of an animal, it 
is possible to trace all its drives to the will to power; likewise all the 
functions of organic life to this one source. (§619) 
 
As Deleuze explains, by “victorious,” Nietzsche means that “the relation of force to 
force, understood conceptually, is one of domination: when two forces are related one is 
dominant and the other is dominated.”29  The will to power serves as the motor that 
drives the struggle of forces, and it is the birth of this will to power that Kubrick depicts 
so powerfully when the man-apes rise above their slavish heritage as the dominated in 
order to become masters of their world.   
While the will to power retains the possibility of being either active or reactive, it 
also has two possible “primordial qualities” of its own—it is either affirmative or 
negative.30  There is always a will present, even if it is a will that denies, that is guilt-
ridden by ressentiment and the bad conscience, or that is purely reactive based on either 
God/morality or on Nihilism.  However, as Deleuze states, “affirmation and negation 
extend beyond action and reaction because they are the immediate qualities of becoming 
itself.  Affirmation is not action but the power of becoming active, becoming active 
personified.  Negation is not simple reaction but a becoming reactive.”31  Therefore, the 
affirmative or negative qualities of the will are directly linked to the process of becoming.  
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To become the Overman, Nietzsche argues that you must learn to affirm becoming 
active, to embrace chance and chaos, to be willing to risk everything for the sake of 
transformation.  The desire for becoming has driven the progress of the human species: it 
allowed us to rise from the pre-human into the human and it is steadily moving us beyond 
the limits of the human and into a posthuman existence.  In essence, the monolith 
instantiates this desire for becoming in the man-apes, which is more apparent in the novel 
because the monolith presents Moon-Watcher with a nocturnal vision.  In this vision, 
Moon-Watcher sees himself and his tribe in a better condition of life: no longer 
emaciated, they appear plump, well-groomed, and more highly civilized.  The monolith 
teases Moon-Watcher with this image until he finally begins to feel the first faint stirrings 
of desire, of something more than the mere instinctual urges that normally govern his 
behavior.  The monolith inscribes a notion of lack in the man-apes’ brains.  While the 
man-apes cannot exhibit the actual manqué-a-être that can only truly arise along with the 
signifier, they begin to experience the first gnawing of lack—they have become 
dissatisfied with being and seek the transformative power of becoming.  In this first 
segment of the film, which features no dialogue, we witness these creatures move from a 
state of being (a state of reactive self-preservation) into a transformative, active state of 
becoming.  The man-apes embrace chance and the roll of the dice; they are willing to 
take hold of their tools (or hammers if we want to use Nietzsche’s favorite metaphor) to 
embrace the forces of chaos and smash themselves into a new form. The monolith 
actuates their desire for becoming, and we consequently see the birth of the element that 
will give rise to humanity—technology.  Simultaneously, this simple piece of technology 
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also heralds the birth of weaponry and property, for the man-apes use the weapon to 
claim the waterhole.  But, above all else, it signifies the birth of the will to power 
 The monolith provides the catalyst that drives the evolution of species, a catalyst 
that enables species to leap across evolutionary chasms that might have hindered 
evolutionary progress if not for its aid.  In “The Dawn of Man” segment, the monolith 
facilitates the apelike species in crossing an evolutionary gap to become tool-users, a gap 
that could conceivably have never been traversed without the appropriate cerebral 
modifications made possible by the presence of the monolith.  Hence, “The Dawn of 
Man” segment depicts the sowing of the seeds of the human—the monolith introduces 
perhaps the most important variable of the human: desire.  From the instantiation of this 
first desire, desire always strives towards utopian ideals, and the methods for attaining 
these utopian desires rely upon technological innovation.   
 
II.  The Human: Desire, Technology, Control  
 At the end of part one of the novel, Clarke charts the progression of human tools 
and weapons from the man-apes to the present and, at the same time, exhibits a typical 
Cold War sensibility that these weapons inevitably will lead to the end of the human:  
The spear, the bow, the gun, and finally the guided missile has given him 
[humankind] weapons of infinite range and all but infinite power.  Without 
those weapons, often though he had used them against himself, Man 
would never have conquered the world.  Into them he had put his heart and 
soul, and for ages they had served him well.  But now, as long as they 
existed, he was living on borrowed time.32  
 
While technology leads to ever higher levels of civilization and to presumably ever more 
utopian experiences for the citizenry, it also inevitably generates new methods of global 
destruction.  In Clarke’s novel, humankind must evolve because it has reached a self-
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destructive stalemate, but Kubrick foregoes such narrative connections, and the second 
section of his film jumps three million years in time to depict the exponential growth that 
has occurred between the era of the man-apes and age of space exploration.  The second 
segment of the film charts the utopian nature of technology and the new states of being 
that it opens for humankind, but it also begins to depict the controlling aspects of 
technology that arise alongside its utopian aspirations. 
 The second section of the film receives no title because Kubrick uses a match cut 
to link together the technological elements of the two sections.  In one of the most 
famous match cuts in cinematic history, Kubrick cuts from a shot of the man-ape 
throwing his bone into the air to a shot of a similarly shaped space vehicle floating 
through the cosmos between the Earth and the Moon.  This match provides a profound 
connection between the two scenes because it not only serves as an editing technique but 
also as a symbol that represents the thematic link between the two sections: the discovery 
of this simple tool or weapon provided the impetus for a historical progression that lead 
to space travel.  Without the bone club, there could be no space odysseys.  This section 
opens with images of the Earth, Sun, and Moon and the various space craft floating in the 
space between the Earth and the Moon.  The spaceships, satellites, and space stations 
gently drift in this liminal space between planetary bodies.  As Johann Strauss’s On the 
Beautiful Blue Danube (1866) languidly plays across this montage, the vehicles all seem 
to have been cut adrift and to simply be floating with no real sense of propulsion.  As 
Mario Falsetto notes, in such scenes, “2001 offer[s] up a kind of cinematic ballet” in 
which “the narrative momentum seems secondary” to the depiction of movement itself.33  
Of course, the film concerns movement on numerous levels: not just the movement in 
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zero-gravity or the propulsion systems of spacecraft but also the movement of evolution.  
The scene creates a sort of cognitive disjunction with the previous scenes of the man-apes 
because the technological leap from bone to space-station seems almost inconceivable, 
especially since “the harmony of space technology is, at first glance, free of the 
destructive violence evident in ‘The Dawn of Man.’”34  Indeed, this section depicts the 
utopian nature of technology as a force that seems to have lost its violent character in 
favor of a utopian future in which new modes of existence are opened up for the subject 
by means of space travel.   
From this “valse méchanique,” as Kuberski terms it,35 the film cuts to interior 
shots of the spacecraft carrying Dr. Heywood Floyd to the space-station that serves as a 
kind of cosmic rest stop between the Earth and the Moon.36  The space station is 
structured as a perfect circle with two spokes running through the middle that divide it 
into four equal-sized arcs.  The docking seems precarious because the space station is 
rotating, but the lilting music and nonchalant pilots make it seem like this precision feat 
of technology proves to be of little consequence.  We then are brought on board the space 
station, whose circular shape is further accentuated by Kubrick’s use of an extremely 
wide-angle lens that gives the images a slightly skewed or bent perspective at the corners.  
The décor of the space-station is distinctly Kubrickian and recalls the milk bar from A 
Clockwork Orange (1971) or the bathroom of the Overlook Hotel in The Shining (1980): 
stark white walls and bizarrely shaped furniture in vivid shades of red.  Kubrick depicts a 
variety of technological advancements: grip shoes that allow one to walk in zero gravity, 
video phones, voice-print identification systems, drinkable meals, zero-gravity toilets, 
and a space-station that rotates in order to generate its own low-level gravity.  Even in 
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these smaller instances, Kubrick keeps the film’s emphasis on the progress of technology, 
but, as we shall see, this seemingly bright technological future represents a utopia in 
which humans are reduced to the state of what Nietzsche terms “the last men,” people 
whose existence has ceased to be predicated upon struggle and who have succumbed to 
the allures of so-called “happiness.” 
Floyd stops at the space station just long enough to share a drink with some 
acquaintances and to hear gossip about the strange occurrences on the moon: 
communication has been lost with a moon base named Clavius.  The scenes aboard the 
space station also hint towards the fact that the seemingly utopian façade of the future 
still remains mired in corporate control: Pan-Am owns and operates the space shuttles 
and the space-station features a Hilton hotel.   As we see on a daily basis, Capital always 
attempts to follow and appropriate the latest technological advancements in order to not 
cede that market to newer corporations—the “logo-maze” of Gibson’s Pattern 
Recognition persists even in space.  Such instances actually highlight the fact that space 
travel has been privatized to some degree in 2001, and that the forces of postindustrial 
capitalism persist even into the seemingly utopian world of the film.   
The waltz rhythm of Strauss’s Blue Danube returns as Floyd progresses on from 
the space station to the Moon’s surface.  Indeed, the music gives the impression that we 
are a partner in a cosmic that twirls us into strange new frontiers of experience.  Dr. 
Floyd has been summoned to the Clavius base on the Moon because another monolith has 
been dug up on the Moon.  During a roundtable meeting between Dr. Floyd and the 
Clavius scientists, the film reveals that a cover story has been issued to keep the public 
from learning about the existence of the monolith.  To avoid cultural shock, the United 
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States government has issued a statement saying that Clavius has been quarantined due to 
an epidemic.  Of course, the cover story serves to mask the fact that the Clavius scientists 
have discovered a monolith buried under the surface of the Moon.  After noticing an 
electromagnetic field of untold magnitude emanating from the crater known as Tycho, 
the researchers on Clavius unearthed what turns out to be another monolith—the artifact 
has been named “TMA-1” or “Tycho Magnetic Anomaly 1.”  Evidence points to its 
having been deliberately buried on the moon four million years ago, hence marking it as 
the first hard evidence of extraterrestrial life, life that apparently exceeded the current 
technological capacities of the human race before the species had yet evolved.  After 
listening to the scientists’ gripes about the cover story, Dr. Floyd flies out to Tycho to 
perform an inspection of the monolith.  As he and the group of scientists gather in front 
of the monolith to take a picture, it begins emitting an ear-piercing screech.  As Dr. Floyd 
flails about from the pain of this sonic emission, he looks up to catch sight of the Sun and 
the Moon converging over the monolith, a shot that replicates the alignment during the 
man-ape segment. Then, Kubrick abruptly cuts to a shot of empty space that features the 
logo “Jupiter Mission Eighteen Months Later.”  Again, Kubrick provides no narrative 
connections between the segments—he forces the audience to draw their own 
connections as the film progresses. 
This second, unnamed segment of the film acts as a narrative bridge between the 
man-ape segment and the larger narrative of the film that concerns the voyage of 
Discovery One.  It further serves to highlight the banal aspects of the 2001 universe and 
to inaugurate the themes of control and computerization that will play out in the film’s 
third segment.  Philip Kuberski argues that the scenes with Dr. Floyd provide glimpses of 
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a world in which the prosaic has triumphed over the creative or, as we might say, in 
which reactive being has triumphed over active becoming:  
Kubrick dramatizes the shift in human culture by leaving the earth behind; 
from this point on, all action is confined to artificial and space 
environments.  An initial impression […] is that the realization of 
Moonwatcher’s celestial longings have emptied them of their vigor.  
Space, now inhabited and comfortably imprinted with corporate logos, has 
become an adjunct of the earth […] We see people devoid of spontaneity 
performing rather than experiencing humor, collegiality, duty, curiosity 
[…] There is a bright, hollow sound to everything and everyone in this 
artificial, indoor world.  Identity is enforced by generic protocol.37 
 
While the world has progressed infinitely in terms of civilization and technology, it has 
also regressed in terms of reality—it has become a world of simulacra.  Like the 
postmodern landscape of Pattern Recognition, the world (or worlds) of 2001 are 
populated by trademarks and peopled by individuals incapable of genuine interactions 
with their environment.  Their needs have all been satisfied, so they exist in a state 
without the possibility of struggle or becoming.  They exist in a state of reactive being 
because their lives become the performance of roles—they become characters aping the 
behavior they are expected to exhibit.38  This is not the case in Clarke’s novel in which 
the Earth remains torn apart by warring factions and Cold War ideological stalemates, but 
this geopolitical friction is completely absent from Kubrick’s film.  Indeed, Earth as 
depicted in Kubrick’s film proves to be more similar to the version of the world in 
Clarke’s Childhood’s End (1953) in which a race of alien Overlords, who just happen to 
have the physical appearance of Satan, take charge of Earth and forcefully spread peace 
across the globe.  While the world enters a so-called “Golden Age,” this utopian 
existence simultaneously destroys much of what had been beautiful and majestic about 
the human condition: “The world’s now passive, featureless, and culturally dead: nothing 
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really new has been created since the Overlords came.  The reason’s obvious.  There’s 
nothing left to struggle for and there are too many distractions and entertainments” (135).  
In Kubrick’s 2001, humankind has similarly been stripped of the need for struggle—it 
has settled into a contentment that is predicated upon its technological innovations, but 
these innovations simultaneously reduce individuals to a simulacral existence in which 
the fundamentals of the human have vanished. 
Kuberski points to the scene at the Tycho crater as an example of their simulacral 
identities and their lack of contact with reality: “When they assemble before the 
excavated monolith in its flood-lit trench, one is reminded of a movie set.  When Dr. 
Floyd sees and touches the monolith, it is through the insulation of his space helmet and 
glove.  There is no ecstatic mystical participation, as there was with the ape-men.  Like 
tourists, the scientists gather round the monument for a group photograph.”39  Humankind 
has achieved technological marvels but they no longer engage in real connections with 
their environment—they experience everything through mediating technologies and 
hence they become trapped in a state of being like the man-apes before the monolith’s 
arrival.  A new evolution is required if humankind is to reclaim the potential that has 
been lost in the synthetic textures of the postmodern world, and TMA-1 points the way to 
this evolution—it lies around Jupiter.40 
The “Jupiter Mission” segment follows the odd events aboard the Discovery One 
as it nears Jupiter.  The sounds emitted by TMA-1 actually serve as a celestial beacon 
pointing towards Jupiter, and Earth sends Discovery One to explore the endpoint of this 
transmission.  The Discovery crew consists of seven members: Dave Bowman, Frank 
Poole, the three hibernating members of the survey team, and the HAL-9000 computer, a 
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computer capable of reproducing human thought and overseeing the entire ship.  The 
HAL-9000 (“HAL” stands for “Heuristic Algorithm”) prefers to be called “Hal,” and he 
seems to exhibit independent thought and even emotions at various points in the film.   
Hal watches the events on the ship through a system of fish-eyed cameras that feature a 
bright red light in the center, which give them the appearance of eyes.  Kubrick even cuts 
frequently to shots from Hal’s perspective—he uses a fish-eyed lens to illustrate how Hal 
sees the world from a slightly skewed, mechanistic perspective.  Hal seems like a normal 
(albeit bodiless) member of the crew: he engages in conversations with Dave and Frank, 
wishes Frank a “Happy Birthday,” and plays chess with Dave, always with his soothing, 
affectless tone of voice.   
Hal’s complete control of the mission seems benevolent and flawless until he 
engages in a rather strange conversation with Dave about the bizarre circumstances 
surrounding their trip to Jupiter.  Hal wonders if Dave “might be having second thoughts 
about the mission,” but the computer admits that he might be “projecting” his “own 
concern about it” (16).  Hal proceeds to explain his consternation regarding the mission:  
Well, certainly no one could have been unaware of the very strange stories 
floating around before we left.  Rumors about something being dug up on 
the Moon.  I never gave these stories much credence, but particularly in 
view of some  of the other things that have happened I find  them difficult 
to put out of my mind.  For instance: the way all our preparations were 
kept under such tight security and the melodramatic touch of putting Drs. 
Hunger, Kimball, and Kaminsky aboard already in hibernation after four 
months of separate training on their own.  (16)41 
 
This exchange exhibits the manner in which Hal represents far more than a computer 
capable of voice interaction—he harbors a genuine intellect capable of forming his own 
opinions, questions, and forebodings about events and even rumors.  As the conversation 
progresses, a slow sense of unease develops over the scene until Hal suddenly begins 
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repeating “Just a moment” like a stuck record, which gives the impression that he is 
experiencing some sort of glitch or is processing a complex piece of information (16).  
Suddenly, he explains to Dave that he has found a fault in one of the communication 
dishes on the outside of the ship.  From this point forward, Hal begins to transform from 
the friendly, all-knowing ship computer into a malevolent force of control that (or 
perhaps who) manipulates the human element of the ship according to his own ideas 
about what is best for the mission. 
 In the sequence that follows, Dave ventures outside the ship in a space pod used 
for extravehicular maneuvers that allows him to retrieve the malfunctioning device.  No 
sound occurs in this scene except for Dave’s deep breathing inside his suit, which 
generates a claustrophobic feeling and begins to demonstrate the fragility of the voyage’s 
human element.  Dave brings the malfunctioning part back on board, but he and Frank 
prove incapable of discovering any faults in the mechanism.  Hal proposes that they 
return the part to the satellite dish and allow it to fail in order to track down the source of 
the error.42  Bewildered, Dave and Frank contact Earth to discuss the situation, and Earth 
concludes that they should proceed with Hal’s plan.  But they also caution that the twin 
HAL-9000 unit on Earth has determined that the device is indeed intact and that the error 
lays with Hal on the Discovery.  Dave asks if Hal can explain the discrepancy between 
his calculations and those of the twin computer on Earth, “Well, I don’t think there’s any 
question about it.  It can only be attributable to human error.  This sort of thing has 
cropped up before, and it has always been due to human error” (18).  Dave and Frank 
proceed to have a secret conversation about disconnection Hal if he proves to be 
malfunctioning outside of the computer’s hearing in one of the space pods, but a shot 
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through Hal’s fish-eyed lens reveals that Hal is capable of reading their lips, at which 
point the film cuts to black and the intermission begins.   
 After the intermission, the film features an exterior shot of Discovery moving 
through space, and Kubrick plunges us back into the claustrophobia of extravehicular 
space maneuvers as Frank replaces the satellite component—again the scene features no 
sound other than his breathing.  Suddenly, the pod begins rotating all by itself and 
lowering its arms in an attack position, after which a series of rapid, jarring cuts highlight 
Hal’s eye on the outside of the pod.  Aboard the Discovery, Dave watches as Frank flies 
off into space with the line to his oxygen tank cut while the unmanned pod spins wildly 
off into nothingness.43  Again, as with the scientists on the moon, Dave remains 
disconnected from his environment: he only experiences these tragic events secondhand 
through a monitor.  While Dave exits the ship to recover Frank’s body, Hal turns off the 
life support systems for the three hibernating crewmembers.  Then, when Dave returns, 
Hal refuses to open the pod bay doors for him, and he explains, “This mission is too 
important for me to allow you to jeopardize it” (24).  The film never reveals why Hal 
began to malfunction—we only witness his actions, but his motives can be presumed 
from his statements.44  After witnessing Frank and Dave’s discussion in the space pod, 
Hal begins to fear that the mission might fail, so he decides to erase the human variables 
from the equation because human error often accounts for failures within computer 
calculations and predictions—it was the unpredictable quantity of human desire that led 
to the faulty predictions in Delany’s Triton after all. 
Dave manages to save himself by blowing himself out of his space pod and into 
Discovery’s airlock.  Then, the film cuts to a grimly determined Dave who begins the 
  243 
 
process of shutting down Hal, and, like any human facing execution, Hal tries to reason 
with Dave in a manner that at least mimics the intonations of fear.  Ultimately, Hal even 
resorts to confessing his fear, “I’m afraid, Dave.  My mind is going. I can feel it” (26).  
Inside a glowing red room, Dave methodically turns off the various databanks that 
represent Hal’s memory and cognitive centers.  As Hal’s voice slowly degrades, we 
witness a mind slowly dying, until Hal returns to reciting his initial introduction speech, 
which ends with his heart- wrenching rendition of the song “Daisy” as his voice slowly 
degrades and then ceases altogether.  In his last moments, Hal’s pleading seems to 
indicate that he indeed has feelings and hence represents a true artificial life form.  In 
Delany’s Triton, computers became capable of controlling subject behavior to a certain 
degree and of reprogramming an individual’s human variables to create new identities.  
In the universe of 2001, humans actually can program the human variables into a 
machine so precisely that it can begin to function just like a human.  As Rodney Brooks 
explains, “we are machines, and from that I conclude that there is no reason, in principle, 
that it is not possible to build a machine from silicon and steel that has genuine emotions 
and consciousness.”45  Brooks proceeds to argue that what frightens humankind about 
robots and artificial intelligence is not their potential to develop autonomous 
consciousness but the fact that they reveal humans to be nothing more than machines in 
themselves.  In essence, then, Hal reveals this essentially mechanistic nature of the 
human—his ability to perfectly mimic and perhaps experience human emotions 
demonstrates the manner in which humanity truly becomes programmable by the society 
of control.  But while computers begin to act like humans, humans begin to operate like 
machines.  As we saw earlier, humans have devolved in this vision of the future because 
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of the mediating technologies that separate them from their environments.  Indeed, Hal 
represents the most sympathetic being in the film because the human characters seldom 
(if ever) exhibit anything approximating genuine emotion—they have been programmed 
by the society of control to respond logically like a machine without recourse to desire, 
fear, love, or any other emotion.  Hence, they remain trapped at the level of being 
because, like a computer, they remain incapable of breaking the programming that orders 
their existence. 
In essence, the “Jupiter Mission” segment reveals the world of 2001 to be the 
society of control, similar to the ones we have already seen depicted in Ghost in the Shell, 
Trouble on Triton, Pattern Recognition, and Spook Country.  Examples of control abound 
in scenes concerning Heywood Floyd: voice print identification systems and government 
cover-ups, to name only the two most explicit ones.  But Hal’s ever-watchful eye and 
virtually omnipotent control of Discovery exemplifies Deleuze’s vision of the control 
society.  Undoubtedly, Hal recalls Michel Foucault’s discussions of the panopticon, 
which acts as the paradigmatic structure of disciplinary societies, but control societies 
perfect the panoptic gaze by decent ring and spreading it throughout society.  Like our 
current world, which is increasingly monitored by cameras on every corner and in the 
hands of every citizen, Discovery represents a space in which one’s actions are never free 
from the all-seeing eye of control.  Furthermore, Hal not only oversees the crewmembers 
but also controls what information they receive, “As the segment unfolds, HAL’s 
surveillance capabilities (d)evolve towards totality […]  HAL knows best, and he sees 
with the greatest clarity.  HAL not only sees/oversees Bowman and Poole, but he also 
controls what they see.”46  Rhodes points to the fact that HAL always controls the images 
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and information that Dave and Frank receive even to the point of barring Dave from 
witnessing the space pod attack Frank.  He further demonstrates that this control extends 
beyond HAL, because 
Disconnecting HAL does not remove oversight; it simply transfers the 
power of surveillance to another.  Initially it comes in the form of a pre-
recorded message from Dr. Heywood Floyd, who stares into the camera as 
he announces the real reason for the Jupiter Mission.  His eyes lock on 
Bowman to announce that another force has been monitoring earth.  Keep 
watching the skies, Bowman, because the skies have been watching us 
since the very beginning.47 
 
Of course, Rhodes’s last statement here echoes the final lines of Christian Nyby’s The 
Thing from Another World: “Keep watching the skies.”48  2001 is not as paranoid a film 
as this comparison or Rhodes’s comments might suggest, but surveillance and control 
remain a subtle undertone throughout.  But the society of 2001 does not rely upon the 
feeble 18th- and 19th-century disciplinary modalities of power but instead operates 
according to the paradigm of control.  As Foucault explains, the panopticon is “a form of 
architecture that makes possible a mind-over-mind-type of power; a sort of institution 
that serves equally well, it would seem, for schools, hospitals, prisons, reformatories, 
poorhouses, and factories […] The panopticon is the utopia of a society and a type of 
power that is basically the society we are familiar with at present, a utopia that was 
actually realized.”49  And we could say that the regime works as a perfect paradigm for 
organizing a spaceship as well.  Like the panopticon, Discovery represents a utopian 
space, a space that features a computer capable of attending to your every need.  But this 
utopianism comes at a price, and, as we saw in chapter three, computers perfect the 
disciplinary/panoptic society and transform it into the society of control.  Whereas 
Deleuze’s essay on control foresees a society in which one’s access to various spaces can 
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be granted or forbidden by computer systems, 2001 takes this a step further by depicting 
a computer that not only restricts and manipulates information or blocks off particular 
spaces (the pod bay doors, for example) but that also becomes capable of simply shutting 
down life support systems.  Hence, Dave encounters pure, unvarnished control, and he 
finds no alternative for further existence except through a transcendence of the bodily 
form, a transcendence that the monolith proves happy to grant him.  Dave must “shift to a 
higher structure” like Tetsuo in Akira, Kusanagi in Ghost in the Shell, and Shinji in 
Evangelion. 
 
III.  Beyond the Star Gate: Infinite Becoming and the Posthuman Condition 
After Dave disconnects Hal, a video appears of Heywood Floyd explaining the 
secret reason for the Discovery mission.  After this video ends, Kubrick abruptly cuts to 
the final section of the film, “Jupiter and Beyond the Infinite.” This final section exists 
beyond linear narrative logic and instead becomes a flow of spectacular and surrealistic 
images.  Kubrick opens this last segment with a shot of Jupiter—the sun appears tiny and 
insignificant as the scene depicts Discovery hovering above the nightside of Jupiter with 
a giant monolith twisting in space above it.  A lone space pod exits the front of 
Discovery, and then the film cuts to a shot of the planets aligned with Jupiter, repeating 
the earlier alignments in the film.  As the monolith floats across this line of planets, a 
series of lights and stars begin rushing towards the camera as Dave enters what is known 
as “the star gate.”50  As with most aspects of the film, this series of images never receives 
an explanation, and the film never refers to it as a “star gate”; indeed, this final section of 
the film features no dialogue.  But Clarke gives it this name in the novel, and critics of 
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the film generally maintain this term in their discussions.  Whereas Clarke’s novel 
explicitly explains the occurrences in the final part of his story, Kubrick’s film provides 
such an iconic cinematic experience because it chooses to structure itself in a manner that 
actually belies structure: it revels in disjunction and ambiguity, particularly in this final 
segment.  But Kubrick’s use of images that resist strict interpretation fits well with the 
motive of these scenes: they are depicting the human as it moves into a posthuman state 
that borders on divinity.  In 2001’s final moments, the viewer becomes like an amoeba 
trying to see through the eyes of God.   
As Dave travels through the star gate, Kubrick alternates shots of stars, lights, and 
other galactic wonders with still images of Dave’s face contorted into various expressions 
of disbelief, horror, and wonder.  These still images of Dave’s face give way to extreme 
close-ups of his eye as he witnesses various space phenomena never before witnessed by 
humankind.  What Dave experiences is more than an acid-freak’s dream come true—it is 
nebulas giving birth to universes, black holes sucking light out of the cosmos, supernovas 
spewing out the entire contents of the periodic table, fields of stars beyond human 
comprehension, and a general closeness to the universe with which humankind’s brain 
was not meant to deal, and thus Dave must be pushed beyond the limits of the human.   
Eventually, Dave begins to encounter phenomena that perhaps point to some 
higher form of intelligence.  For example, at one point, he witnesses a plane of lights 
spread out against the stars with a series of glowing and pulsing polyhedrons floating 
across the surface.  He travels across valleys, mountains, and suns that could easily 
provide the backdrop for some alien civilization.   Of course, in the film, Dave never 
encounters aliens per se, yet he no doubt finds evidence of a higher intelligence, an 
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intelligence of which he becomes a constituent part at the film’s end.  Clarke’s series of 
novels explain that the monoliths represent technology from an alien civilization that has 
scoured the universe for millions of years in search of life forms that have the capacity to 
develop intelligence: “…And Because, in all the galaxy, they had found nothing more 
precious than Mind, they encouraged its dawning everywhere.  They became farmers in 
the fields of stars; they sowed, and sometimes they reaped.  And sometimes, 
dispassionately, they had to weed.”51  But, in many ways, Kubrick’s film remains far 
more provocative because it leaves us wondering whether Dave has encountered aliens or 
whether he has possibly made contact with some sort of deity that drives evolution.  As 
Carolyn Geduld points out, “the easiest sensible interpretation of the slab [the monolith], 
disregarding Clarke’s is to call it a religious symbol.  Kubrick, however, has pointed out 
that alien technology would probably look strange enough to appear godlike to humans 
on Earth.”52  In essence, the film leaves open the possibility that Dave attains oneness 
with God and that these images represent his mind evolving into a divine state of 
consciousness.   
As Deleuze argues, “Kubrick is renewing the theme of the initiatory journey 
because every journey in the world is an exploration of the brain.”53  In effect, then, 2001 
proves to be a sort of strange, cosmic bildungsroman in which Dave journeys towards a 
state of psychic maturity through the evolution of his consciousness and his consequent 
communal interaction with the entirety of the cosmos.  Dave journeys not just to Jupiter 
but also into the depths of his cerebral makeup which the monolith alters in order to allow 
him to become one with the universe. Flaxman and Lambert explain, “if the brain is a 
plane of immanence or consistency, then we might understand its function through 
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networks of images themselves. The brain is a screen, Deleuze says, but the screen, the 
cinema, is also a brain, an organization of images and memories whose connections 
(regular or irrational) comprise an ‘image of thought.’”54  What is the “image of thought” 
projected onto the screen at the end of 2001?  It is literally the evolution of Dave 
Bowman’s brain, a “mental image,” in Deleuzian terms, of how the monolith alters not 
only Dave’s brain but his entire state of being—he is reduced to the body without organs, 
a plane of pure immanence from which he can restructure (or perhaps deconstruct) 
himself into a new cosmic (or perhaps even divine) form of existence. 
 Finally, Dave arrives—if one can use such a word because Dave has most likely 
moved beyond places in any concrete sense of the term—in a strange white room 
decorated in a Louis XVI style where he witnesses himself at various stages of life.  Here, 
Dave escapes from time and his body: he watches himself wasting away through various 
stages of old age, each of which he becomes, until finally at the verge of death the 
monolith returns to beckon him onwards to a new life, a life beyond the reach of decay, 
beyond the limits of knowledge, and certainly “beyond the infinite.”  Thus, Dave is 
reborn in the form of the star child, a child because he is no longer subject to temporal 
constraints but also because he has become like the child in Nietzsche’s three 
metamorphoses—he has cast off the constraints of society and slavish morality and has 
been born anew into a state of pure becoming.  In the final shot of the film, the star child 
returns to Earth, and we see it floating in space above the Earth.  As Deleuze explains, the 
sphere of the child coincides with the globe of the Earth to point the way for the new 
evolution of humankind: “At the end of Space Odyssey, it is in consequence of a fourth 
dimension that the sphere of the foetus and the sphere of the earth have a chance of 
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entering into a new, incommensurable, unknown relation, which could convert death into 
a new life.”55  Thus, Dave’s “initiatory journey” is complete; he has reached out “beyond 
the infinite” and matured into a new realm of knowledge and consciousness.  As Arthur 
C. Clarke’s sequel (2010: Odyssey Two) makes clear,  Dave can now interact with the 
earth (and all of the universe) at a very basic, yet infinitely complex level, that is direct 
and without interferences such as language or the ego—he can literally beam his presence 
or voice between points almost instantaneously.  As the embodiment of cosmic 
awareness, the monolith aids Dave Bowman in achieving a state that humankind never 
dreamed of: oneness with the stars.  For, in the novel, when Dave states “The thing’s 
hollow—it goes on forever—and—oh my God—it’s full of stars!,” he means not just the 
monolith but himself as well.56  For at the film’s end, Dave’s Lacanian “lack” has been 
filled permanently; it has been filled with “stars,” with the cosmos itself.  He has moved 
beyond the realm of the body and into a potentially blissful realm of cosmic beauty, total 
communication, and limitless knowledge. 
 In effect, Dave embraces the chaos of the universe over the rigid organization of 
the human form to become a body without organs.  Or, he might be said to embrace a 
higher structure since, of course, chaos theory posits that chaos represents an intense 
order too complex for the human mind to comprehend.  But is 2001’s image of human 
evolution truly libratory?  Andrei Tarkovsky “disliked it [2001] as cold and sterile,” and 
hence tried to create a science fiction film that truly depicted human emotion: the result, 
of course, was his classic adaptation of Stanislaw Lem’s Solaris.57  While 2001 does 
remain cold in the sense that the viewer cannot glean any real sense of Dave’s desires, it 
nonetheless provides the perfect example to begin our exploration of disembodiment as 
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the next evolutionary step.  Gilles Deleuze actually first evokes the body without organs 
in The Logic of Sense (1969) during an exploration of Nietzsche’s relation to the Pre-
Socratics, whose philosophy Deleuze reads as “schizophrenic.”1  In the two volumes of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus), Deleuze further 
develops the term in conjunction with Félix Guattari as a symbol for describing 
schizophrenic experiences.  Deleuze explains that organs are not the enemies of the 
organless body:  
The organs themselves, however, are not the real enemy of the organless 
body.  Organism is the enemy, in other words, any organization which 
imposes on the organs a regime of totalization, collaboration, synergy, 
integration, inhibition and disjunction.  Only in this sense are the organs 
indeed the enemy of the organless body, which exerts a repulsive action 
on them and treats them like instruments of persecution.  On the other 
hand, the organless body attracts the organs, appropriates them for itself, 
and makes them function in a regime other than the one imposed by the 
organism…2 
 
In effect, Dave moves beyond the regime of organism to become pure consciousness.  
Generally, to achieve the state of the body without organs entails reaching a state of stasis 
or death, but for Dave who has moved entirely beyond the realm of bodies, it means an 
ascendance to a condition of pure self beyond the constraints of any physical limitations.  
Indeed, the monolith acts as a perfect symbolic representation of the body without 
organs, for, as Deleuze and Guattari explain,  
In order to resist organ-machines, the body without organs presents its 
smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface as a barrier.  In order to resist 
linked, connected, or interrupted flows, it sets up a counterflow of 
amorphous, undifferentiated fluid.  In order to resist using words 
                                               
1 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas 
(1969; New York: Columbia UP, 1990) 128-9. 
2 Gilles Deleuze, “Schizophrenia and Society,” Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995, 
trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina, ed. David Lapoujade (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006: 17-28) 20. 
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composed of articulated phonetic units, it utters only gasps and cries that 
are sheer unarticulated blocks of sound.3   
 
The shiny, black, geometrically perfect surface of the monolith presents just such an 
undifferentiated, unknowable mass, and its utterances manifest themselves only in 
dissonant sounds or creepy choral arrangements. Like Tarkovsky, one can read 2001 as a 
cold depiction of Darwinian evolution, or one can read it as an attempt to imagine 
something beyond the organization of the human form, beyond the lack that language, 
hierarchical organizations, and repressive social systems force upon the individual.  In 
Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari pose a fundamental question: “Is it really necessary 
or desirable to submit to such repression?”58  The organization of desiring-machines 
inflicts pain upon the body, for “Desiring-machines make us an organism; but at the very 
heart of this production, within the very production of this production, the body suffers 
from being organized in this way, from not having some other sort of organization or no 
organization at all.”59  The monolith represents this other form of organization, a 
completely free-flowing, horizontal (not vertical and hierarchical) organization that 
allows lines of flight to exist at any given moment.  The monolith inducts Dave into a 
similar existence as he casts off his desiring machines to become a full body without 
organs, an empty slate upon which his new existence as the star child can be inscribed 
without reference to repressive systems.   
In essence, this final section  provides a paradigmatic example of what Gilles 
Deleuze terms a “cinema of the brain” in which “the world itself is a brain, there is an 
identity of brain and world, as in the great circular and luminous table in Doctor 
Strangelove, the giant computer in 2001: A Space Odyssey, the Overlook hotel in The 
                                               
3 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 9. 
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Shining.”60  While Hal may provide the initial example of the “world as brain” in the 
film, the entire filmic image becomes a depiction of Dave Bowman’s brain in the final 
section.  The final sequence achieves what Gregg Lambert and Gregory Flaxman call 
“the full cereberalization of the cinema,” a cereberalization that allows the audience to 
directly experience the evolutionary changes in Dave Bowman’s consciousness.61  While 
discussing the concept of the “world-brain” in Kubrick’s films, Deleuze explains the limit 
that is posited by such a cinema:  
The identity of world and brain, the automaton, does not form a whole, but 
rather a limit, a membrane which puts an outside and an inside in contact, 
makes them present to each other, confronts them or makes them clash.  
The inside is psychology, the past, involution, a whole psychology of 
depths which excavate the brain.  The outside is the cosmology of 
galaxies, the future, evolution, a whole supernatural which makes the 
world explode.62 
 
The end of 2001 depicts Dave Bowman’s movement from the inside to the outside—we 
watch as the heterotopian space of the film causes our paltry visions of the universe to 
explode.  No longer is Dave to be governed by bodily limitations, temporal demarcations, 
and a psychology that ends at the borders of the ego.  In effect, Dave moves beyond a 
world governed by logic:  
He is forced to use a small pod in section four, where he will enter a world 
devoid of logic.  HAL’s disconnection, therefore, means the end of logic 
as we know it…Bowman’s trip being one beyond logic, where no human 
mind can understand what is happening […] The final shots present the 
symbol of the new baby, the Starchild.  It represents, within the chain of 
meanings associated with previous metaphors, the possibility of a new 
human being possessing a new intelligence that can understand the new 
illogicality of space and time because they are perceived as changeable, 
rather than as coherent or immutable parameters.63  
 
Kubrick’s film breaks logical narrative connections in a manner akin to La Jetée and 
Primer in order to visualize this state beyond logic.  While 2001 remains tied to the 
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spectacle in the tradition of Méliès, it still breaks with traditional structures in order to 
imagine a state beyond the strictures of narrative and time.  Hence, Dave manages to 
attain a state usually accorded only to deities: an extemporal, omnipresent existence that 
allows communication not only with other humans but with the cosmos itself.  The 
monolith embodies this experience as a black void of screeching dissonance.  When the 
monolith appears for the second time and subjects Dr. Floyd and the other scientists to a 
piercing burst of sound, it seems to not lead to direct evolution, yet it paves the way for 
evolution by pointing towards Jupiter using its sonic assault.  This audio burst represents 
the seeming chaos that communion with the monolith and the cosmos holds.  By pointing 
the way to Jupiter, the monolith incites humankind’s desire for knowledge and meaning, 
but, as we saw in Chapter Two, desire remains predicated upon lack as long as one 
remains subject to the society of control.  But Dave transcends the bodily form and 
becomes the body without organs in order to transmute his desire into the will to power, a 
motor for infinite becoming instead of an Oedipal lack that impedes his progression. 
 
IV.  Conclusion: Equating the Human: Encounters with the Heterotopian 
 In Nietzsche’s prologue to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra decries the 
coming of the last men, men who have achieved a utopian existence and happiness based 
on the eradication of struggle.  They strive neither for too much nor too little, but instead 
have “invented happiness” by always dwelling in the mean between two extremes.64  
When Zarathustra attempts to warn the townspeople about the coming of this 
“despicable” race of humans, the townspeople misunderstand him and ask him to teach 
them how to become these last men.65  Indeed, to many people, the world of the last men 
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might seem idyllic, yet Zarathustra (or Nietzsche) argues that this world robs us of 
essential aspects of the human: struggle, desire, and becoming.  As Nietzsche’s example 
suggests, utopias learn to manipulate the variables of the human into a social equation 
that provides the greatest possible contentment to the largest demographic of individuals.   
 Arthur C. Clarke’s other evolutionary epic, Childhood’s End, features just such a 
utopian transformation of humankind, a transformation in which the majority of the 
human race literally become “the last men.”  The novel concerns a race of aliens known 
as the Overlords who appear above the major cities of Earth and eventually reveal the 
paltry role that humankind plays in the affairs of the universe.  As Clarke’s novel 
elucidates, utopia leads towards peace and plenty but also towards the death of the 
human.  When the Overlords bring global peace to Earth in Childhood’s End, humankind 
loses its sense of struggle: “I fear that the human race has lost its initiative.  It has peace, 
it has plenty—but it has no horizons.”66  When humankind achieves peace and when it is 
provided with endless distractions, then it loses its desire for becoming, for reaching 
beyond the present into the future.  On the Earth of Childhood’s End, this leads to the 
creation of a colony called “New Athens” where artists and scientists try to reignite the 
human impulse for advancement and culture.  But soon the humans learn that the 
Overlords are merely servants of an even more powerful entity known as the Overmind, 
which seeks out worlds and then spurs the evolution of their children into a new form of 
being.  Initially, the children of Earth develop psychic powers and begin taking mental 
journeys through the universe, but soon they evolve beyond this and leave their bodies 
behind.  After shedding their physical forms, the children become united into one 
consciousnesses—Childhood’s End was one of Hideaki Anno’s inspirations for Neon 
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Genesis Evangelion.  The parents of the children are left behind with no future—much 
like the characters in Alfonso Cuarón’s Children of Men—and they soon destroy 
themselves with nuclear weapons.  Like Nietzsche’s discussion of the last men, 
Childhood’s End demonstrates how the human must rid itself of utopian orderliness and 
embrace chaos the heterotopian if it is to achieve new states of becoming. 
 Of course, there are dangers inherent in such forms of evolution because, as 
Kevin Stoehr argues, “2001 is not necessarily a celebration of the idea of any evolution or 
advancement toward such a form of existence, since the dangers inherent in this type of 
transcendence (i.e., the surpassing of the need for physical embodiment) are also evoked 
in the film.”67  For instance, as Stoehr elaborates, the idea of existing beyond the body 
destroys our sense of being because it robs us of the context within which we define 
ourselves: “those who pretend to locate themselves somehow beyond the borders of their 
present life-situation are left only with nothing in particular—an absence of meaning and 
value.”68  Stoehr makes a valid point, but he also misunderstands the critical apparatus of 
science fiction.  While works such as Kubrick’s definitely attempt to imagine alternative 
forms of existence, they more directly comment upon our present systems of thought—
they are texts that allow us to make first contact with spaces of radical otherness in a way 
that incites us to question our most basic concepts of reality and self.  Kubrick’s 2001 
exemplifies this critical function of science fiction because it depicts the transcendence of 
a utopian space in order to attain communication with a heterotopian space in which 
radical difference can reactivate struggle and becoming.  The heterotopian exposes our 
traditional, stable images of the universe to the chaos of multiplicity—it opens the realms 
of chance in which becoming can thrive.  In Kubrick’s film and in Clarke’s novel, society 
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has progressed to the point where further development remains impossible while the 
individual remains tied to the limits of the body, so Dave must seek transcendence 
through disembodiment.  This disembodiment exposes him directly to chaos in a manner 
at which the human mind would balk—the heterotopian represents a sublime moment, as 
Kant defines it in Critique of the Power of Judgment, in which reason fails because it 
cannot fathom the complexity of chaos.  Hence, whereas the traditional fictional narrative 
might expose us to the beautiful, to the orderliness and structure of the utopian, science 
fiction brings us into contact with the heterotopian, a sublime space that shreds our 
concepts and decimates our attempts to impose structure and coherence.  By doing so, 
science fiction allows us to not simply conceive of other states of being but to use our 
contact with the heterotopian to engage in a critique of our traditional theoretical 
discourses and to generate new theoretical concepts that can displace or advance existing 
critical strands.  In essence, science fiction allows critical theory to move beyond its state 
of reactive being and to embrace a state of radical becoming in which thought can 
struggle past its conventional restrictions and thrive upon a new plane of immanence. 
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